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Defines corporate governance, describes the special characteristics of Belgian companies and presents a study of the disciplining of bad management in 165 companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange 1989‐1996. Finds that poor share price performance is generally linked to a higher turnover of directors except in holding companies and that several measures of poor accounting performance are linked to higher director and CEO turnover, although there is more resistance to this in large companies and less in those with a higher proportion of non‐executive directors or total/foreign ownership. Shows that negative after‐tax earnings lead owners with strong monitoring abilities (e.g. holding companies) to increase their stake while others (e.g. families and institutional shareholders) reduce it; and that CEO replacement is followed by increased dividends. Summarizes the findings, noting the differences between the finance sector and others.

This paper seeks to answer the question whether control and changes in control after a firm's initial public offering (IPO) have a significant influence on firm value in two very different systems of corporate governance, i.e. Germany and the UK.

The dynamics of post‐IPO firm performance are investigated for size‐ and industry‐matched German and UK samples.

It was found that, although the post‐IPO evolution of control in German and UK companies differs significantly, there is no significant change in their long‐run financial and operating performance. The paper concludes that the long‐run performance of IPOs is not correlated with control and ownership retention. Moreover, the results presented in the paper suggest that the poor long‐term performance of IPOs documented in empirical literature can neither be explained by potential agency conflicts arising from the reduction in control held by the original shareholders nor by a reduction in the incumbents’ control.

Contrary to what may be expected, the involvement of the pre‐IPO shareholders in the firm after the flotation is not crucial to the firm in terms of value generation. Although a reduction in control is expected to lead to less intensive monitoring as strong blockholders are no longer present, there is still no evidence that the firm will suffer in terms of its performance over the long run.

The paper uses an original methodology which consists of matched samples of German and UK firms with similar initial levels of control. The paper then tracks changes in control over the six years after the IPO and links these to the levels of and changes in performance.

In this paper, we analyse the short-term wealth effects of large (intra)European takeover bids. We find large announcement effects of 9% for target fir

The aim of the paper is to study the long‐run under‐performance of UK initial public offerings (IPOs) by relating it to the pre‐IPO financial performance of the firm as well as the managerial decisions taken before the IPO.

The three‐year share returns of UK IPOs is studied using various methodologies such as buy and hold returns, cumulative abnormal returns and Fama and French three‐factor returns.

It was found that the percentage of equity issued and the degree of multinationality of a firm are the key predictors of its performance after the IPO. It is also found that small firms behave differently from large firms and suffer from worse long‐run performance than large firms.

There is a great need for future research to focus on ownership structure and long‐run returns. Further, a focus on the level of debt and venture capital financing in the pre‐IPO period may also uncover important relationships with the long‐run performance of a firm.

The results obtained from this study provide important information for the prospective long term investors in new issues. While pre‐IPO performance of a firm cannot predict the post‐IPO performance with certainty, nevertheless the results of this study suggest that long‐term investors should show caution while deciding on long term investment in IPO firms.

The paper explains the post‐IPO underperformance of firms by relating it to the pre‐IPO managerial decisions made in the firm. It also documents the role of multinationality in explaining long run underperformance.

This study aims to find whether the Indian private corporate sector follow stable cash dividend policies, whether dividends smoothen earnings, estimate the implicit target dividend ratio, and examine the determinants along with speed of adjustment of dividends towards a long run target ratio.

The study uses the instrumental variable (IV) approach for dynamic panel data for 1971‐2010 periods controlling for economic reforms. The GMM‐in‐levels model, GMM‐in‐first‐differences and GMM‐in‐systems are alternatively estimated to include other lag structures.

In the post‐reform period lower dividends are consistent with rapid growth in the economic environment and the tendency to smoothen dividends has considerably decreased over time. The estimated model suggests dividends substitute for less opportunity for internal growth and increased general likening to relatively retain their earnings and finance their growth, unlike the past.

Limitation to capture substitution, ownership and self selection effects stems up from data as the Annual Studies RBI does not include such variables, does not capture qualitative data and disallows identification of the firm.

The paper documents long run trends and inter‐temporal dividend patterns controlling economic reforms for a relatively larger number of public limited firms nearing four decades for an emerging economy.

This is a first attempt to take a holistic view of dividend using rich set of unexplored dynamic panel data on Indian firms controlling for reforms using contemporary econometric models and analyzes issues relating determinants, smoothening and stability of the corporate dividend structure.