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This study investigates the circumstances under which a business to customer (B2C) marketplace chooses to implement green marketing to promote green product investment (GPI). It further identifies the optimal sales model approach for implementing green marketing under uncertainty about the effects of GPI.

We examine an e-commerce (EC) supply chain involving a manufacturer who determines the product’s greenness level and a B2C marketplace who can operate in either an agency or a reselling mode and engages in green marketing to promote sales of green products. Using the backward induction method, we develop an analytical model to drive the optimal decisions and profits under each sales model.

Our research demonstrates that high GPI uncertainty drives B2C marketplaces to adopt green marketing strategies. These initiatives not only prompt manufacturers to invest in eco-friendly products but also boost profits for all parties involved. Nevertheless, these benefits depend on the choice of a sales model between agency and reselling. Our findings offer a novel practical application into the relationship between GPI uncertainty and green marketing. When the GPI uncertainty is high, green marketing is profitable for the B2C marketplace regardless of which sales mode is adopted. However, when uncertainty is low, green marketing only benefits the B2C marketplace in the agency mode. Moreover, the interaction between GPI uncertainty and the referral fee exerts a moderating influence on the preferred sales mode for both the manufacturer and the B2C marketplace.

Our findings offer a novel practical application into the relationship between GPI uncertainty and green marketing. When the GPI uncertainty is high, green marketing is profitable for the B2C marketplace regardless of which sales mode is adopted. However, when uncertainty is low, green marketing only benefits the B2C marketplace in the agency mode. Moreover, the interaction between GPI uncertainty and the referral fee exerts a moderating influence on the preferred sales mode for both the manufacturer and the B2C marketplace.

Overall, our research contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex but beneficial interplay between GPI uncertainty, green marketing and sales mode selection in an EC supply chain.

This study aims to examine manufacturers’ strategic responses to consumer migration from offline to online channels, focusing on how these shifts affect their channel selection and business strategies.

This research uses a theoretical framework using a Stackelberg game model to analyze manufacturers’ decision-making processes amid evolving consumer behaviors. It intricately explores the strategic implications across three distinct channel structures: manufacturer direct sales (MD), retailer resale (RR) and retailer agency (RA), focusing on their economic outcomes and market dynamics. This approach is instrumental in decoding the multifaceted nature of channel migration and its impact on manufacturer–retailer relationships in the digital marketplace.

The research reveals that in MD and RA scenarios, as channel migration intensifies, manufacturers tend to lower both wholesale and online retail prices. Conversely, in the RR scenario, the set wholesale price is intricately linked to the market share, with higher prices set for smaller offline market shares. From a strategic standpoint, MD emerges as the optimal choice for maximizing manufacturer profits, while RA takes precedence when considering the entire supply chain’s profitability, particularly under high commission costs.

This research illuminates the impact of channel migration on manufacturers’ pricing strategies and channel selection. It not only advances the understanding of consumer behavior in multichannel retail environments but also offers practical insights for businesses in effectively managing online and offline channels.

This study aims to explore the dynamics between the brand manufacturer’s revenue model choice and the platform’s private label product entry strategy, specifically, (1) Under the wholesale and agency models, when should the platform introduce its private label product to compete with the manufacturer? (2) Facing the potential threat of the platform’s entry, how should the manufacturer choose between the wholesale and agency models? (3) How does the platform’s entry strategy affect the manufacturer’s price decisions and demand? (4) What are the implications of the strategic interaction between the manufacturer’s model selection and the platform’s encroachment on social welfare and consumer surplus?

This study develops a multistage game model consisting of a manufacturer, a platform and consumers. The model describes the strategic interaction between the manufacturer and the platform, where the manufacturer first chooses one of the revenue models from the agency model and the wholesale model, followed by the platform’s decision whether to offer its own products to enter the competition, after which the two parties set the price of their products to compete on price according to their strategies, then the consumers make purchase decisions based on the principle of utility maximization.

For the platform, to not hurt its profitability in the manufacturer channel with too much competition, lower social utility sensitivity and lower similarity of product imitation rather favor platform entry. Platform entry affects manufacturers’ retail prices and demand differently across different revenue models. Interestingly, if the social utility sensitivity and imitation similarity are moderate, when the commissions extracted by the platform are low, manufacturers still have the incentive to adopt the wholesale model rather than the agency model. In addition, platform entry into competition increases consumer surplus and social welfare only when consumer sensitivity to social utility is low.

The research model innovatively describes the strategic interaction between the manufacturer and the platform; to more accurately portray the consumer demand model, this model also introduces the parameters of the similarity of the platform’s products to the products of the manufacturer, as well as the social utility sensitivity of consumers. Conclusions are drawn on the choice of platform entry strategy versus the choice of revenue model for manufacturers. Relevant managerial insights are provided for both platforms and manufacturers, which partially explains the existing market situation.

The purpose of this paper is to find an incentive strategy to enhance the interests of the main manufacturer by inducing the suppliers to conflict the fixed incentive provided by the main manufacturer.

The main manufacturer‐supplier model is widely applied in the R&D procedure of complex products such as aeroplanes. Because of the uncertainty in the R&D, the effort of the suppliers has an important effect on it. Considering the dynamic interaction between the main manufacturers and suppliers, with the main manufacturers as leaders and suppliers as followers, this paper establishes a Grey‐Stackelberg model to analyze the best change of the incentive strategies of the main manufacturers and the effort strategies under incentive‐conflict of suppliers under the uncertain environment. A numeric example is also computed in the last part of the paper.

The results show that the main manufacturer can increase its benefit without damaging the interests of suppliers by controlling the fixed incentives.

The paper succeeds in establishing the Grey‐Stackelberg model by analysing the grey area among the main manufacturer and the suppliers, and helps to develop grey systems theory.

Suggests that gaps exist between the product ranges or lines offered by manufacturers and the assortments selected and stocked by retailers. Looks at the extent to which differing levels of “product volatility” affect retailers’ selectivity in stocking items from a manufacturer’s line. Provides a limited test of several hypotheses about how the degree of product volatility of the category within which a manufacturer’s line belongs might affect the number of items in the line that will be stocked by a retailer. Analysis of stock‐planning data for two retailers in each of two product categories offers some support for the hypotheses. Interprets these results in light of theories of distribution channel co‐ordination and retailer expertise. They may reflect an alternative explanation for widely observed increases in retailer power.

Cooperative advertising is intended for the mutual benefit of channel partners. Shows that manufacturers and dealers/distributors in the boating industry view this marketing activity very differently. Manufacturers see no connection between cooperative advertising and other aspects of the relationships with their dealers. On the other hand, dealers relate their views of cooperative advertising to other facets of their relationships with manufacturers. Consequently, when there is conflict over cooperative advertising, it is liable to have a negative effect on other arrangements that dealers have with manufacturers. Manufacturers may not understand how negativity creeps into other relationships between dealers and themselves.

The managerial questions of this paper are as follows: What are the equilibrium conditions of transfer price, quantity and profits when considering dynamic subsidies from the government? Which collection channel is better for a manufacturer, direct collection by itself or through an online platform?

This research investigates the three collection models: the manufacturer-driven model, the online platform-driven model and the competitive model. Based on the differential game, this research explores the transfer price, collection cost, subsidy and manufacturer and online platform profit in different models when considering the dynamic subsidy.

The results show that the collection strategy for the manufacturer depends on its collection cost. If the collection cost is lower, then the manufacturer may prefer to collect by itself. When the collection cost meets a certain range, the manufacturer may collect the used product through an online platform. The online platform-driven model is the most efficient because both the manufacturer and the online platform can make a higher profit.

This research bridges the gap between waste electrical and electronic equipment collection and government subsidies by demonstrating the dynamic condition of subsidies. It offers an approach to address the influence of dynamic subsidy, which can provide practical insights for the government implementing the subsidy policy.

A popular production model for high-tech manufacturers is that they move most production lines abroad to produce formal products for sale and just keep a few production lines in headquarters to manufacture sample products for new product development. Under such a production model, the paper aims to develop a selection model of International Air Express (IAE) for high-tech manufacturers in airfreight of sample products using the fuzzy best-worst method (BWM).

In this paper, an assessment model based on the fuzzy BWM approach is proposed for high-tech manufacturers in selecting airfreight carriers for the shipping of sample products. Further, one high-tech electronic manufacturer in Taiwan was empirically investigated to validate the assessment model.

The result indicates that electronics manufacturer pays more attention to Promptness, Mutual trust, Freight rate and Financial status of fixed assets when selecting IAEs. Besides, FedEx is argued to be the most preferred IAE for the transportation of sample products. Based on the findings, some practical management implications were discussed.

Some literature limitations should be addressed. Initially, the adoption of the fuzzy BWM assumes independence among criteria. Nonetheless, this assumption is not yet to confirm in this study. Accordingly, this limitation leaves room for improvement in future studies. Further, in this paper, five experienced experts from the Radiant Opto-Electronics Corporation (ROEC) case were empirically surveyed. To ensure the validity of the surveying, this paper adopted an interviewing survey instead of a traditional mailed survey. However, more representative samples are still necessary to confirm the empirical results in future research.

Firstly, the proposed research model provides a systematic framework to the decision-making process, which assists high-tech manufacturers in identifying the most suitable IAEs based on multiple criteria. It has been illustrated that high-tech companies deliver their sample products requiring timely and secure means of transport. In practice, manufacturers can assess various IAEs considering some main factors, such as Operational Flexibility (OF), Partner Relationship (PR), Transportation Capability (TC) and Management, using fuzzy BWM. This process ensures the selection of IAEs aligning with their logistical needs and business priorities, ultimately enhancing operational efficiency and customer satisfaction. Secondly, empirical results from the ROEC case indicate that electronics manufacturer pays more attention to Promptness, Mutual trust, Freight rate and Financial status of fixed assets when selecting IAEs. Besides, FedEx is argued to be the most preferred IAE for transportation of sample products. In other words, ROEC should consider establishing long-term contracts with preferred IAEs (i.e. FedEx) to secure favorable rates and service commitments. On top of that, results not only provide practical information for manufacturers in selecting IAEs but also for IAE partners to improve their service policies.

The results not only provide practical information for high-tech manufacturers in selecting airfreight carriers but also for the airfreight carriers to improve their service quality.

This paper aims to explore the effect of different government subsidy decisions and the differences between the consequences of these decisions when supply chain members engage in cooperative green innovation through cost-sharing arrangements.

This paper investigates the optimal decisions for green supply chains under two types of subsidies, including subsidies for green innovation research and development (R&D) costs and subsidies for consumers, by integrating game theory with numerical simulation.

The optimal R&D cost-sharing ratio is found to be 2/3 for manufacturers and 1/3 for retailers. Under any subsidy policy, the supply chain can achieve maximum total profit. When the supply chain adopts the optimal R&D cost-sharing ratio, subsidies for green innovation R&D costs prove to be the most effective in increasing the supply chain’s profit. However, from the perspective of total social welfare, the analysis reveals that government subsidies to consumers are more beneficial for promoting overall social welfare.

Previous studies on green supply chain decisions have primarily focused on either government subsidies or corporate cost sharing in isolation. In contrast, this study combines both government subsidies and cost sharing within a unified framework for a more comprehensive analysis. Additionally, this paper examines the impact of government subsidies on supply chain cost-sharing decisions and their effect on overall social welfare while considering the presence of cost sharing and using the combination of theoretical modeling and simulation analysis.

As the risk of uncertain quality of used products potentially hinders remanufacturing, this study aims to examine the impact of risk aversion under quality uncertainty of used products in a remanufacturing supply chain (RSC) consisting of a manufacturer and an independent remanufacturer.

We develop an RSC model where the manufacturer produces new products, outsources remanufacturing to the independent remanufacturer and sells both new and remanufactured products to end consumers. Using a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game framework, we derive the equilibrium solutions under risk-neutral and risk-averse scenarios. Additionally, we design a two-part tariff contract to achieve coordination.

We show that while risk aversion leads the manufacturer to raise the outsourcing fee, which in turn reduces both the remanufactured quantity and the collection rate of used products. Consequently, consumer surplus and social welfare decline, while environmental impacts rise. The proposed two-part tariff contract can improve the collection rate and social welfare. We also explore two extensions: an authorization remanufacturing scenario and a two-period scenario. We find that risk aversion has no impact on the selection of remanufacturing mode and the equilibria in the first period. Our findings provide timely managerial insights for RSC management.

One of the main risks deterring remanufacturing is the quality uncertainty of used products. However, the risk aversion arising from this uncertainty and its effects have rarely been studied within a game-theoretic framework. This paper fills this gap by analyzing the remanufacturer’s risk aversion under quality uncertainty and investigating its impacts.