Search results

This paper aims to demonstrate how illicit funds are being laundered through underground currency exchange networks.

Sixty interviews with money launderers and compliance officers were conducted to identify methods relevant to current money laundering issues. Further, a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers was administered.

The currency exchange method is highly suitable for money launderers with access to a criminal network. It may be used for placement or pre-placement. Evidently, the vast majority of compliance officers fail to recognize the utilization of this method in their daily business.

Implications are based on the statements of 60 interviewees, comprising both alleged money launderers and compliance officers.

The study identified gaps in anti-money laundering mechanisms. The documentation of said inconsistencies aims to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with useful insights into the minds of money launderers.

Whereas most prior literature focuses on money laundering prevention methods, how money launderers operate is not illustrated. This study comprehensively overviews the issue by interviewing not only compliance officers but also money launderers. Understanding how money launderers operate is essential to effectively prevent money laundering. In particular, compliance officers must be able to view money laundering from the criminal’s perspective to sufficiently combat the issue.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how cryptocurrencies are used to launder money and how solutions from Liechtenstein’s novel blockchain legislation could be used to tackle the issue.

Within the scope of the literature review, the characteristics of cryptocurrencies and how these characteristics facilitate money laundering are discussed. To investigate concrete methods that money launderers use, a qualitative study with 10 presumed money launderers and 18 prevention experts was conducted. The results were subsequently tested quantitatively. Thereafter, the novel Liechtenstein blockchain act is discussed and it is detailed how the legislation could contribute to the establishment of an international standard in blockchain regulation.

Money launderers continue to abuse cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin as vehicles for financial crime. The Liechtenstein Blockchain Act could serve as a benchmark for regulators around the world aiming to solve the issue.

Current anti-money laundering regulations are rather ineffective when it comes to cryptocurrencies.

The findings of this paper illustrate that new and innovative means for combating money laundering are needed. In particular, this paper provides insights into cryptocurrency crime and Liechtenstein’s response for legislators, law enforcement, compliance officers and regulatory authorities.

Liechtenstein’s blockchain act, as a potential remedy to money laundering, has thus far not received international attention.

This paper aims to illustrate how illegally obtained funds are laundered through raw diamonds in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

To identify specific money laundering techniques involving raw diamonds, this study used a qualitative content analysis of data collected from 60 semi-standardized interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers.

Raw diamonds are extraordinarily suitable for money laundering in European German-speaking countries. In particular, they may be used in all three stages of the laundering process, namely, placement, layering and integration.

Because the qualitative findings are based on semi-standardized interviews, their insights are limited to the perspectives of the 60 interviewees.

Identifying gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms should provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate.

While prior studies focus on the methods used by organizations to combat money laundering and how to improve anti-money laundering measures, this paper investigates how money launderers operate to avoid detection, thereby illustrating authentic experiences. Its findings provide valuable insights into the minds of money launderers and combines criminal perspective with that of prevention experts.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how money launderers circumvent compliance measures by using exchange offices to launder incriminated funds.

The three-step process entailed carrying out unofficial interviews with money launderers, which gave first insight into the issue, followed by expert interviews that were reviewed by means of a qualitative study. The findings of the qualitative study were processed during the subsequent quantitative research.

Although exchange offices are a known threat to anti-money laundering efforts, they continue to be highly applicable. As exchange offices are responsible for their own compliance measures, compliance officers employed by other institutions do not encounter money laundering through exchange offices regularly.

The findings of the study are limited to the experiences of the interviewed experts, which, naturally, are highly subjective. Further, they are geographically limited, as certain areas were not represented in the study.

During the literature review, a research gap was identified. The present study attempts to partially fill the same. The illustrated findings aimed at facilitating an improvement of anti-money laundering measures. The insights into the minds of money launderers provide valuable information for legislators, compliance officers and authorities.

Presently, the majority of the literature focuses on the issue of money laundering from a compliance perspective. However, accurately understanding how money launderers circumvent the existing prevention measures requires an exploration of their approaches. To effectively inhibit money laundering, it is necessary to gain a holistic overview of the issue, which entails the observation of both perspectives.

The purpose of the paper is to illustrate how companies may benefit from whistleblowing and how whistleblowing may be incentivized to more effectively combat corruption.

No clear hypothesis could be formulated based on the literature review. Therefore, an explorative approach was selected for the purpose of this study. Ten selected compliance experts were interviewed, and the results were subjected to summarizing content analysis.

It was found that corruption, particularly bribery, continues to be prevalent in many corporations and that current anti-bribery incentives are rather inefficient. It was also found that whistleblowing incentives have thus far not been investigated in sufficient depth in the literature, despite the fact that they can be immensely useful in combating corruption.

Interviews with different experts, at different times, or selecting experts from different locations could have led to diverging results.

Incentive systems, particularly whistleblowing incentives, can be designed to prevent corruption in multinational corporations.

This study explores a new field and develops innovative theory to gain a deeper understanding of whistleblowing.

This case study highlights why and how the Swiss banking sector played a crucial role in the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) corruption scandal. In particular, the paper illustrates how different actors in the Swiss financial sector neglected compliance guidelines and due diligence, thus effectively facilitating the laundering of misappropriated 1MDB funds. The purpose of this paper is to give bankers and compliance officers an overview of the methods money launderers use to circumvent compliance measures so that the Swiss banking sector can be protected more effectively from abuse. In addition, there is discussion whether current regulations, including banking secrecy, should be amended.

This paper used a content analysis methodological approach to collect data from media sources. Qualitative methods were used to analyze these sources.

The findings reveal that the Swiss banking sector played a major role in facilitating the siphoning and subsequent laundering of 1MDB funds by neglecting due diligence obligations.

This paper advocates a more consequential implementation of the existing anti-money laundering and corruption regulations.

A reworking of the 1MDB scandal should be of interest to compliance professionals in the banking sector and citizens that have been negatively affected or are concerned by the involved high-level corruption.

This paper is the first of its kind to study the role of the Swiss banking sector in the 1MDB scandal.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how illegally obtained funds from Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland are laundered through the banking system in Dubai.

The study is conducted using a qualitative content analysis of 60 semi-structured expert interviews with both criminals and money laundering prevention experts, and a quantitative survey of 200 financial sector compliance officers.

Some banks in Dubai are highly suitable for all stages of the money laundering process. However, although certain banks have weak compliance mechanisms, others act in an exemplary manner.

The qualitative findings are based on semi-structured interviews and are limited to the 60 interviewees’ perspectives.

Identification of gaps in anti-money laundering mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how money laundering criminals operate.

The existing literature focuses mainly on organizations and the methods they use to combat money laundering. This paper outlines how money launderers operate to avoid detection. Authentic experiences are illustrated. The reader is provided with valuable insights into the minds of money launderers. Both lawful and criminal perspectives are taken into account.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how illegally obtained funds are laundered by employment of consulting companies in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

A qualitative content analysis of 28 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts, and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers led to the identification of concrete money-laundering techniques involving the employment of consulting companies.

Consulting companies continue to be used for money laundering in European German-speaking countries, especially in the layering and integration stages of the money laundering process, during which the origins of funds are concealed, and the money is integrated into the legal economy.

Qualitative findings from the analysis of semi-standardized interviews are limited to the 28 interviewees’ perspectives.

Identification of gaps in existing anti-money-laundering mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate.

The existing literature focuses on organizations that combat money laundering and the improvement of anti-money-laundering measures. This paper outlines how money launderers avoid detection. Both preventative and criminal perspectives are considered.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how illicit funds are laundered by using the gold method in German-speaking European countries.

To identify approaches to money laundering via gold, 60 semi-standardized interviews with money launderers and compliance officers were conducted. Further, a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers was administered.

The gold trade in European German-speaking countries remains extraordinarily suitable for money laundering. In particular, it may be used for placement and layering.

The implications are based on the statements of 60 interviewees, including both money launderers and compliance officers. Thus, the derived results are limited to the perspectives of these 60 persons.

Based on this study’s findings, gaps in the existing anti-money laundering measures are identified. Documenting these inconsistencies should provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into the minds of money launderers.

As this study explores the perspectives of both compliance officers and money launderers, it provides a broad overview of the issues. Most existing literature fails to observe money laundering from the launderers’ perspective, focusing instead on methods to prevent money laundering. Effective prevention requires profound knowledge of how criminals operate. Only by adopting criminals’ perspective can compliance officers effectively spot money-laundering methods.

The purpose of this paper is to exemplify how money launderers in European German-speaking countries use deposit boxes to place incriminated funds.

During a qualitative content analysis of 60 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts and a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers, concrete money laundering techniques using deposit boxes were identified.

Deposit boxes may be used to place incriminated funds or prepare for their subsequent placement. Thus, the method is highly suitable to the demands of small-scale money laundering.

The study’s qualitative findings are limited to the perspectives of the 60 interview partners. The interviews were conducted in a semi-standardized fashion.

The present paper aims at identifying gaps in existing anti-money laundering mechanisms to provide compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with worthwhile insights into the minds of criminals.

The present paper illustrates how money launderers operate to avoid detection, capturing the perspective of the launderer. Thus, the reader is granted access to highly valuable information that is supposed to facilitate the introduction of new anti-money laundering measures. Moreover, it shows how compliance officers view the issue and what they consider to be important to the successful implementation of compliance mechanisms. Moreover, the officers’ statements will exhibit which methods they do and do not engage with on a daily basis.