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This chapter examines the trends in published comparative and international education research from 2014 to 2019 with a special focus on 2019 publication in open access journals and by authors situated in the Global South. In particular, two trends from 2019 are (1) the increasing number of research publications in the field of comparative and international education that are being published in online, open access journals and (2) the representation among these research publications between authors situated in Global North versus Global South contexts. Evidence from the six years of data collection suggests that single country studies and qualitative methods continue to dominate published research in comparative and international education journals. 2019 data also show that there are significant different in the publication trends in subscription versus open access journals in the field, and that authors from the Global South are more likely to publish in open access journals, especially if they are female.

This chapter provides an examination of the characteristics of comparative and international education research published in 2020 as well as an overview of the trends in this research since 2014. This analysis of published research includes a special focus on authors situated in the Global South as well as those authors who are affiliated with organizations outside of academic (i.e., professional, non-teaching organizations). These two focus characteristics reflect the shifting composition of authors and research in comparative and international education in the twenty-first century as well as the professionalization aspirations of the field of comparative and international education more broadly. Evidence from the seven years of data collection suggests that there is a marked shift toward increasingly more co-authored research, a shift from predominantly qualitative methods to non-empirical research content, and a rise in topic oriented research over the otherwise dominant single-country study in comparative and international education research.

Agency theoretic models have been used in the past to justify the use of stock options as an effective incentive alignment mechanism to create a common fate between principals and agents. In this paper, we use behavioral theory to reach the opposite conclusion – namely, that the design characteristics of the typical stock option plan foster perverse incentives for loss‐averse agents, leading to decisions with detrimental consequences for principals. We also consider alternative stock option designs and other equity‐based executive compensation plans and argue that they may suffer from the same problems as traditional stock option plans – namely, that loss‐averse executives will try to protect the endowed value of that equity through self‐serving decisions that do not enhance shareholder wealth.

The empirical support for agency theory explanations for the great variance in CEO pay has been equivocal. Drawing from the performance appraisal literature, we hypothesize that boards of directors incorporate human judgment into the evaluation and reward of CEO performance in order to balance managerial risk with agency costs. We test Baysinger and Hoskisson’s (1990) proposition that insider‐dominated corporate boards rely on subjective performance evaluation to reward the CEO, and we argue that R&D intensity influences this relationship. Using a sample of Fortune firms, findings support our contention that human judgment is important in evaluating and rewarding CEO performance.

Boards of directors often attempt to foster corporate entrepreneurship by replacing a firmʼs chief executive officer (CEO). Compelling theoretical arguments and anecdotal evidence suggest that when firm performance has suffered, a new CEO is best suited to lead the firmʼs creative endeavors. On the other hand, among firms that retain their existing CEO after a decline in performance, manipulating the CEOʼs compensation package is a common governance practice used by boards to encourage innovation. In these cases, some have argued that increasing the CEOʼs pay will encourage corporate entrepreneurship, because the CEO has been compensated for assuming additional risk. Counter to these propositions, this study develops theoretical arguments that a firmʼs existing CEO is better equipped to foster corporate entrepreneurship and that this probability increases when the CEOʼs cash compensation is decreased. Results from a sample of 100 single-product manufacturing firms suggest firms that retain their current CEO and decrease the CEOʼs cash compensation are most likely to engage in corporate entrepreneurship. Implications that this research has for corporate entrepreneurship, corporate governance, and firm performance are discussed.

This paper aims to present three girls’ visual annotations and digital responses that restory a scene in the picturebook I’m New Here. The authors focus on how children use multimodal tools to reflect their critical knowledge of the world by illuminating how this group of girls responded to and incorporated broader social issues.

This study takes place in a third-grade classroom. Using qualitative methods that build on critical multimodal literacy, the authors documented and analyzed children’s visual and digital interpretations. Data were generated from classroom sessions that incorporated interactive readalouds, as well as students’ annotated visual images, sketches, video and digital responses. The collaborative analytic process involved multiple passes to interpret visual, textual and multimodal elements.

The analyses revealed how Aliyah, Tiana and Carissa used multimodal tools to engage in the process of restorying. Through their multimodal composition, they designed images that illuminated their solidarity with the young female character wearing the hijab; their desire to disrupt xenophobic bullying; and their hope for a respectful and inclusive climate in their own classroom.

In this paper, the authors examine how three girls in a third-grade classroom restory using critical multimodal literacy methods. These girls’ multimodal responses reflected how they disrupted dominant storylines of exclusionary practices. Their authentic acts of visual advocacy give us hope for the future.

The purpose of this paper is to enrich the finding by Aguinis et al. (2018) that there is little overlap between the extremes of firm performance and the extremes of CEO pay using a novel approach to characterize the distribution of pay and performance. The authors aim to shift the focus of compensation researchers from fruitlessly trying to link pay to performance to theory-rich accounts of pay that take into consideration the idiosyncratically motivated and socially embedded nature of CEO compensation.

The authors’ approach in this commentary is conceptual. They synthesize compensation literature from different fields such as economics, finance, sociology, strategic management and corporate law, as well as the empirical findings from the focal paper to support their characterization of the current state of the literature and future directions it should take.

The authors synthesize discussion of CEO pay down to three dimensions of CEO responsibilities and motivations. They argue that a realistic pay design should take into account that CEOs have limited control over performance, they are accountable to multiple stakeholders and they are motivated by financial as well as nonfinancial incentives.

The commentary presents researchers with high-order framing of CEO pay that goes beyond debating over methodology or narrowly focusing on limited behavioral drivers of pay setting. Instead, the authors encourage researchers to take advantage of their three-legged framework to theorize about CEO pay.

El objetivo de este comentario es enriquecer el hallazgo de Aguinis y otros (2018) de que existe poco solapamiento entre los extremos del resultado organizativo y los extremos de la retribución del CEO utilizando una aproximación novedosa para caracterizar ambas distribuciones. Queremos cambiar el foco de los investigadores de tratar inútilmente de vincular retribución y resultados hacia explicaciones basadas en teoría que tomen en consideración la naturaleza idiosincrática y socialmente embebida de la retribución del CEO.

Nuestra aproximación es conceptual. Sintetizamos la literatura sobre retribución de diferentes campos como la economía, las finanzas, la sociología, la gestión estratégica o la legal, así como los resultados empíricos del artículo central de este número para sostener nuestra caracterización del estado del arte de la literatura y las direcciones que debería tomar en el futuro.

Sintetizamos la discusión sobre la retribución del CEO en tres dimensiones de responsabilidad del CEO y motivaciones. Argumentamos que un diseño realista de la retribución deben tener en cuenta que los CEO tienen un control limitado sobre los resultados, son responsables antes varios grupos de interés (stakeholders), y están motivados por incentivos financieros y no financieros.

Nuestro comentario va más allá del debate sobre la metodología, o de un enfoque estrecho sobre los determinantes conductuales de la fijación de la retribución. Por el contrario, animamos a los investigadores a utilizar nuestro marco de tres pilares para teorizar sobre la retribución del CEO.

O objetivo deste comentário é ampliar os achados de Aguinis et al. (2018) de que há pouca correlação entre os extremos da performance da empresa e da remuneração do CEO, usando uma abordagem inovadora para caracterizar a distribuição do pagamento e performance. Nosso objetivo é mudar o foco dos pesquisadores em remuneração, de indevidamente vincularem remuneração à performance, para teorias bem desenvolvidas sobre remuneração que considerem a natureza da remuneração do CEO como motivada de maneira idiossincrática e dependente do seu contexto social.

Nossa abordagem nesse comentário é conceitual. Nós sintetizamos a literatura sobre remuneração de diferentes áreas, como economia, finanças, sociologia, gestão estratégica e direito corporativo, bem como os achados empíricos do artigo central desse comentário, para dar suporte à nossa caracterização do estado da arte e das direções futuras que a literatura deveria tomar.

Nós sintetizamos a discussão sobre a remuneração do CEO em três dimensões de responsabilidades e motivações do CEO. Nós argumentamos que um plano de pagamento realista deve levar em conta que os CEOs têm controle limitado sobre os resultados, eles são responsáveis perante os stakeholders, e eles são motivados por incentivos financeiros e não financeiros.

O nosso comentário apresenta aos pesquisadores uma estrutura conceitual para remuneração de CEOs que vai além do debate sobre a metodologia, ou do foco limitado nos determinantes comportamentais da configuração da remuneração. Ao invés disso, incentivamos os pesquisadores a utilizar nossa estrutura de três pilares para teorizar sobre o pagamento do CEO.

This paper seeks to analyze how compensation framing influences the risk‐taking behavior of the firm's chief executive officer (CEO), and the mediating role played by risk bearing.

The study employs a sample of 108 US firms that issued an initial public offering in 1993, 1994 and 1995. Data from a survey filled out by the CEO of the firm are completed with secondary information. A structural equation model is estimated which explicitly considers the mediating effect of risk bearing on the compensation framing‐risk taking relationship.

The analyses indicate that while the performance targets included in the CEO's compensation contract indirectly influence the riskiness of the CEO's strategic decisions through its influence on the employment risk component of executive risk bearing, the level of compensation relative to peers does not. It shows that not all reference points are equally relevant in determining the CEO's willingness to take risk, nor do all the elements of risk bearing play the same role in that partial mediation.

The paper provides a refinement of previous work on modelling the risk‐taking behavior of managers.

The paper provides a guideline to think about the behavioral consequences of the pay level in the market for executives and the performance targets included in the compensation contracts.

The paper proposes and tests a model on how different reference points used to frame compensation influence CEO risk taking. It also provides the first test of a central proposition of the behavioral agency model: risk bearing partially mediates the influence of compensation framing on risk taking.

The purpose of this paper is to extend our understanding of CEO compensation by looking into the CEO pay‐setting process. Particularly, a process model is proposed to specify the interaction between situational indicators, process variables, contextual factors and CEO pay.

A modest review the major theories that are driving the field of CEO compensation study reveals several interesting findings. These models or perspectives provide valuable but incomplete understanding of the multifaceted phenomenon. Especially, the realm of CEO pay‐setting process is still unexplored. A process model of CEO compensation is developed to fill in this gap.

CEO compensation is a negotiation between a CEO and a principal. Negotiated CEO pay is better predicted by CEO aspirations and principal reservations, rather than economic indicators. CEO power and the institutional environment have a moderating effect.

The study suggests that a better theory is critically in demand in order to improve effectiveness of corporate governance. This paper underscores that a real challenge for a principal in influencing CEO pay is to anticipate CEO aspirations and to monitor the gaps between CEO aspirations and principal reservations, rather than to control economic indicators. Unfortunately, until now there has been very limited information about principal reservation and CEO aspiration.

This inquiry seeks to make a difference by moving CEO compensation research into a fruitful direction. To our knowledge, this inquiry is the first attempt that provides systematic explanation as to how and why situational indicators do not directly influence the negotiated CEO pay. The newly proposed model is much realistic, much integrative and much dynamic, compared with existing conceptualizations. Eight propositions are presented to guide empirical research as well as future theory development.

Research has already uncovered a great deal of evidence about the individual and organizational qualities that enhance effective teaching and the kinds of qualifications (attributes) that are associated with effective teaching and learning. From a research perspective, increased precision and specificity in the definition and refinement of specific concepts (e.g., pedagogical content knowledge) will increase academic knowledge about the relationship between teacher characteristics, working conditions, and the quality of instruction that takes place. This knowledge may have little effect on policy formation. From a policy perspective, a holistic or organic conception of teacher quality will be critical for effective policy formation and implementation. At some point, academic knowledge about different aspects of effective or “quality” teaching need to be connected to a general concept of a quality teacher in order to be effectively inserted into policy debates and the general media. Systematic use of academic knowledge is often hindered by either the narrow focus of the research, or by its limited application to actual teacher practice. In spite of these limitations in academic research, there are areas where academics, policymakers, and practitioners have achieved consensus or are converging on shared constructs of promise. In other areas, both academic and political debates seem locked into conflict over constructs related to teacher quality. Identifying these three broad categories of consensus, convergence, and conflict provides a broad framework to assess the kinds of research and the kinds of reform that need to be carried out in order to promote and sustain teachers’ development and implementation of their professional skills in the classroom.