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The analysis intends to clarify whether higher education institutions place as much value on internal transparency as on external transparency. This study aims to analyze the university budgeting process as a reflection of internal transparency. It also aims to identify the weaknesses of the budgeting process regarding transparency in order to improve decision-making.

A case study that applies mixed methods – documentary analysis, observations and interviews – has been conducted. To study internal transparency, the model of three levels of transparency of Biondi and Lapsley (2014) has been applied to the budgeting process of a university. Then, the results have been compared to the external transparency of this institution.

While external transparency is achieved, internal transparency in the budgeting process is far from optimal in the case of study. An improvement in transparency of the budget process can promote the engagement of stakeholders in the process and achieve better governance.

The general inductive approach is not as strong as other approaches in the area of theory or model development. However, it does provide a simple approach for deriving findings linked to this research’s questions.

Trust issues and external accountability appear to be more relevant than internal transparency for universities. However, improving the three levels of transparency along the budgeting process could motivate collegiate members to reinforce accountability, as it requires them to effectively communicate their actions and decisions to their represented.

This paper seeks to situate transparency as an attribute of university governance, contributing to the scarce literature on transparency, internal and external, in the university. The study compares the approach of this university to external transparency – which relates to accountability – with internal transparency – a concept that links to corporate governance. This study uses the novel lens of Biondi and Lapsley model (2014) to study internal transparency, focussing on university budgeting as a key management tool.

In recent international debates on auditing regulation, Spain has assumed a real prominence as a claimed practical example of where a policy of mandatory audit firm rotation did not work and was duly abolished. This study aims to provide an analysis of the implementation and subsequent removal of mandatory audit firm rotation in Spain in the 1990s.

This takes the form of historical analysis; the evidence in the paper derives from congressional hearings, financial newspapers and documents produced by the professional associations of auditors in Spain.

This paper demonstrates that at no stage was mandatory rotation of audit firms ever enforced on Spanish auditors. Further, the revision and subsequent removal of the Spanish law on mandatory audit firm rotation emerge as a rather politicized process, with no evident reference being made in the process of legislative reform to Spanish auditing experiences. The analysis also reveals that at the very time that Spain was being cited internationally for rejecting mandatory audit firm rotation, Spanish political parties and regulators were debating whether to “re‐introduce” such a regulation.

The clear implication of the paper is that considerable caution needs to be taken in today's international‐auditing arena, when analyzing the standpoints and claims made by professional associations and the evidence they provide to support their arguments for and against regulatory reform.