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Auditors are required to perform analytical procedures during the planning and concluding phases of the audit. Such procedures typically use data aggregated at a high level. The authors investigate whether artificial neural networks, a more sophisticated technique for analytical review than typically used by auditors, may be effective when using high level data.

Data from companies operating in the dairy industry were used to train an artificial neural network. Data with and without material seeded errors were used to test alternative techniques.

Results suggest that the artificial neural network approach was not significantly more effective (taking into account both Type I and II errors) than traditional ratio and regression analysis, and none of the three approaches provided more overall effectiveness than a purely random procedure. However, the artificial neural network approach did yield considerably fewer Type II errors than the other methods, which suggests artificial neural networks could be a candidate to improve the performance of analytical procedures in circumstances where Type II error rates are the primary concern of the auditor.

The authors extend the work of Coakley and Brown (1983) by investigating the application of artificial neural networks as an analytical procedure using aggregated data. Furthermore, the authors examine multiple companies from one industry and supplement financial information with both exogenous industry and macro-economic data.

This paper aims to examine differential perceptions of lenders and investors on (1) the use, perceived usefulness, importance and adequacy of annual reports, (2) the importance of qualitative characteristics (QCs) and (3) the perceived impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on financial reporting quality (FRQ) in Sri Lanka.

A questionnaire survey study of practising professionals consisting of Sri Lankan investors (N = 214) and lenders (N = 235).

In relation to (1), lenders and investors rank three out of ten information sources ahead of the remaining seven: both include annual reports and personal knowledge. However, the highest average response for lenders is direct communication with clients, and for investors, it is stock market publications. Within annual reports, both decision-makers identify financial statements as the most useful part. Concerning (2), they both identified understandability as the most important QC followed by timeliness. Relevance ranked last, surprisingly. In relation to (3), both groups perceived that the new IFRS reporting environment improved the FRQ compared to the previous Sri Lanka Accounting Standards regime.

Ranking understandability as the most important QC in terms of decision usefulness contradicts IASB's categorisation. The authors provide empirical data on the perceived degree of success of adopting IFRS in a developing economy.

The authors design a decision-oriented (lending vs investing) and context-specific (IASB's financial reporting framework) questionnaire to examine the perceptions of key capital providers separately on the issues mentioned above in “Purpose” within a developing economy. The survey fits into two aspects of the decision-useful theory: useful to make what decisions and useful to whom.

Enterprises in developed and developing world environments often begin life in the informal sector operating outside the purview of government oversight. Sectoral firm change, however, from the informal to the formal sector is not well studied. The purpose of this paper is to answer the following research question: “What firm-level markers help explain the movement of firms from the informal to the formal sector?”

Data from 719 urban formal enterprises included in the 2016 El Salvador Enterprise Survey undertaken by the World Bank forms the basis of the empirical analyses. The survey questionnaire comprehensively encompasses business practices and performance and the overall business environment.

Multivariate results reveal location, firm maturity, problems with land acquisition, a line of credit or active business loan, extortion by street gangs and practices of informal competitors increase the odds of informal firms becoming formal enterprises. Lessening the odds of once informal firms moving to the formal sector include the lack of access to public utilities, visitation by tax officials, formation as a corporation, bank accounts, number of employees and time spent focused upon government regulations.

Contextualized within the national setting of El Salvador, the integration of informal enterprises into the formal economy and related public policy implications of informal firm regularization are discussed.

Las empresas de países desarrollados y en desarrollo a menudo comienzan su vida en el sector informal y que opera fuera del ámbito de la supervisión gubernamental. Sin embargo, el cambio de empresas sectoriales, desde el sector informal al formal, no está bien estudiado. Este artículo busca responder la siguiente pregunta de investigación: “¿Qué marcadores de nivel de empresa ayudan a explicar el movimiento de las empresas del sector informal al formal?”

Los datos de 719 empresas formales urbanas incluidas en la encuesta de empresas de El Salvador de 2016 realizada por el Banco Mundial constituyen la base de los análisis empíricos. El cuestionario de la encuesta abarca de manera integral las prácticas y el rendimiento empresarial y el entorno empresarial general.

Los resultados multivariables revelan la ubicación, la madurez de la empresa, los problemas con la adquisición de tierras, una línea de crédito o un préstamo comercial activo, la extorsión por parte de pandillas callejeras y las prácticas de competidores informales aumentan las probabilidades de que las empresas informales se conviertan en empresas formales. Disminuir las probabilidades de que una vez las firmas informales se muden al sector formal incluyen la falta de acceso a los servicios públicos, las visitas de los funcionarios tributarios, la formación como corporación, las cuentas bancarias, el número de empleados y el tiempo dedicado a las regulaciones gubernamentales.

En el contexto nacional de El Salvador, se analiza la integración de empresas informales en la economía formal y se discuten las implicaciones de las políticas públicas relacionadas con la regularización de empresas informales.

The authors comment on the paper by Aguinis et al. (2018). The authors believe that their hypotheses probably are true, but their methodology is flawed and their data do not support their conclusions.

The authors review and comment on the paper by Aguinis et al. (2018).

The data do not adequately demonstrate a power law distribution for chief executive officer’s (CEO) performance because the analysis confounded external conditions affecting performance, and the authors use inappropriate dependent variables. The analysis does not demonstrate a power law distribution for CEO pay because the analysis does not take into account changes in pay level and mix over time. The analysis does not show a lack of overlap between the two distributions because it does not take into account the way that the CEOs are paid for performance and because it uses CEO pay averaged over CEO tenure.

A more convincing analysis of the authors’ hypothesis would require the use of total shareholder return (TSR) as the dependent variable for organizational performance and would require a number of much more specific controls.

The authors call for greater use of power law thinking by practitioners in setting CEO pay. Their analysis indicates that practitioners already think in power law terms and allocate CEO pay accordingly. Moreover, power law theory and findings could be misused as an excuse for paying average CEOs much more than they are already paid.

The authors add another perspective on CEO pay.

The authors’ perspective is informed both by research and by consulting experience on CEO pay projects.

Comentamos el trabajo de Aguinis et al. (2018). Creemos que sus hipótesis son probablemente ciertas, pero su metodología presenta deficiencias y sus datos no apoyan sus conclusiones.

Revisamos y comentamos el trabajo de Aguinis y otros (en prensa).

Los datos no demuestran adecuadamente la existencia de una distribución ley de potencia (power-law) porque sus análisis no consideran las condiciones externas que afectan al resultado de la empresa y los autores hacen un uso inapropiado de las variables dependientes. Los análisis no demuestran que la retribución de los CEO sigua una distribución de ley de potencia porque no toman en consideración cambios en el nivel o composición de la retribución en el tiempo. Los análisis no muestran una falta de superposición entre las dos distribuciones porque no toman en cuenta la forma en la que los CEO son retribuidos por los resultados y porque utilizan la retribución media calculada sobre la antigüedad del CEO.

Un análisis más convincente de las hipótesis planteadas requiere el uso del rendimiento total de los accionistas como variable de resultados organizativos y un número mucho más específico de variables de control.

Los autores animan a los profesionales a pensar más en términos de una distribución de ley de potencia a la hora de fijar la retribución del CEO. Sus análisis indican que los profesionales ya piensan en términos de ésta distribución y asignan las retribuciones de manera acorde a ella. Es más, los resultados derivaos de la teoría de la ley de potencia pueden utilizarse erróneamente como una excusa para pagar menos al CEO medio.

Añadimos otra perspectiva sobre el pago a los CEO.

Nuestra perspectiva viene avalada por nuestra investigación y experiencia de consultoría en proyectos de retribución a CEOs.

Discutimos o trabalho de Aguinis et al. (2018). Acreditamos que as suas hipóteses são provavelmente verdadeiras, mas a sua metodologia apresenta deficiências e os dados apresentados não suportam as conclusões.

Analisamos e comentamos o trabalho de Aguinis et al. (2018).

Os dados não demonstram adequadamente a existência de uma distribuição de poder-lei porque suas análises não consideram as condições externas que afetam o resultado da empresa e os autores fazem uso impróprio das variáveis dependentes. As análises não mostram que as recompensas dos CEOs seguem uma distribuição da lei do poder porque não tomam em consideração as mudanças no nível ou na composição da remuneração sobre o tempo. As análises não mostram falta de sobreposição entre as duas distribuições, porque não têm em conta a forma como os CEOs são pagos pelos resultados e porque utilizam a retribuição média calculada sobre a antiguidade do CEO.

Uma análise mais convincente da hipótese proposta requer o uso do desempenho total dos acionistas como uma variável de resultados organizacionais e um número muito mais específico de variáveis de controle.

Os autores incentivam os profissionais a pensar mais em termos de uma distribuição da lei de potência quando se define o salário do CEO. Suas análises indicam que os profissionais já pensam em termos dessa distribuição e distribuem as recompensas de forma proporcional a ela. Além do mais, os resultados derivados da teoria da lei de poder podem ser erroneamente usados como uma desculpa para pagar menos para o CEO médio.

Agregamos uma outra perspectiva no pagamento ao CEO.

Nossa perspectiva é apoiada pelo nosso pesquisa e experiência de consultoria em projetos de remuneração para CEOs.

On December 24, 1989, an armed insurrection began in Liberia. Charles Taylor, a former government official, led a rebel force, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), into the north-eastern Nimba County. A breakaway faction, the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL), led by Prince Yormie Johnson gained control of central Monrovia – the capital – and killed the President Samuel Doe. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in August 1990, sending monitoring troops (the ECOWAS Military Observer Group, ECOMOG), and convened a national conference which elected an Interim Government of National Unity. In October 1990, ECOMOG established a neutral zone in Monrovia where Dr. Amos Sawyer was installed as Interim President in November. Various different factions and opposition groups were formed and clashes between the rebel groups and the Liberian army continued.

The purpose of the study is to set a research agenda so that future conceptual and empirical research can improve the understanding of why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled.

The paper compiles and adds to many of the explanations provided by this special issue’s nine commentaries regarding why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled. These explanations were grouped into two categories: economic (e.g. marginal productivity theory, agency theory and behavioral agency model) and social-institutional-psychological (e.g. CEO individual differences and characteristics and CEO-organization interactions). Moreover, new analyses based on additional data were conducted to examine measurement-related explanations for the observed pay-performance decoupling.

Results based on alternative measures of pay and performance confirmed, once again, the existence of pay-performance decoupling.

This paper will stimulate research pitting theoretical explanations against each other to understand their relative validity in different contexts.

The paper informs ongoing efforts to link CEO pay to performance.

The paper also revisits the decoupling of CEO pay and firm performance from a normative and value-based perspective (i.e. regarding whether pay and performance should be related).

The paper clarifies that the articles in this special issue largely concluded that CEO pay is decoupled from CEO performance.

Objetivo – El objetivo es proponer una ageda de investigación de forma que la futura investigación conceptual y empírica pueda mejorar la comprensión sobre por qué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO no están conectados.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – El artículo compila y añade a la mayoría de las explicaciones proporcionados por los nueve comentarios publicados en este número especial acerca de porqué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO están desconectados. Estas explicaciones se agrupan en dos categorías: económicas (e.g. teoría de la productividad marginal, teoría de agencia, modelo de agencia comportamental) y socio-institucional-psicológicas (e.g. diferencias y características individuales del CEO, interacción CEO-organización). Además, se llevan a cabo nuevos análisis sobre datos adicionales para examinar algunas explicaciones relativas a la medición para la falta de conexión entre retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Resultados – Los resultados basados en medidas alternativas de retribución y rendimiento confirman, una vez más, la existencia de una desconexión entre ambas magnitudes.

Limitaciones/implicaciones – Este artículo estimulará a investigación contraponiendo diferentes explicaciones teóricas para entender su validez relativa en diferentes contextos.

Implicaciones prácticas – El artículo informa sobre los esfuerzos actuals para relacionar la retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Implicaciones sociales – El artículo revisa la desconexión entre la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO desde una perspectiva normativa y de valor (i.e. sobre si la retribución y el rendimiento deben estar conectados).

Originalidad/valor – El artículo clarifica que los artículos en este número especial concluyen que la retribución del CEO está desconectada de su rendimiento.

O objetivo é estabelecer uma agenda de investigação para que futuros estudos conceptuais ou empíricos possam melhorar a compreensão do porquê de a compensação do CEO e o desempenho do CEO estarem dissociados.

Metodologia – O artigo compila e acrescenta às muitas explicações fornecidas pelos oito comentários deste número especial sobre as razões da dissociação da compensação e do desempenho do CEO. Estas explicações agrupam-se em duas categorias: económicas (eg., teoria da produtividade marginal, teoria da agência, modelo da agência comportamental) e Socio-institucional-psicológicas (eg., características e diferenças individuais do CEO, interações CEO-Organização). Além disso, conduziram-se novas análises baseadas em dados para examinar explicações baseadas em medições para a dissociação pagamento-desempenho.

Resultados – Resultados baseados em medidas alternativas de pagamento e desempenho confirmaram, uma vez mais, a existência da dissociação entre pagamento e performance.

Limitações/implicações – Este artigo estimula investigação que contraponha diferentes explicações teóricas, para perceber a sua validade relativa em diferentes contextos.

Implicações práticas – O artigo dá informação sobre esforços em curso para ligar a compensação do CEO ao desempenho.

Implicações sociais – O artigo revisita a dissociação do pagamento e desempenho da empresa Numa perspectiva normative e baseada em valores (ie, sobre se a compensação e a performance devem estar relacionadas).

Originalidade/valor – O paper clarifica que os artigos neste número especial basicamente concluiram que a compensação do CEO está dissociala do desempenho do CEO.

Marc von Boemcken is a senior researcher at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, Germany. His areas of expertise include the international arms trade as well as the privatization of security provision.

Collective sanctions have long been a contested instrument of international politics, especially since 1990, when United States and large power use of the technique increased to the point where Richard Haass declared that a “sanctions epidemic” had emerged (Haass & O'Sullivan, 1999). Regional bodies, most notably by the European Union (EU), paralleled this trend through a dramatic increase in their own resort to sanctions (Kreutz, 2005). The imposition of sanctions by the United Nations (UN) reached the point that, in comparison to pre-1989 behavior, the 1990s were labeled “the sanctions decade” (Cortright & Lopez, 2000).

Organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB) have been studied in both private and public sector organizations in countries around the globe. The purpose of this study is to compare the perceptions of the OCB construct between American and Portuguese public secondary school teachers and test an operational measure of the construct for schools across the two cultures.

Teachers' perceptions of the OCB in their schools were measured using the Organizational Citizenship Behavior Scale. This operational measure, developed in the USA, was translated for use with Portuguese teachers. Data from samples of US and Portuguese secondary schools were compared. Principal axis factor analyses, reliability coefficients, and other descriptive data were used to verify the factor structures, number of factors, and reliability of the measure across these two cultures.

Both versions of the OCB Scale (American and Portuguese) were reliable and stable; they worked well for both high schools and middle schools in Portugal and in the USA. One factor of organizational citizenship emerged. The operational measure used to measure OCB in public schools in this study is reliable and stable, despite cultural differences.

OCB are important because they influence organizational effectiveness. Despite cultural variations, and dramatic historical differences in their public education systems, this operational measure of OCB was effective. It provides researchers and practitioners a reliable and valid measure to assess the OCB of school organizations.

This was the first attempt to determine the integrity of an operational measure of OCB across cultures. The construct has been studied in schools in different countries using different operational measures, which blurred the definition of the construct and made it difficult to study and compare to other variables of effectiveness.