Xavier Piulachs, Ramon Alemany and Montserrat Guillen
This paper aimed to study the price of health insurance for individuals aged 65 years and over.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aimed to study the price of health insurance for individuals aged 65 years and over.
Design/methodology/approach
A sample of private health policyholders in Spain is analysed. Joint models are estimated for men and women, separately. A log-linear model of the transformed cumulated number of claims associated with emergency room occupation, ambulance use and hospitalization is estimated, together with a proportional hazard survival model.
Findings
The association between the longitudinal process of severe medical care and the survival time process is positive and highly significant for both men and women. An increase in the price of health insurance because of the effect of a larger number of emergency care demand events is slightly offset by the decrease in expected longevity.
Research limitations/implications
The effect of an increase in the number of claims is small compared to the reduction in survival, so age still plays a central role in ratemaking.
Practical implications
High rates of health insurance for elderly insureds should be compensated with younger insureds in the portfolio.
Social implications
Affordable health insurance premiums for elderly people are difficult to obtain only with strict actuarial principles.
Originality/value
The proposed methodology allows dynamic rates to be designed, so that the price of health insurance can change as new usage information becomes available.
Details
Keywords
José M. Merigó, Salvador Linares-Mustarós and Joan Carles Ferrer-Comalat
This chapter develops a conceptual taxonomy of five emerging digital citizenship regimes: (1) the globalised and generalisable regime called pandemic citizenship that clarifies…
Abstract
This chapter develops a conceptual taxonomy of five emerging digital citizenship regimes: (1) the globalised and generalisable regime called pandemic citizenship that clarifies how post-COVID-19 datafication processes have amplified the emergence of four intertwined, non-mutually exclusive and non-generalisable new technopoliticalised and city-regionalised digital citizenship regimes in certain European nation-states’ urban areas; (2) algorithmic citizenship, which is driven by blockchain and has allowed the implementation of an e-Residency programme in Tallinn; (3) liquid citizenship, driven by dataism – the deterministic ideology of big data – and contested through claims for digital rights in Barcelona and Amsterdam; (4) metropolitan citizenship, as revindicated in reaction to Brexit and reshuffled through data co-operatives in Cardiff; and (5) stateless citizenship, driven by devolution and reinvigorated through data sovereignty in Barcelona, Glasgow and Bilbao. This chapter challenges the existing interpretation of how these emerging digital citizenship regimes together are ubiquitously rescaling the associated spaces/practices of European nation-states.
Details
Keywords
- Pandemic citizenship
- algorithmic citizenship
- liquid citizenship
- metropolitan citizenship
- stateless citizenship
- nation-states
- city-regions
- Tallinn
- Estonia
- Amsterdam
- Netherlands
- Barcelona
- Catalonia
- Cardiff
- Wales
- UK
- Glasgow
- Scotland
- Bilbao
- Basque Country
- Spain
- rescaling
- postpandemics
- datafication
- digitalisation
- COVID-19
- blockchain
- e-Residency
- dataism
- digital rights
- big data
- data co-operatives
- platform co-operatives
- foundational economy
- radical federalism
- data sovereignty
- devolution
- independence
- technopolitics
- algorithmic nations
- digital citizenship
- citizenship
This study examines the effect of host government interference with foreign investors’ assets on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow. The author hypothesizes that the…
Abstract
This study examines the effect of host government interference with foreign investors’ assets on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow. The author hypothesizes that the relationship between host government interference and FDI inflow takes the form of an inverted U shape. The author tests this hypothesis using data from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes between 1996 and 2017. The results support the above hypothesis. While host government interference with the assets of a few foreign investors may not deter FDI inflow, frequent interferences, which result in an increasing number of host state–foreign investor disputes, reduces FDI inflow in a host country. The analysis also shows that when faced with an increasing host country uncertainty, investors adopt a wait and see strategy. However, how long investors wait depends on the economic situation of the host country. For high-income countries, investors wait until approximately 10 disputes before reducing investments level in a host country, while for low-income countries, this waiting period is a mere two disputes. The findings of this study suggest that countries seeking to attract more FDI should not interfere with the activities of foreign investors, however, if they do, disputes should be settled at home, not in international arbitration courts, because doing so frequently may poison the host environment and deter other foreign investors from investing in the host country.