Calum G. Turvey, Michael Hoy and Zahirul Islam
We develop a theoretical model of input use by agricultural producers who purchase crop insurance, and thus may engage in moral hazard. Through simulations, our findings show a…
Abstract
We develop a theoretical model of input use by agricultural producers who purchase crop insurance, and thus may engage in moral hazard. Through simulations, our findings show a combination of partial insurance coverage and partial monitoring of inputs may reduce substantially the problems associated with moral hazard. The minimum level of input use that must be required by regulation is determined to be substantially lower than the optimal or actual input level chosen by producers. Because the use of inputs for crop production occurs in many stages over the pre‐planting, planting, and growing seasons, only a minimal input requirement is needed. Thus, the cost of implementing such a regulation can be kept much lower than would be the case for a regulation of complete monitoring of input usage.
Details
Keywords
Adeyemi Esuola, Michael Hoy, Zahirul Islam and Calum G. Turvey
Asymmetric information in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection can result in sizable program costs for government‐provided crop insurance plans. We present a methodology…
Abstract
Asymmetric information in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection can result in sizable program costs for government‐provided crop insurance plans. We present a methodology and illustrative simulations to show how these two types of information problems interact in a way to create program costs for the providers of crop insurance. Our methodology allows us to ascertain the relative contributions to program costs of these two sources of asymmetric information. The exercise is useful in pointing out directions for future study seeking ways to improve the design of crop insurance plans.
Details
Keywords
James B. Davies and Michael Hoy
We adopt a standard distributional impact methodology, based on Atkinson's cost of inequality approach, to estimate the degree of implicit redistribution created through public…
Abstract
We adopt a standard distributional impact methodology, based on Atkinson's cost of inequality approach, to estimate the degree of implicit redistribution created through public funding of health insurance in Canada. The first stage of the exercise is to determine the public health insurance benefits received by families of various age and composition and to add these to measured after-tax incomes. In our base case, which uses the Atkinson Mean Logarithmic Deviation as inequality index, we find that accounting for public health insurance benefits implies a reduction in inequality equivalent to 2.4% of per capita income. We then model the implications of moving to a hypothetical fully privatized system while proportionately refunding to individuals the tax revenues saved in doing so. This would give rise to a further 2.4% equivalent per capita income reduction resulting from increased inequality in the distribution of after-tax income. Thus, for this scenario, moving from public financing of health insurance in Canada to a fully privatized system implies an overall increase in inequality equivalent to a loss of 4.8% of per capita income. This corresponds to an increase of about 25% in existing inequality. Not surprisingly, the impact of publicly financed health insurance in reducing inequality is strongest for the elderly.
James Davies, Michael Hoy and Tracy Lynch
The distributional impacts of replacing an income tax that has graduated marginal rates by a flat tax are complex. Typically the flat tax rate will be less than the top marginal…
Abstract
The distributional impacts of replacing an income tax that has graduated marginal rates by a flat tax are complex. Typically the flat tax rate will be less than the top marginal rate under the pre-existing tax, leading to gains for the wealthiest. On the other hand, real-world proposals generally combine this with increases in personal exemptions that benefit some of the lowest income taxpayers. The result is that flat tax proposals usually redistribute from the middle to the extremes.
Insurance and asset holdings are modeled as the jointly determined outcomes of a constrained optimization problem. Consequently, (1) full coverage may be optimal despite limited…
Abstract
Insurance and asset holdings are modeled as the jointly determined outcomes of a constrained optimization problem. Consequently, (1) full coverage may be optimal despite limited premium loading, (2) insurance is normal if insurable assets are normal, (3) insurance cannot be a Giffen good, and (4) insurance is a complement to price‐elastic assets.
Colin Harris, Andrew Myers, Christienne Briol and Sam Carlen
A discipline is bound by some combination of a shared subject matter, shared theory, and shared technique. Yet modern economics is seemingly without limit to its domain. As a…
Abstract
A discipline is bound by some combination of a shared subject matter, shared theory, and shared technique. Yet modern economics is seemingly without limit to its domain. As a discipline without a shared subject matter, what is the binding force of economics today? The authors combine topic modeling and text analysis to analyze different approaches to inquiry within the discipline of economics. The authors find that the importance of theory has declined as economics has increasingly become defined by its empirical techniques. The authors question whether this trajectory is stable in the long run as the binding force of the discipline.
Details
Keywords
For equity, societies may wish to eliminate certain forms or manifestations of inequality. Horizontal equity and vertical equity in the income tax are topics which have interested…
Abstract
For equity, societies may wish to eliminate certain forms or manifestations of inequality. Horizontal equity and vertical equity in the income tax are topics which have interested me for some years. Although any shortfall from each of these objectives can be measured in terms of unwanted inequalities, equity per se is a different concept from equality. Equity relates to fairness, justice and other societal norms which give expression to the best aspirations of our collective social conscience. For example, equal access to health care for those in equal need is an accepted norm for horizontal equity in the health field. Vertical equity in this context means treating appropriately differently those who have different needs. When offered the opportunity to be Guest Editor of this volume of Research on Economic Inequality, I decided to define the focus simply as “equity”, without placing any further restriction on topics. The papers which were ultimately included in this volume are the ones, from among those offered, which survived a rigorous refereeing process. Each has its own “take” on the concept of equity, and its link with equality. I hope that you, the reader, will gain from reading all of these contributions and pondering their significance.