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The purpose of this study is to examine the direct association between firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores, CSR disclosures and executive compensation. This study further investigates the moderating role of CSR in the association between executive compensation and firms’ stock market and accounting performances.

This study collects CEO compensation information from the Execucomp database and CSR performance information from the MSCI ESG database. The final sample consists of 4,193 firm-year observations for 1,318 US public firms for the period 2009–2013. This study uses lagged regression analysis to test the direct and moderating roles of CSR in executive compensation.

Regarding the direct role of CSR, this study finds that CEO compensation is positively related to CSR performance but not to firms’ issuance of CSR reports. This study also finds a positive moderating role of CSR in the relationship between CEO compensation and firms’ stock performance. However, the authors do not identify any role for CSR in the relationship between CEO compensation and accounting performance. The results also show a negative association of CSR in the relationship between CEO compensation and firm size.

This study fills a gap in the literature by providing empirical evidence on the direct association between CSR and CEO compensation and how the association between CEO compensation and firm performance is moderated by CSR scores. The novel findings of this study will benefit managers, boards of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders, including regulators and policymakers.

The recent economic and political focus on rising income inequality and the extent of government intervention into pay policies has renewed the interest in executive compensation. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of changing regulatory landscapes on executive pay and its components.

This study examines a recent 23-year period divided into three distinct intervals separated by two major regulatory changes, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and the Dodd–Frank Act. Bonus, long-term and total compensation are separately modeled as a function of each regulatory change while controlling for firm size, performance and year. The model is estimated using panel data with firm fixed effects. An industry analysis is also conducted to examine sector variations.

Total compensation increased 29 percent following SOX and 21 percent following Dodd–Frank, above what can be explained by size, firm performance and time. Total compensation increased following both SOX and Dodd–Frank in all industries except for the financial services industry where total compensation was unchanged. Results are robust to using smaller windows around each regulation.

This study does not seek to determine whether executive compensation is at an optimal level at any point in time. Instead, this study focuses only on the change in executive compensation after two specific regulations.

The debate over the extent to which the government should intervene with executive compensation has become a frequent part of political and non-political discourse. This paper provides evidence that over the long-term, regulation does not curtail executive compensation. An important exception is that total compensation was restrained for financial services firms following the Dodd–Frank Act.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether corporate social media information helps improve analysts’ forecast accuracy.

This study uses hand-collected information on S&P 500 firms’ official Facebook pages and uses posts and reactions to such posts to measure corporate Facebook information. Multivariate regression models are estimated to test the relationship between analysts’ forecast accuracy and corporate Facebook information.

The results indicate that analysts forecast accuracy is unresponsive to posts. However, analyst forecast errors are decreasing in reactions to posts. These findings are robust to the inclusion of control variables, firm and time fixed effects, and alternative specifications of forecast errors and different pre-forecast time windows.

This study has some limitations. It focuses only on the S&P 500 firms, which are large and generally provide better information to the market. The sample period coincides with the early period of the corporate Facebook culture. However, more recent data sets are likely to provide stronger results.

The findings of this study provide support for “information generation” role of social media and show that reactions to corporate Facebook posts are the new and unique information generated from corporate social media activities, which help information intermediaries in improving their forecasting accuracy.

This study makes an important contribution to the literature by separating the information dissemination role of social media from information generation role and establishes the first evidence on how corporate social media information affects forecast accuracy of financial analysts.

The purpose of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the economic determinants of the compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) between the pre- and post-financial crisis periods. To conduct the comparative analysis, the authors consider five years before and five years after the financial crisis of 2008. The authors use the data from the US financial service institutions and run separate regressions for the pre- and post-crisis periods to check if there is any significant difference in the economic determinants of executive compensation before and after the financial crisis. The authors find that total compensation and its incentive components decreased significantly in the post-crisis period. In the pre-crisis period, total compensation was determined by stock performance, accounting profit, growth, and leverage, whereas in the post-crisis period stock returns and leverage are the major factors influencing total compensation. The authors also find that firms’ leverage negatively influences the sensitivity of the pay for performance, but the influence of leverage on pay for performance is weaker in the post-crisis period. Our research is significant in the context of the US economy, the regulatory reforms of financial institutions, and the perspectives of the executive compensations. This is the first study that compares the relationship between compensation and firm performance over the pre- and post-crisis periods. It is an explicit attempt to develop a theoretical understanding of the compensation/performance relationship for the financial industry, which is blamed for the financial crisis and is affected by the Dodd–Frank regulation after the crisis.