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When major reallocations of the firm’s assets are strategically necessary, the corporation’s decision system is perhaps put to its severest test. This paper aims to argue that a relevant balance in the corporate governance structure is highly important to assure those strategic decisions taken are successful and economically beneficial to shareholders’ wealth.

This study examines US firms making major acquisitions resulting in large losses or large gains and identify weaknesses and strengths in their respective governance structures.

Firms making large loss acquisitions demonstrate a balance in the corporate governance structure that heavily favors the CEO. Firms making large gain acquisitions present a more efficient balance in the configuration their corporate governance dynamics. Finally, the authors present evidence that making a major acquisition triggers rebalancing of the corporate governance dynamics to increase the effectiveness of monitoring the implementation of the acquisition. The authors find firms making large loss acquisitions make more extensive changes in the professional expertise on their boards.

This study provides a broad understanding of the role of corporate governance by examining overall governance dynamics and offers how one corporate governance structure does not fit all firms, at all times, in all circumstances. Instead, timely imbalances within the configurations of corporate governance dynamics over the major strategic acquisition process can be consistent with the goal of increasing shareholders’ wealth.

Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have mandated mutual fund disclosure regimes to help investors make better investment decisions to strike an optimal balance between the investors' interest in more timely and accurate portfolio holdings disclosure and the cost associated with making and disclosing the holdings information available to investors. Many academics and practitioners point out that, despite all the regulations on portfolio disclosure, fund managers can still engage in practices that go against the spirit of the rules without violating the letter of the law. The purpose of this paper is to address the empirical question of whether the practice exists, using holdings data for more than 3,000 equity mutual funds during the time period from 1995 to 2004.

In this paper, the authors examine window dressing by mutual fund portfolio managers, using holdings data covering more than 3,000 equity mutual funds from 1995 to 2004. The authors first investigate whether the fund holdings are materially different from universe holdings across performance quintiles based on holdings in the month of disclosure and in the following month. The second part of the analysis examines funds' patterns of buying and selling. Finally, the measure of “Buying Intensity” and “Selling Intensity” is examined, with a specific focus on the holdings data for the fourth quarter.

An examination of fund holdings finds no statistically significant evidence of systematic window dressing, either at the aggregate level or within subsamples of funds based on size or past performance. Rather, it was found that fund managers tend to chase momentum. A combination of investor sophistication and market oversight may serve to be effective in dissuading fund managers from engaging in the practice.

The authors' data are at the individual fund level, based on equity mutual funds holdings data provided to Morningstar on a quarterly or monthly basis (according to Elton et al., the Morningstar database provides timely and accurate mutual fund holdings information). These data allow us to infer better the investment manager intent vis‐à‐vis using 13F data, which is aggregate data across various fund families and separate accounts, or aggregate pension fund equity holdings data that includes aggregate holdings of multiple portfolio managers. In addition, the authors comment on the significance of the regulatory checks and balances that are designed to restrict fund managers' ability to window‐dress their portfolios. In summary, the combination of quantitative evidence from empirical tests and an examination of the legal framework under which mutual fund portfolio managers operate, lead to the conclusion that window dressing is not prevalent in the industry.

The timeliness of portfolio holdings information disclosure has been of interest among regulators, academics and practitioners since the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Securities Exchange Commission has been trying to strike a balance between investors' interest in timely disclosure and the potential costs associated with revealing the strategies of investment managers. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether current rules regarding the delay in disclosure adequately protect investors, and prevent the formation of copycat portfolios that can profit from the research of the original portfolio manager.

The paper examine the effectiveness of different delays (30, 60 or 90 days) in disclosure of holdings for a sample of large‐cap, actively‐managed mutual funds. Copycat portfolios are constructed based on the holdings of the original portfolios, and their returns compared against the returns (net of expenses) of the original portfolios over the corresponding time frames.

The results indicate that the current delay of 60 days is sufficient to prevent such free‐riding; however, shortening the delay to 30 days would adversely affect mutual fund investors.

The paper aims to provide an answer to those debates on the effective delays in portfolio disclosure among academics and practitioners based on quantitative evidence. It also contributes to leave a guideline for regulators since the patterns of over‐ or under‐performance of the original portfolio returns vis‐à‐vis the copycat portfolio returns over varying delays provide important insights about possible effects of changes in disclosure regulations.