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Money laundering is the only way of getting the proceeds of criminal activity into the economy. Without it the criminal cannot profit from his endeavour. So, governments worldwide are trying to find new ways of preventing criminals profiting from their crimes. They are using hard law, they are using outreach provisions. They are creating new areas of risk for those engaged in all manner of trade both domestically and with any international aspect. This paper shows why.

‘The activities of professional advisers, particularly lawyers has, in the past, caused considerable concern in the field of money‐laundering activities, due in no small part to the existence of the secrecy generated by the attorney‐client privilege.’

The purpose of this analysis is to present the history of anti‐money laundering efforts in the United States as it applies both domestically and internationally, and demonstrate how this new legislation, if enacted, will mark a dramatic change in the customary treatment of international financial transactions and to international long‐arm jurisdiction and law enforcement. If enacted as proposed, this legislation may provide the tools necessary to achieve substantial progress in this effort.

The objective of this paper is to challenge some of the rhetoric pertaining to the “harm” caused by “dirty” money infiltrating into the “legitimate economy.” The arguments regarding the impact of dirty money have been used to justify enhancements to law enforcement powers, and increasingly invasive investigative strategies and intelligence gathering regimes.

The paper reviews the literature pertaining to the intersection between “dirty money” and “legitimate business” and looks at how some of the most notorious criminal operations have been handled by the press and the courts. The paper examines corporate complicity in situations involving premeditated, ongoing criminal conduct and discusses two specific ways in which societies acknowledge and accommodate criminality within the operation of these corporations.

The paper argues that one must never minimize the amount of legitimate business that involves dirty money or uses dirty opportunities or was once dirty and is now legitimate or was legitimate and is now dirty.

The pretense of a clear separation between criminality and corporate operations is “useful” and is occasionally correct – but not as the norm and ought not to be the operating law enforcement expectation.

The paper encourages the reader to question the easily repeated claims about the financial threats from stereotypical forms of “organized crime,” while either dismissing or re‐defining the equally serious, or more serious, activities of professions (lawyers, accountants, bankers, politicians, government officials, corporate CEOs, etc.) operating supposedly legitimately.