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Several studies have examined the impact of market fundamentals on house prices. However, the effect of economic sectors on housing prices is limited despite the existence of two-speed economies in some countries, such as South Africa. Therefore, this study aims to examine the impact of mining activities on house prices. This intends to understand the direction of house price spreads and their duration so policymakers can provide remediation to the housing market disturbance swiftly.

This study investigated the effect of mining activities on house prices in South Africa, using quarterly data from 2000Q1 to 2019Q1 and deploying an auto-regressive distributed lag model.

In the short run, we found that changes in mining activities, as measured by the contribution of this sector to gross domestic product, impact the housing price of mining towns directly after the first quarter and after the second quarter in the non-mining cities. Second, we found that inflationary pressure is instantaneous and impacts house prices in mining towns only in the short run but not in the long run, while increasing housing supply will help cushion house prices in both submarkets. This study extended the analysis by examining a possible spillover in house prices between mining and non-mining towns. This study found evidence of spillover in housing prices from mining towns to non-mining towns without any reciprocity. In the long run, a mortgage lending rate and housing supply are significant, while all the explanatory variables in the non-mining towns are insignificant.

These results reveal that enhanced mining activities will increase housing prices in mining towns after the first quarter, which is expected to spill over to non-mining towns in the next quarter. These findings will inform housing policymakers about stabilising the housing market in mining and non-mining towns. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to measure the contribution of mining to house price spillover.

The current paper aims to address the management dynamics of civil society organisations (CSOs) in volatile contexts. Along with analysing CSOs’ management dynamics at a general level, it also offers specific insights into their management strategies in response to COVID-19 pandemic.

This study uses a qualitative research design, where in-depth case studies are undertaken with four CSOs operating in post-conflict volatile Sub-Saharan African economies of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Findings revealed that multiple stakeholder management plays an important role in social value creation by CSOs. The findings further state that, in volatile contexts, CSOs appear to have more legitimacy than state functionaries due to their capabilities in dealing with political pressures and conflict sensitivities. The findings also revealed that case CSOs operating in Liberia and Sierra Leone were quick to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic by adjusting their working routines accordingly by switching to online working where possible and repurposing their management strategies. This repurposing of management strategies focussed on minimising economic disruptions caused by COVID-19 and continuing to create social value by helping youth and farmers particularly.

This paper contributes to the extant literature by being one of the first studies, highlighting the specificities of CSO management in volatile (especially Sub-Saharan African post-conflict) contexts and contributes to the literature streams on multiple stakeholder management and social value creation. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the current paper is also one the first study to address the management strategies of case CSOs in response to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The purpose of this study is to examine the politics, political economy, and fallout of hawkish regulatory policy on prescription drugs in Nigeria. Hawkish regulatory policy on prescription drug in Nigeria, such as opioid analgesics, is a very complex and multifaceted one, which usually involves the interplay of many factors and parties.

Policy manuals, official government gazettes (legislations, regulations, Acts and decrees), academic literature and a direct ethnographic observation of events surrounding the regulation of prescription drugs were reviewed and engaged.

The results revealed that Nigerian and global political economy and politics interface to define the direction of the new restrictive opioid policy, with resultant friction between prohibition and consumption. The reviews showed that the overarching “get-tough” and “repressive” policy are not necessarily founded on empirical evidence of an increase in prescription drug sales or use, but more as a product of the interplay of both internal and external politics and the prevailing socioeconomic order.

Instead of borrowing extensively from or being influenced by repressive Western drug laws and perspectives, Nigerian policymakers on prescription opioids should take control of the process by drawing up a home-grown policy that is less intrusive and punitive in nature for better outcomes. A mental sea change is required to understand the intrigues of Western power in Nigeria’s politics and political economy to avoid the continuous symptomatic failure of drug policy.

The politics and economic influence of the United Nations, USA and Western powers, as well as the axiom of moral panic of prescription drugs scares within the Nigerian environment, are particularly significant in the making of the emerging hawkish policy on prescription drugs in Nigeria.