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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of board of directors (BODs) and management in the decision-making of Shariah supervisory board (SSB) and implementation of their decisions.

The paper implements qualitative case research to explore the influences of BODs and management in the context of Bangladesh. To accomplish the research objective, we collected data from the 17 respondents from the regulators, Shariah supervisory boards, Shariah department executives and Shariah experts from the central bank and Islamic banks of Bangladesh.

This study found that management of Islamic banks indirectly influences the practices and functions of SSB, their decision-making and other activities. However, from either ethical or moral ground, management cannot influence SSB; management does not have legitimate power to control over their activities. Sometimes the BODs and management use the SSB and Shariah executives as a showcase and rubber stamp to accomplish their goals and to maximize profit in either partially or fully. Management assumes that Shariah officers are accomplishing and minimizing their income and hindering business functions without any contributions.

The study significantly contributed to the national and global regulatory bodies by providing suggestions that regulatory bodies should be more concerned with the independence of SSB and Shariah executive officers. Besides, the BODs and management should be careful in handling Shariah issues as they were committed to do Islamic banking as per Shariah law. The study has theoretical contributions regarding the stakeholder and legitimacy theories.

This is the first research which extends the literature of the Islamic banking and Shariah governance mechanisms in perspective of Bangladesh concerning the influence of BODs and management in the decision-making of SSB and implementation of their decisions.

The study aims to examine the independence and effectiveness of the Shariah department officers of the Islamic banks in Bangladesh as the Shariah supervisory board (SSB) provides the annual Shariah report and Shariah resolutions based on the reports of the Shariah department officers.

The study applied a qualitative case study to achieve the research objectives. Data were collected through face-to-face interviews with the regulators, Shariah supervisory boards, Shariah department executives, and experts from the central bank and Islamic banks of Bangladesh.

The study illustrates that Shariah department officers/Shariah officers in Bangladesh seem to lack independence and decision-making authority in accomplishing ex-post Shariah governance functions (i.e. Shariah audit, Shariah compliance and Shariah review) as well as ensuring Shariah compliance. The Shariah officers cannot work spontaneously on practical issues without any interference. The Shariah officers also have to answer to the management regarding their Shariah functions and are not allowed to come up with any opinions without the authority’s authorization.

The study has significant contributions to the central bank and Islamic banks in Bangladesh. This research suggests that regulators, SSB, and Islamic banks should focus on ensuring Shariah compliance and protecting the independence of Shariah department officers as they are mainly related to practical monitoring of Shariah issues. It also suggests that Shariah department officers should directly report to SSB rather than the management regarding Shariah’s compliance and audit issues.

This study is unique in the context of Bangladesh and the global context as a whole for Shariah department officers.