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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the crucial question of whether gender diversity in boardroom is associated with CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link.

The authors used the data of companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange for a sample consisting of KSE-100 index companies for the period of five years. The authors used the ordinary least square regression technique to test the developed hypotheses. The authors also used the two-step Heckman selection model, two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching method to control the problem of endogeneity.

The authors find reliable evidence of a negative association between gender diversity and CEO pay and of board gender diversity’s strengthening the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. The authors also find that women director are more effective in setting the optimal contract in non-family-owned firms and firms with dispersed ownership structure as compared to family-owned firms and firms with concentrated ownership structure. Moreover, results also reflect that the influence of board diversity on both CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link is stronger when gender diversity goes beyond tokenism.

The findings have implications in terms of providing the basis for policy makers to accord the same level of importance to gender diversity in the boardroom as well as contributing to the current debate on the desirability of mandating or recommending gender diversity on boardrooms.

This study is among the few studies which investigate the moderating role of boardroom gender diversity on the CEO pay-performance link. In addition, this study contributes to the institutional theory by providing the empirical evidence that the effect boardroom gender diversity on CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link varies by type of ownership.

This paper aims to investigate the question concerning whether gender diversity in the boardroom matters to lenders or not?

To answer this question, the authors use the data from 2009 to 2015 of all A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The authors use ordinary least squares regression and firm fixed effect regression to draw our inferences. To check and control the issue of endogeneity the authors use one-year lagged gender diversity regression, two-stage least squares regression, propensity score matching method and Heckman two-stage regression.

The results suggest that the presence of female directors on the board reduces managerial opportunistic behavior and information asymmetry and, consequently, creditors’ perceptions about the probability of loan default and the cost of debt. The authors find that lenders charge 4 per cent less from borrowers that have at least one female board member than they do from borrowers with no female board members. The authors also find that the board structure (i.e. gender diversity) of government-owned firms also matters to lenders, as government-owned firms that have gender-diverse boards have a lower cost of debt (i.e. 5 per cent lower interest rate).

The findings have implications for individual borrowers and for regulators. For example, borrowers can get debt financing at lower rates by altering their boards’ composition (i.e. through gender diversity). From the regulatory perspective, the results support recent legislative initiatives around the world regarding female directors’ representation on boards.

This paper makes several contributions. First, beyond the recent studies on boardroom gender, the authors investigate the relationship between gender diversity in the boardroom and the cost of debt. Second, the authors extend the literature on the association between government ownership and cost of debt by first time providing evidence that the board composition (e.g. gender diversity) of government-owned firms also matters to the lenders. The other contributions are discussed in the introduction section.

In this paper, the authors investigate whether an independent and gender-diverse compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers' pay and firm performance in Chinese companies. The authors also investigate whether the independent compensation committee composed of all male directors is effective in designing the optimal contract for executives.

The authors use data from A-share listed companies on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2005 to 2015. As a baseline methodology, the authors use pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression to draw inferences. In addition, cluster OLS regression, two-stage least square regression, the two-stage Heckman test and the propensity score matching method are also used to control for endogeneity issues.

The authors find evidence that an independent or gender-diverse compensation committee strengthens the link between top managers' pay and firm performance; that the presence of a woman on the compensation committee enhances the positive influence of committee independence on this relationship; that a compensation committee's independence or gender diversity is more effective in designing top managers' compensation in legal-person-controlled firms than they are in state-controlled firms; that gender diversity on the compensation committee is negatively associated with top managers' total pay; and that an independent compensation committee pays top managers more.

The study results highlight the role of an independent compensation committee in designing optimal contracts for top managers. The authors provide empirical evidence that a woman on the compensation committee strengthens its objectivity in determining top managers' compensation. The study finding supports regulatory bodies' recommendations regarding independent and women directors.

The study findings contribute to the recent debate about gender equality around the globe. Given the discrimination against women, many regulatory bodies mandate a quota for women on corporate boards. The study findings support the regulatory bodies' recommendations by highlighting the economic benefit of having women in top management positions.

This study contributes to literature by investigating the largely overlooked questions of whether having a gender-diverse or independent compensation committee strengthens the relationship between top managers' pay and firm performance; whether an independent compensation committee is more efficient in setting executives' pay when it is gender-diverse; and whether the effect of independent directors and female directors on top managers' compensation varies based on the firm's ownership structure. Overall, the main contribution of the study is that the authors provide robust empirical evidence in support of the managerial power axiom.

The purpose of this paper is to address whether gender diversity on compensation committees ensures objective determination of CEOs’ compensation.

The authors use a sample of companies listed in China from 2006 to 2015. The authors use pooled ordinary least square regression as the baseline methodology, and two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching to control for endogeneity.

The authors find evidence that gender-diverse compensation committees limit CEOs’ total cash compensation and strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm performance, but only independent female directors have a significant impact, indicating that the monitoring effect outweighs the executive effect. Moreover, compensation committees with a critical mass of female directors have more impact on CEOs’ total pay and the link between CEO pay and firm performance than do committees with a single female director. Finally, gender-diverse compensation committees are more effective in setting CEOs’ compensation in state-controlled firms, where agency issues are more severe.

Female directors can improve firm-level governance by monitoring management actions, such as setting CEOs’ compensation. The study contributes to the debate on gender diversity in the boardroom, finding a positive economic effect. The study sheds light on China’s diversity practices at the director level and provides empirical guidance to China’s regulatory bodies.

The authors extend earlier studies by providing the first empirical evidence that gender-diverse compensation committees strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm performance; that independent female directors are more effective in the monitoring role than executive female directors; that compensation committees with a critical mass of female directors are more effective in setting CEOs’ pay than are committees with a single female director; and that the influence of gender-diverse compensation committees on CEOs’ pay varies by type of ownership.

This paper examines the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the economic growth of Afghanistan over the period 1990 to 2019.

This study uses an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) to measure FDI’s impact on economic growth and determine the short- vs long-run relationship.

The results show that the F-bound cointegration test confirms the long-run relationship among the variables. The long-run and short-run results reveal that foreign direct investment has a significant negative impact on economic growth in the long run. However, domestic investment and labour force have a significant and positive impact on economic growth in the long run. Moreover, the impact of trade openness on economic growth is insignificant in the long run, while it has a significant negative impact in the short run.

In this study, we contribute to this research area by analysing the function of FDI in economic growth from Afghanistan’s experience and perspectives. This is the first study empirically examining this relationship in Afghanistan while considering other selected macroeconomic indicators. This paper could greatly benefit policymakers in Afghanistan by guiding the formulation of FDI policies that would spur its economic growth and development.