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This study aims to investigate the effect of public corruption on the performance and risk of financial institutions domiciled in the USA..

This study uses the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Public Integrity Section Reports to proxy corruption. The analysis is performed by bank size and includes robustness checks for omitted variables and endogeneity concerns.

The results show that a corrupt environment is associated with lower bank performance without a reduction in risk. Larger banks tend to underestimate the increase in credit risk. Small- and medium-size banks seek to “re-capture” returns in corrupt districts by reducing their liquidity.

The implication of this research is that financial institutions do not thrive in corrupt environments and are unlikely to participate in corrupt practices. Overall, this study documents the tangible harm inflicted by corrupt practices.

A practical implication is that banks may attempt to re-capture lower returns resulting from corrupt environments by extending more risky loans, specifically, commercial real estate loans.

This study demonstrates the costly impact of corruption on large and small banks. While larger banks report higher share of non-performing loans, smaller banks show an increase in the provision for loan and lease losses, suggesting that smaller banks may be more risk averse.

Prior studies investigate corruption in US firms while excluding financial institutions. This study fills this gap by investigating the effect of public corruption on the performance and risk of financial institutions domiciled in the USA.

The purpose of this paper is to determine if the failure of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to persecute Madoff is, in fact, an ethical failure. The authors turn to the extension of Aristotelian theory of moral values, virtue epistemology, to identify specific failures. The authors generalize this study’s conclusions to an overall responsibility of regulatory agencies to exercise epistemic virtues in their decision-making process. The authors explore how behavioral biases confound the execution of epistemic duty, and how awareness of behavioral biases can alleviate epistemic failures. The authors conclude this study with recommendations to prevent future frauds of Madoff proportions.

The authors rely on recent advances in virtue epistemology and behavioral finance. The authors combine these two theoretical approaches to better understand the duty of competence inherent in being a finance professional, and even more so in being a regulator entrusted with overseeing financial industry, and psychological biases that may prevent finance professionals and regulators from performing this duty.

The paper concludes that the SEC employees failed to exercise epistemic virtues in their handling of the complaints implicating Madoff’s firm of fraud. This failure reveals a consistent pattern of behavioral biases in decision-making. The authors posit that knowledge of ethical theory, specifically virtue epistemology, as well as awareness of behavioral biases, which inhibit epistemically virtuous cognitive process, can improve the functioning of both finance industry and its overseers. The authors suggest that future finance professionals and regulators need to acquire this knowledge while pursuing their undergraduate education: it is the duty of business schools to facilitate this progress.

This paper combines the theory of virtue epistemology with the current knowledge of behavioral biases, which distort rational decision-making, to explain the failures of regulators to analyze fraud reports. The authors extend this finding to recommend the inclusion of the theory of virtue epistemology in business schools’ ethics curriculum.

This paper aims to revisit the assumption of the cyclicality of the property-liability insurance market and identify a scenario in which the so-called underwriting cycles are unpredictable, according to a dynamic cash flow model which generates non-cyclical output dynamics.

This paper is on the intersection of real business cycle models and financial cycles. The authors construct a dynamic model of an insurer’s cash flows with stochastic loss shocks and capacity constraints, in which loss shocks have a dual impact on both underwriting profits and access to external capital. They simulate the insurer’s optimal output responses to loss shocks, including output movements in underwriting coverage and external capital, to explore the source of unpredictable underwriting cycles through linear quadratic approximation in the model economy.

The authors find that the effect of loss shocks on the insurer’s cash flows could spread out and amplify over time because of the dynamic interaction between its underwriting capability and ability to raise external capital. This dynamic interaction can generate a non-cyclical pattern of changes in underwriting coverage and access to external capital in the benchmark economy. Applied to different experimental economies, the simulation results reveal that the determinants of the level of output fluctuations include the size of loss shocks, the sensitivity of capital market to loss shocks and the tightness of capital market.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there has been no attempt to study insurance output cyclicality with a dynamic cash flow model based upon the real business cycle literature, in which the dynamic interaction between underwriting and access to external capital because of loss shocks has an amplifying effect on output markets. This paper contributes to the current body of research by being able to simulate and show the insurance output dynamics resulting from the amplifying effect under capacity constraints.