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This study aims to investigate how relatively weaker manufacturers respond to the dominance of stronger suppliers and/or customers. The study also analyzes how the competitive intensity perceived by manufacturers moderates their responses to powerful chain partners.

Using hierarchical regression, data from 1,417 manufacturing companies sampled from the fifth and sixth versions of the International Manufacturing Strategy Survey were analyzed.

This study found that relatively weaker manufacturers often adopt exploration strategies to countervail the dominance of suppliers and adopt exploitation strategies to deal with more powerful customers. In dealing with both dominant suppliers and customers, relatively weaker manufacturers are prone to adopt exploration and exploitation strategies simultaneously and hence become ambidextrous. Furthermore, the link between dominance in supply chains and the exploration (exploitation) strategy is strengthened (weakened) as market competition perceived by manufacturers intensifies.

The contribution of this paper is multi-folds. First, this paper develops and test a novel theoretical model on how relatively weaker manufacturers create tailored strategies to defend their positions in the supply chain. Second, it integrates resource dependence theory and organizational learning theory to propose that relatively weaker manufacturers could use a unique configuration of exploration and exploitation strategies to counteract the dominance of their suppliers and customers. Third, it investigates supply chain power by considering the manufacturers’ upstream and downstream powerful partners together, rather than individually and fourth, it reveals that relationships linking supply chain power to manufacturers’ tailored strategies are contingent on competitive intensity.

The development of low-carbon production is impeded by the investment costs of green technology research and development (R&D) and carbon emission reduction while facing the uncertain risk of emission reduction investment. With the government's carbon emission constraints, green manufacturers implement the advance selling strategy to increase both profit and reduction level. However, few studies consider the consumer's green preference and emission constraints in advance selling market and spot market independently. The authors' paper investigates the optimal strategies of advance selling pricing and reduction effort for green manufacturers to maximize profits.

The authors' paper designs a stochastic model and investigates the manufacturer's optimal strategies of advance selling price and emission reduction efforts by categorizing different purchasing periods of low-carbon consumers. With the challenges of uncertain demand and government's emission constraints, the authors' develop the non-linear optimization model to investigate the manufacturer's profit-oriented decisions.

The results show the government's carbon constraints cannot influence the manufacturer's profit, but the consumer's low-carbon preference in the advance selling period can. Interestingly, the manufacturer will make fewer reduction efforts even when the consumers have stronger environmental awareness. In addition, the increasing consumer price sensitivity will exacerbate the profit loss from mandatory emissions reduction. Overall, for achieving a win–win situation between emission reduction and profit growth, green manufacturers should not only consider the sales strategies, market demand, and government constraints in a low-carbon market, but also pay attention to the uncertainty of green technology innovation.

With the consideration of the government's carbon emission constraints, uncertain demand, and low-carbon consumer's preferences, the authors' study innovatively incorporates the joint impacts of advance selling strategy and emission reduction effort strategy and then differentiates between two cases that pertain to the diverse carbon emission regulations.

This study addresses the challenge of generating material waste from support structures in 3D printing manufacturing and aims to explore more cost-effective manufacturing strategies for 3D printing manufacturers by considering two strategies: technology upgrading and material recycling.

This study examines the optimal decisions for manufacturers under each scenario (including a benchmark model and models for the two strategies) and explores the most profitable strategy by comparing the optimal profits of the manufacturer and analyzing the impact of key factors.

This study reveals that the choice of the optimal manufacturing strategy depends on the cost coefficient of technological effort and the fixed cost associated with introducing material recycling. In addition, it finds that material recycling is particularly effective in enhancing consumer surplus.

The analysis provides an important basis for decision-making for 3D printing manufacturers considering technology upgrading and material recycling, which can not only enhance economic benefits but also contribute to the sustainable advancement of 3D printing technology.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to focus on the adverse effects of support structures in 3D printing manufacturing and systematically explore the economic feasibility of improving this issue through both technology upgrading and material recycling.

This paper seeks to fill the literature gap that lacks of exploring negotiation strategy with competing partners under asymmetric production-cost information. The purpose of this paper is to examine firms’ optimal contract negotiation strategies in buyer–supplier–supplier triads where there are concurrent negotiations between the retailer and two competing manufacturers.

The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain, in which the retailer has the option of segmented or unified negotiation policy, whereas the two competing manufacturers can withhold or share production cost information in the negotiation. Based on game theory, the authors derive the manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices and the retailer’s optimal retail prices with eight possible scenarios. Optimal strategic choices and operational decisions are then explored through the comparative analysis of equilibriums of eight possible scenarios.

The authors find that the retailer will adopt different negotiation strategies depending on manufacturers’ decisions on sharing or withholding their production-cost information. When both manufacturers share their production-cost information, the retailer will adopt a unified negotiation policy. The high-efficiency manufacturer should adopt the same information-sharing strategy as the low-efficiency manufacturer in order to gain more profit.

The modelling helps to bring further clarity in supply chain contract negotiation by offering a conceptual framework to enhance our understanding of the effects of information-sharing strategy and negotiation policy in the negotiation process form the perspectives of all engaging parties. Managerial insights derived from the research will enable retailers and manufacturers to make informed and better strategic and operational decisions to improve market competitiveness.

Aims to discuss the basic strategy taken by a specific manufacturer. States supply chain structures influence, directly, the supply chain inventory as a measure of performance. Examines the difference in the supply chain in relation to the manufacturer’s strategy to the product.

This paper explores how the manufacturer’s strategic choice (acquisition or investment) impacts product quality in a supply chain comprising two complementary suppliers and a common manufacturer.

The manufacturer faces six strategic choices to improve product quality: acquiring or investing in the high-capable supplier, the low-capable supplier, or both. As the Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer determines which strategy is adopted, while suppliers are separately responsible for components’ quality and wholesale prices. The authors use game theory and calculate the model with Mathematica.

The authors develop analytical models to analyze how acquisition costs, investment proportions, component importance and quality improvement coefficients influence decision-makers. The results show that the highest quality may not benefit the manufacturer. Investing in or acquiring a low-capable supplier is better than a high-capable supplier under certain conditions. If the gaps between two suppliers’ quality improvement coefficients and the importance of two components are dramatic, the manufacturer should choose an investment strategy.

This study contributes to the complementary supply chain management by comparing two kinds of strategies-acquisition and investment, with a high-capable supplier and a low-capable supplier.

Analyses the strategy of ingredient branding and its implications on the distribution channel members, in addition to its potential for aiding product introduction and adoption. Considers the benefits and the drawbacks for the supplier, manufacturer, retailer and consumer. Concludes that the appropriateness of ingredient branding depends on manufacturer‐supplier relationship, the need to differentiate the brand, and the ability to implement the new branding strategy.

Previous studies have rarely integrated the financing modes of a capital-constrained manufacturer with the choices of online sales strategies. To address this gap, the authors study how a manufacturer selects optimal financing modes under different sales strategies in three dual-channel supply chains.

This paper considers three sales strategies, namely, combining a traditional retailer channel with one of the direct selling, reselling and agency selling channels, and two common financing modes, namely, bank financing and retailer financing. The authors obtain equilibrium outcomes of the manufacturer and traditional retailer and then provide the conditions for them to select optimal financing modes under three sales strategies.

The results indicate that the manufacturer’s financing decisions rely on the initial capital and interest rates, and the manufacturer selects retailer financing only if the initial capital is relatively larger. In terms of financing mode options, the retailer financing mode is more beneficial for the manufacturer under the three sales strategies. From the perspective of sales strategies, the direct selling model is more beneficial. In addition, the higher the consumer acceptance of the online channel, the more profits the manufacturer obtains.

This paper provides suggestions on how the capital-constrained manufacturer chooses financing modes and sales strategies.

This paper integrates the financing mode and different sales strategies to investigate the manufacturer’s optimal operational decisions. These sales strategies allow us to investigate the manufacturer’s optimal financing modes in the presence of both different financing modes and sales strategies.

Previous studies have investigated the influence strategy–economic satisfaction links within a pairwise framework. This study aims to reexamine this issue in a network context from both the structural and relational embeddedness perspectives.

An ego network approach in which the network consists of a focal distributor, other distributors and alternate manufacturers is adopted to measure the distributor’s network. Drawing on data from 124 distributors from China’s tire industry, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses.

The empirical results find a positive relationship between a manufacturer’s noncoercive influence strategies and the distributor’s economic satisfaction and an inverse U-shaped relationship between coercive influence strategies and economic satisfaction. It discusses the joint effects of coercive and noncoercive influence strategies and finds that the former mitigate the positive effects of the latter and that the latter flatten the inverse-U shaped effect of the former. Further, when a distributor spans rich structural holes, the effects of coercive and noncoercive influence strategies on economic satisfaction weaken. When a distributor has strong ties with its network members, the effects of noncoercive influence strategies are mitigated, while the effects of coercive influence strategies are enhanced.

This study provides implications for manufacturers, particularly concerning how to properly exert influence strategies to improve distributors’ economic satisfaction. Manufacturers should consider the attributes of the networks in which the distributors are embedded, involving structural holes and tie strength. They should also carefully use the two influence strategies simultaneously.

This study contributes to the influence strategy literature by incorporating a network perspective by empirically examining the different moderating effects of structural holes and tie strength; provides a new and powerful explanation for the effects that coercive influence strategies have on economic satisfaction by testing an inverse U-shaped effect; and examines the effects of the interaction of two strategies.

In contrast to many studies that were conducted in a Western context, this study seeks to extend the understanding and empirical findings on power, dependence, and interfirm influence strategies by examining these issues within a channel of distribution in Singapore. Research hypotheses are developed, centering on the relationship between a manufacturer’s power and its use of coercive and noncoercive influence strategies as well as the reciprocal use of coercive and noncoercive influence strategies in the channel dyad. Data from a field study of personal computer dealers are used in testing the research hypotheses. In contrast to most previous studies, a multiple‐item measure of influence strategies is used. Among the findings is that a manufacturer in this channel setting tends to use both coercive and noncoercive influence strategies in influencing its dealers.