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Collective sanctions have long been a contested instrument of international politics, especially since 1990, when United States and large power use of the technique increased to the point where Richard Haass declared that a “sanctions epidemic” had emerged (Haass & O'Sullivan, 1999). Regional bodies, most notably by the European Union (EU), paralleled this trend through a dramatic increase in their own resort to sanctions (Kreutz, 2005). The imposition of sanctions by the United Nations (UN) reached the point that, in comparison to pre-1989 behavior, the 1990s were labeled “the sanctions decade” (Cortright & Lopez, 2000).

The paper aims to investigate the consequences of climate change for the future of armed forces and their presentation in national security documents.

A classification of potential future military roles and functions is derived from relevant literature, resulting in six “military futures”. Frames are developed for these whose occurrence is counted in 53 authoritative documents on security policy and defense planning from 38 countries. Results are presented in descriptive statistics.

The paper demonstrates that climate change has become an important issue for military planning. However, the directions in which it takes thinking about the future of armed forces differ widely. Among the six “military futures” identified, those linked to the function of disaster relief are most frequently found. However, the expansion of traditional military roles is also promoted. Rarer are suggestions for armed forces to became “greener” or “leaner”. In general, climate change provides an additional justification for continuing established paths for military planning.

The paper makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, it provides a classification of potential future consequences of climate change for armed forces. Second, it empirically establishes, for a set of authoritative documents, the relative importance of differing expectation of the effects of climate change on the structure and functions of militaries.

Arms embargoes in themselves are not able to achieve political goals. At least in the past, they neither stopped wars, nor did they change the political behavior of the targeted states or groups.

The popularity of arms embargoes makes sense on the one hand but can be puzzling on the other. Since arms are a type of good often linked directly to war and peace as one of the central objects of international politics, stemming the flow of arms to a country or group accused of acting against international peace and security is a logical response. However, while this reaction is frequent, it is not generally regarded as being effective. In fact, arms embargoes have a reputation of not functioning well. One can find many references, in academic literature and policy papers alike, which state that arms embargoes “do not work” that they are “ineffective” or that they are “not worth the paper they are printed on.” The paradox that sanctions are deemed to be of little consequence but are still popular among policy-makers (Baldwin, 1997) is particularly striking.

The dependent variables for this analysis include three measures of arms embargo effectiveness, which were referred to as ‘levels of effectiveness’ in the Framework Chapter. These are the embargo's success in causing a targeted policy change (level I effectiveness), success in changing arms flow to the target (level II effectiveness), and a measure of effectiveness to capture the arms embargo initiators satisfaction with the operation of the embargo (level III effectiveness).

Marc von Boemcken is a senior researcher at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, Germany. His areas of expertise include the international arms trade as well as the privatization of security provision.