An important lesson that philosophy can learn from the Turing test and computer science more generally concerns the careful use of the method of levels of abstraction (LoAs). The…
Abstract
Purpose
An important lesson that philosophy can learn from the Turing test and computer science more generally concerns the careful use of the method of levels of abstraction (LoAs). The purpose of this paper is to summarize the method and apply it to the paper, modelling and analysis of phenomenological and conceptual systems showing its principal features and main advantages.
Design/methodology/approach
The constituents of the method are “observables”, collected together and moderated by predicates restraining their “behaviour”. The resulting collection of sets of observables is called a “gradient of abstractions” (GoAs) and it formalises the minimum consistency conditions that the chosen abstractions must satisfy. Two useful kinds of GoA – disjoint and nested – are identified. It is then argued that in any discrete (as distinct from analogue) domain of discourse, a complex phenomenon may be explicated in terms of simple approximations organised together in a GoAs. Thus, the method replaces, for discrete disciplines, the differential and integral calculus, which form the basis for understanding the complex analogue phenomena of science and engineering.
Findings
The result formalises an approach that is rather common in computer science but has hitherto found little application in philosophy. So the philosophical value of the method is demonstrated by showing how making the LoA of discourse explicit can be fruitful for phenomenological and conceptual analysis. To this end, the method is applied to the Turing test, the concept of agenthood, the definition of emergence, the notion of artificial life, quantum observation and decidable observation.
Originality/value
This paper applies the method of abstraction to the paper, modelling and analysis of phenomenological and conceptual systems showing its principal features and main advantages. It is hoped that this treatment will promote the use of the method in certain areas of the humanities and especially in philosophy.
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The purpose of this paper is to consider the Turing test (TT) in relation to artistic creativity.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to consider the Turing test (TT) in relation to artistic creativity.
Design/methodology/approach
Considers the TT in the domain of art rather than the usual context. Examines the TT in music and gives examples that involve exploratory creativity.
Findings
The TT for computer art has been passed “behaviourally” already occasionally, at a world class level. Where non‐interactive examples (such as AARON and Emmy) are concerned, the test has been passed in a relatively strong form.
Research limitations/implications
Raises the problem concerning the concept of creativity which is closely linked in most people's minds with the concept of art. There may be no such thing as computer art because there is no such thing as computer creativity. These arguments are examined and questioned.
Practical implications
This paper produces a discussion, which bears upon the relevance of the TT to artistic creativity and computer artworks and also in relation to musical creativity.
Originality/value
Provides further discussion about the imitation game in the context of computational creativity.
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The purpose of this paper is to consider Turing's two tests for machine intelligence: the parallel‐paired, three‐participants game presented in his 1950 paper, and the…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to consider Turing's two tests for machine intelligence: the parallel‐paired, three‐participants game presented in his 1950 paper, and the “jury‐service” one‐to‐one measure described two years later in a radio broadcast. Both versions were instantiated in practical Turing tests during the 18th Loebner Prize for artificial intelligence hosted at the University of Reading, UK, in October 2008. This involved jury‐service tests in the preliminary phase and parallel‐paired in the final phase.
Design/methodology/approach
Almost 100 test results from the final have been evaluated and this paper reports some intriguing nuances which arose as a result of the unique contest.
Findings
In the 2008 competition, Turing's 30 per cent pass rate is not achieved by any machine in the parallel‐paired tests but Turing's modified prediction: “at least in a hundred years time” is remembered.
Originality/value
The paper presents actual responses from “modern Elizas” to human interrogators during contest dialogues that show considerable improvement in artificial conversational entities (ACE). Unlike their ancestor – Weizenbaum's natural language understanding system – ACE are now able to recall, share information and disclose personal interests.
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The purpose of this paper is to consider Alan Turing's philosophical paper on “Computing machinery and intelligence”, in which he defined the “imitation game”, now usually known…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to consider Alan Turing's philosophical paper on “Computing machinery and intelligence”, in which he defined the “imitation game”, now usually known as the Turing test.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper shows that Turing's paper contained more than the test; it contained a wide survey of what a computer could do and its relation to human thought.
Findings
This paper discusses how Turing's paper represented the outcome of many years in which Turing has both developed the concept and the design of the digital computer, and considered how its action could be related to human thought.
Originality/value
Analysis of Turing's paper provides an understanding and appreciation of Turing's contributions and the significance of the Turing test.
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It is widely known that when Turing first introduced his “imitation‐game” test for ascertaining whether a computing machine can think, he considered, and found wanting, a series…
Abstract
Purpose
It is widely known that when Turing first introduced his “imitation‐game” test for ascertaining whether a computing machine can think, he considered, and found wanting, a series of objections to his position. It seems safe to say that one of these objections, the “theological objection” (TO), is regarded by Turing to be positively anemic, and that ever since he delivered his rapid (purported!) refutation over half a century ago, the received view has been that, indeed, this objection is as weak as can be. The purpose of this paper is to show that TO is not the pushover Turing, and others since, take it to be.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper is devoted to the TO within the Turing test (TT) and to Turing's reply to this objection.
Findings
The paper reaches the conclusion that Turing's response to TO fails.
Originality/value
This paper is a defense of the TO to the TT.
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The purpose of this paper is to consider Turing's test and his objections to the idea that a machine might eventually pass it. Discusses behavioural diversity in relation to the…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to consider Turing's test and his objections to the idea that a machine might eventually pass it. Discusses behavioural diversity in relation to the Turing test.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper argues that this objection cannot be dismissed easily, taking the view that the diversity exhibited by human behaviour is characterised by a kind of context‐sensitive adaptive plasticity. Draws on Descartes' arguments and artificial intelligence to interpret the Turing test.
Findings
It is found that the distinctive context‐sensitive adaptive plasticity of human behaviour explains why the Turing test is such a stringent test for the presence of thought and why it is much harder to pass than Turing himself may have realised.
Originality/value
This paper provides an unique view of Turing's test that will assist researchers in assessing its value and its goals.
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The purpose of the paper is to show the impossibility of teaching an individual to live and realize their potential in a modern dynamic environment by being within an artificial…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of the paper is to show the impossibility of teaching an individual to live and realize their potential in a modern dynamic environment by being within an artificial education system and explore the idea of life-creating education.
Design/methodology/approach
The study is based on the models of future education and community. Education is viewed from the position of a student’s ability to self-realize in the modern world. This paper relies on the analyses of basic characteristics of formal education, the challenges to it from the point of view of contemporaneous society and the main routes to improve education.
Findings
An artificial education system with its translation of a stable experience model is obsolete. Formal education does not provide an individual with the necessary life experience. Learners’ interest and involvement into cognitive activity; joint creative activity and production of personal knowledge; self-determination; and personal fulfilment are the main features of life-creating education. It involves the whole society into learning, modifies teachers’ functions and requires developing flexible management tools.
Originality/value
This original work shows basic principles of life-creating education and maps the way forward. The represented results will be useful for developing new models of education improvement.