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The majority stockholders are not the same as parent company stockholders in a consolidated entity when one or more subsidiaries own parent company’s shares. In this milieu, the allocation of income could be performed: a) among majority and minority stockholders; b) among parent company stockholders and minority stockholders. Considering minority interest as a component of the consolidated equity, this paper demonstrates how the criterion used to allocate income can influence on the consolidated financial statements and, thereby, analysis based these financial statements.

The paper aims to discuss the amended provisions relating to protection of minority shareholders (PMS) in the newly amended Chinese Company Law and evaluate whether it adequately protects the interests of minority shareholders.

In total, 26 cases will be examined by discussing the characteristics of the relevant parties involved, specifically plaintiffs, defendants, their lawyers, judges and also the grounds of complaint. A comparison will be made between the cases decided by following the first Company Law (1994) and the cases decided in accordance with the newly amended Company Law (2006).

The findings indicate that the amended Company Law has removed certain drawbacks in PMS present in the first Company Law (1994) but the New Company Law can protect interests of minority shareholders only to a certain extent. Further amendments are still needed.

This is one of the first studies to actually examine the implementation of PMS‐related provisions in the newly amended Company Law.

This paper aims to examine how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in the context of Africa.

Data are collected from the world competitiveness report for the period 2010-2015. To examine the validity of the study’s hypotheses empirically, the authors use ordinary least squares with correlated panel-corrected standards error (PCSE).

This paper offers additional empirical evidence on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in Africa. It highlights that country-level corporate governance structures such as efficacy of corporate boards, strength of investor confidence, regulations of securities exchanges and the operation of the Big 4 accounting firms have significant positive impacts on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

This paper fails to include all African countries because of non-availability of a report for some African countries. Thus, the findings on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in a country are applicable to the countries used in this study.

This paper emphasizes on the relevance of country-level corporate governance structures to ensuring a reasonable level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

This paper partially fills the gap regarding the absence of an empirical cross-country study on how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

Through content analysis, the study traces the relative prominence of “biomedical” and “public health” approaches in congressional bills aimed at improving the health of racial and ethnic minorities over a 28-year period. It documents a surge of interest in minority health during the late 1980s and early 1990s and highlights the dominance of biomedical initiatives during this period. Drawing on historical methods and interviews with key informants, the paper explains these patterns by detailing the ways in which policy legacies shaped the interests, opportunities, and ideas of interest groups and policy-makers.

Although tax-motivated income shifting has been widely explored, no studies have as yet analyzed the association between ownership structure and management decisions about income shifting. The ownership structure of multinational groups is characterized by different levels of minority interests, and our aim is to establish whether income shifting is explained by the aim of expropriation of minorities, as well as taxation avoidance.

We collect data on a sample of European parent companies located in five countries and their foreign subsidiaries, and run a multivariate regression based on the Huizinga and Laeven (2008) model.

Our results support the idea of minority expropriation, finding evidence of ownership-motivated income shifting. We also find that the level of minority protection affects ownership-motivated income shifting, and that, when both are present, expropriation is statistically significant.

Although the study looks at a wide range of subsidiaries, a limitation may be that it examines only firms having parent companies in five European countries. Further research would overcome this limitation and extend the literature and take into account other income-shifting contextual variables. Our results may lead regulators to pay more attention to the protection of minority interests.

This research offers insights to companies and investors, and should help them to make better-informed decisions and evaluate the best contexts for investments.

This study enriches the literature on income shifting by revealing that it can be caused by factors other than the desire to avoid taxation. It suggests that ownership structure is crucial.

A strong indication of the reasons behind minority mayors' shift from deracialization can be found in the changes in the U.S. population over the last two decades. The changes in population has eroded – or potentially is in the process of eroding – a key variable in the election of minority mayors: the presence of a majority Black population. For example, with cities losing Black population while gaining Whites and Latinos, the conditions under which Black candidates run for mayor in many U.S. cities are quite different from the experience of the first elected Black mayors. Washington, DC has lost 16% of its Black population since 1990. Between 2000 and 2010, the Black population decreased by 6%. Yet, during the same time period, the district has experienced increases in White population, with a 14% increase since 2000. With a Black population of less than 50% as compared to a Black population over 70% in 1980, the district has enjoyed the distinction of no longer being a majority-Black city (Washington Post, 2007). Atlanta, Georgia also has experienced a loss of Black population (Cox News Service, 2007). These data are suggestive of trends where, if they continue, ambitious Black candidates for mayor will find their electoral coalitions composed of increased numbers of Whites and Latinos in areas where Blacks have dominated for decades.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance at shareholders meetings on related party transaction (RPT) proposals.

This paper empirically examines the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance in shareholders’ meetings on the voting results of RPT proposals based on the hand-collected voting data of Chinese listed companies.

The empirical result shows a significant positive relationship between the attendance of minority shareholders and the nonagreeable vote rate of RPT proposals. Moreover, this positive relationship is strengthened when the corporate governance is poor, the negative media coverage is high, and the on-site attendance of minority shareholders is high. Conversely, good corporate governance and high positive media coverage can weaken this positive correlation. The additional analysis reveals that the number of RPTs and better market performance in the future can be significantly reduced when minority shareholders express their nonagreeable voice actively.

This paper analytically and empirically examines the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance in shareholders’ meetings on the voting results of RPT proposals based on the hand-collected voting data of Chinese listed companies. It provides direct and convincing evidence for the impact of minority shareholders’ attendance and exercise of voting rights in shareholders’ meetings on the outcome of RPT proposals. It complements the literature on the governance effects of minority shareholders’ attendance in shareholders’ meetings to exercise their voting rights in emerging capital markets. This study has practical value by guiding minority investors to participate actively in corporate governance.

SMEs are essential to economic growth in Malaysia and many emerging economies as they are a major source of employment and contribute towards the gross domestic product. It is therefore imperative that the corporate governance practices of SMEs are enhanced by assurance that appropriate monitoring occurs and procedures are in place. This study aims to address this issue.

The concentration of ownership in Malaysian companies results in less protection for minority shareholders. This is because the laws protecting minority shareholders mainly focus on director/shareholder conflicts and are not suited to companies with concentrated shareholdings, especially where the conflict is commonly seen between the majority and minority shareholders. Furthermore, owing to the levels of power distance, collectivism and assertiveness in Malaysia, shareholders are unlikely to litigate. The research was carried out through case analysis and analysis of extant literature and existing laws in Malaysia, to illustrate that the minority shareholders in the concentrated shareholding SMEs are not well protected.

The paper finds that current prohibitive models of law are not desirable as they have promoted compliance with the letter but not the spirit of the law.

The study focuses only on SMEs that have been incorporated.

The study enables minority shareholders to reduce fraud and self‐dealing by the majority through more direct participation in corporations, reliance on procedural protections to balance business flexibility and application of brightline rules which stand a better chance of compliance by those who understand them.

The self‐enforcing model is a non‐adjudicative mechanism of enforcement which requires substantial compliance with procedural requirements and aims for voluntary compliance. It proposes that minority shareholders and independent directors hold veto powers, thus reducing fraud and self‐dealing.

This chapter offers an historical overview and analysis of US broadcast regulation. It demonstrates how seemingly race-neutral policies – the interpretation of “public interest,” the preference for incumbents, the application of the First Amendment, and the embrace of colorblindness within US media policy – has functioned to entrench White interests in the broadcasting sector. Drawing on critical policy studies and critical race theory, this chapter illuminates how broadcast regulation has been a technology of White privilege, one that has had substantial consequences for the distribution of both material and symbolic resources as well as for the contours of the public sphere in the United States.

Prior literature shows that income shifting is widely performed by multinational groups, but no research as yet has studied alignment between controlling and minority interests on tax avoidance in multinational groups with high ownership concentration. This study aims to analyze the effect of high ownership concentration on cross-jurisdictional tax-motivated income shifting.

To test the hypotheses, this study focuses on European multinational groups. Data are collected on European parent firms and each subsidiary. The model considers the natural logarithm of profit before tax and tax incentive.

Findings show that subsidiaries shift income for tax avoidance purposes. The alignment of shareholders’ interests and ownership concentration leads to higher levels of tax avoidance through subsidiaries’ infra-group transactions. High ownership concentration decreases the influence of minority interests and allows parent company shareholders to choose a tax avoidance strategy more freely.

The results suggest that taxation levels need to be harmonized to reduce the incentive for tax avoidance and the incentive of governments to reduce their statutory tax rate, to shift profits inwards and reduce outward flow. Without international coordination, this approach may lead to the unevenness of legislative frameworks around the world, and bring significant disadvantages for some countries, influencing economic growth and business development.

This study extends prior findings showing that tax-motivated income shifting as a method of tax avoidance in European multinational groups is stronger in groups with high levels of ownership concentration. This means that managers have the incentive to shift income between subsidiaries for tax and ownership benefits in favor of the parent company’s shareholders and against minority interests.