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This paper aims to investigate the association between International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) effort due to higher levels of material adjustments and audit fees. In addition, this paper tests whether these associations differ between industry specialist auditors and non-specialist auditors.

The authors measure IFRS effort by using differences between local GAAP and IFRS. More specifically, they measure the differences in the balances of accounts that are prepared under IFRS as opposed to the previously used Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) standards. They posit that higher material adjustments and more risk to fair presentation of financial statements require additional accounting and auditing effort (“IFRS effort”).

The authors find that audit fees are higher when accounting standards are more material and complex at an aggregate level. Nevertheless, not all standards are equally complex and/or material and not all individual standards contribute to higher audit fees. In addition, the results show that the positive association between IFRS effort and audit fees is more pronounced when firms are audited by city-level industry specialists than by non-industry specialists.

Overall, the results are consistent with the prediction of increasing audit fees for firms requiring higher levels of IFRS effort compared to firms requiring lower levels of IFRS effort. The results contribute to the understanding that not all IFRS are equally complex and, thereby, the standards require different levels of auditor effort. Isolating specific standards based on materiality/risk levels is informative to standard setters for standard setting, standard implementation and post-implementation review of standards.

The main objective of the study is to ascertain the level of independence and the effectiveness of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) members of Islamic banks in Bangladesh. This is because only SSB members are empowered to oversee and certify the overall business functions of Islamic banks.

This paper implements qualitative case research approach to explore the research objective in the context of Bangladesh. We applied purposeful and snowball sampling tactics for selecting respondents. By using a semi-structured questionnaire and face-to-face interviews, we collect data from SSB members, central bank executives and experts in Islamic banking and Shariah governance.

The study finds that majority Islamic banks' SSB's positions are similar to the Board of Directors (BOD) of the banks. Next, this study finds that in recruiting/selecting SSB members, some banks do not follow the guidelines of the central bank. This study finds mixed evidence regarding the independence of the members of the SSB. Most of the respondents opined that SSBs do not have power; in some cases, members of SSB are not independent and seeming powerless as BOD selects and recruits them. In contrast, they are dependent on management in respect of strategy implementation.

The study significantly contributed to the national and global regulatory bodies by identifying an important governance determinant of Islamic banks that is the independence of SSB members, which is highly important for both Shariah functions, and to enhance the trust level of the stakeholders. This study makes a theoretical contribution by documenting the violation of stakeholder theory and agency theory in recruiting SSB members by BOD's choice. The lack of SSB members' independence has an impact on Shariah legitimacy of the Islamic banks which is contradictory with the notion of legitimacy theory. This study recommends the central bank to ensure the independence of the SSB and central bank should take initiatives to develop an environment for the Islamic banking sector.

This study extends the literature of corporate governance relating to Islamic banking and financial institutions. More specifically, this paper explores the necessity of independence of members of the monitoring body (here SSB), an important constituent of governance, to ensure high-quality governance and transparency in reporting to increase diverse stakeholders' trust/confidence. The absence of independence of SSB in performing their functions contradicts with the agency, stakeholder and legitimacy theory, which is inconsistent with global evidence, that demands further investigations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of board of directors (BODs) and management in the decision-making of Shariah supervisory board (SSB) and implementation of their decisions.

The paper implements qualitative case research to explore the influences of BODs and management in the context of Bangladesh. To accomplish the research objective, we collected data from the 17 respondents from the regulators, Shariah supervisory boards, Shariah department executives and Shariah experts from the central bank and Islamic banks of Bangladesh.

This study found that management of Islamic banks indirectly influences the practices and functions of SSB, their decision-making and other activities. However, from either ethical or moral ground, management cannot influence SSB; management does not have legitimate power to control over their activities. Sometimes the BODs and management use the SSB and Shariah executives as a showcase and rubber stamp to accomplish their goals and to maximize profit in either partially or fully. Management assumes that Shariah officers are accomplishing and minimizing their income and hindering business functions without any contributions.

The study significantly contributed to the national and global regulatory bodies by providing suggestions that regulatory bodies should be more concerned with the independence of SSB and Shariah executive officers. Besides, the BODs and management should be careful in handling Shariah issues as they were committed to do Islamic banking as per Shariah law. The study has theoretical contributions regarding the stakeholder and legitimacy theories.

This is the first research which extends the literature of the Islamic banking and Shariah governance mechanisms in perspective of Bangladesh concerning the influence of BODs and management in the decision-making of SSB and implementation of their decisions.