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The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of USA Executive Order 13224, one of the most important US counter‐terrorist finance measures, on corporations operating in countries with designated terrorist organizations.

The effects of Executive Order 13224 are focused on the case of Chiquita Brands International, a major US banana‐exporting corporation that operated in Uraba, Colombia until 2004. The US Government prosecuted Chiquita for “engaging in transactions” with an illicit, Colombian paramilitary group considered by the US a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a specially‐designated global terrorist. This paper presents the duress defense that Chiquita could have raised at trial under US federal law.

Executive Order 13224 was drafted hastily and under pressure leading to over‐inclusive language and over‐broad implementation. Chiquita's case suggests that Executive Order 13224, drafted with the intention of reducing terrorist funding, has made it possible for an extortion victim to be prosecuted for payments it has not chosen to make. This paper will suggest narrowly tailoring the language of Executive Order 13224 or providing an exculpatory provision.

Counter‐terrorist finance measure Executive Order 13224 has not been sufficiently examined by scholars. Research on this topic should go hand in hand with enquiry into possible defenses for corporations operating in countries with designated terrorist organizations and having to make extortion payments.

Suggestions are put forward for corporations operating in countries with designated terrorist organizations as well as for drafters of counter‐finance terrorist measures.

Although the designation of terrorist organizations under the executive order has been discussed, few scholars have addressed cases of over‐broad application of the executive order. The unexamined case of Chiquita is a unique case in that the extortion victim, and not the extortion perpetrator, is prosecuted. Also, Chiquita was prosecuted for an activity (making extortion payments to the Autodefensas Unidas Campesinas that became a crime after Chiquita began its engagement with such an activity. Furthermore, examining this case thoroughly is important because it has repercussions on at least two public policy levels: the US' War on terrorism and the rights and remedies of corporations investing in countries with designated terrorist organizations.

Town centre management (TCM) schemes in Spain have generally evolved primarily from a retail perspective, led by small and medium sized (SME) retailers. However, their development has often focused on business goals (e.g. profit, increase in footfall, etc). In doing so, they have often overlooked the very social issues that have embedded retail historically in the socio‐economic matrix of our towns and cities. This paper, adopting a case‐study approach, seeks to re‐address this imbalance by exploring some of the key success factors of Gran Centre Granollers (GCG) – one of Spain's most advanced retailer‐led TCM schemes located in Granollers (near Barcelona).

This paper, adopting a case‐study approach, explores some of the key success factors ofGCC..

GCG's visionary motto of “city, culture and commerce” and its inclusive approach to the management of the area's stakeholders have captured the imagination of the town's independent retailers (75 per cent of them are members of the scheme). It has also proved pivotal in engaging the town's residents with the scheme's vision, purpose and ethical values. This is reflected in the success of their customer loyalty credit card initiative and the steady growth of the scheme's membership from ten to three hundred businesses in the last ten years.

This case study should be of interest to town centre managers, SME retailers, researchers in the social sciences and students of urban regeneration and retail management.