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The process performed during a financial statement audit is critical but is unobservable to external stakeholders. This can create challenges in assessing the quality of individual audit engagements. This study’s objective is to introduce and investigate an archival measure based on publicly available information that proxies for audit process ineffectiveness.

We proxy for audit process ineffectiveness using errors in the audit report. We examine audit reports to identify errors because the audit report represents the auditor’s primary communication with financial statement users and is subject to rigorous preparation and review. We first examine if typical factors influencing audit process ineffectiveness are associated with audit report errors. We then examine whether audit reports containing errors are associated with audit quality measures.

We find that errors are more likely to be present in audit reports when time pressure exists and less likely when auditors exert more effort and when audit engagement risk is higher. Results also show that errors in audit reports are positively associated with financial reporting misstatements, measured by subsequently disclosed Big R restatements and out-of-period adjustments.

Collectively, our evidence suggests that an audit report containing an error is a suitable proxy for audit process ineffectiveness. This proxy has audit quality implications because inattentiveness in one area of the audit process could indicate inattentiveness in another area.

This paper aims to examine the relation between voluntary disclosure (VD) in audit committee reports and banks’ earnings management. It investigates whether such disclosure reflects an attempt by audit committees to engage in impression management.

The study considers top US bank holding companies from 2006 to 2015. The authors develop a scoring grid to measure VD in audit committee reports. The scoring grid is based on recommendations from 10 industry and governance organizations’ reports that analyzed audit committee disclosures. Multivariate regression analyzes are used in this paper.

Descriptive statistics reveal that the level of VD in audit committee reports did not increase significantly from 2006 to 2015. Multivariate analyzes indicate that whenever banks’ level of earnings management is high, audit committees increase the extent of their VDs in their reports. The authors infer from this finding that audit committees are using VDs as a vehicle for impression management.

This paper sheds light onto the motives behind audit committees’ VDs. The evidence, which is consistent with impression management by audit committees in their report, also provides further background to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s recent initiative to enhance VDs in the audit committee report.