Sir Raymond Streat, C.B.E., Director of The Cotton Board, Manchester, accompanied by Lady Streat. A Vice‐President: F. C. Francis, M.A., F.S.A., Keeper of the Department of…
Abstract
Sir Raymond Streat, C.B.E., Director of The Cotton Board, Manchester, accompanied by Lady Streat. A Vice‐President: F. C. Francis, M.A., F.S.A., Keeper of the Department of Printed Books, British Museum. Honorary Treasurer: J. E. Wright, Institution of Electrical Engineers. Honorary Secretary: Mrs. J. Lancaster‐Jones, B.Sc., Science Librarian, British Council. Chairman of Council: Miss Barbara Kyle, Research Worker, Social Sciences Documentation. Director: Leslie Wilson, M.A.
Sir Raymond Streat, C.B.E., Director of The Cotton Board, Manchester, accompanied by Lady Streat. A Vice‐President: F. C. Francis, M.A., F.S.A., Keeper of the Department of…
Abstract
Sir Raymond Streat, C.B.E., Director of The Cotton Board, Manchester, accompanied by Lady Streat. A Vice‐President: F. C. Francis, M.A., F.S.A., Keeper of the Department of Printed Books, British Museum. Honorary Treasurer: J.E.Wright. Honorary Secretary: Mrs. J. Lancaster‐Jones, B.Sc., Science Librarian, British Council. Chairman of Council: Miss Barbara Kyle, Research Worker, Social Sciences Documentation. Director: Leslie Wilson, M.A.
Nikolaos Kavadis and Xavier Castañer
To show that differences in the extent to which firms engage in unrelated diversification can be attributed to differences in ownership structure.
Abstract
Purpose
To show that differences in the extent to which firms engage in unrelated diversification can be attributed to differences in ownership structure.
Methodology/approach
We draw on longitudinal data and use a panel analysis specification to test our hypotheses.
Findings
We find that unrelated diversification destroys value; pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners in a firm’s equity reduce unrelated diversification, whereas pressure-resistant domestic owners increase unrelated diversification; the greater the firm’s free cash flow, the greater the negative effect of pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners on unrelated diversification.
Research limitations/implications
We contribute to corporate governance and strategy research by bringing in owners’ institutional origin as a shaper of owner preferences in particular with regards to unrelated diversification. Future research may expand our investigation to more than one home institutional context, and theorize on institutional origin effects beyond the dichotomy between Anglo-American and non-Anglo-American (not oriented toward shareholder value maximization) owners.
Practical implications
Policy makers, financial analysts, owners, and managers may want to reflect about the implications of ownership structure, as well as promoting or joining corporations with particular ownership configurations.
Social implications
A shareholder value-destroying strategy, such as unrelated diversification has adverse consequences for society at large, in terms of opportunity costs, that is, resources could be allocated to value-creating activities instead. Promoting an ownership configuration that creates value should contribute to social welfare.
Originality/value
Owners may not be exclusively driven by shareholder value maximization, but can be influenced by normative beliefs (biases) stemming from the institutional context they originate from.
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One of the difficulties in supplying readers with information is that the readers themselves sometimes only vaguely know what they want. Requests for specific references appear…
Abstract
One of the difficulties in supplying readers with information is that the readers themselves sometimes only vaguely know what they want. Requests for specific references appear easy, but some readers, untrained in library techniques, appear to think that reports, books, etc., are classified by colour, shape or size. Moreover, it has been found that each of the variables in the request data (e.g. author, journal, column, number, date, etc.) is subject to errors of 100 per cent. or more. For this type of aberration it is difficult to find a cure, as it seems to be caused by the peculiar mental make‐up of the scientist and technician. These suffer under the delusion that they have wonderfully accurate memories, whereas, in fact, they are endowed with extraordinarily fertile imaginations.
Nathalie Del Vecchio and Carine Girard
Purpose – This chapter presents the results of an exploratory study carried out on activist institutional investor strategies. It aims to identify the way in…
Abstract
Purpose – This chapter presents the results of an exploratory study carried out on activist institutional investor strategies. It aims to identify the way in which different types of institutional investors are reacting to new institutional pressures in the French context.
Design/methodology/approach – Our methodology is based on a series of semi-directive interviews, combined with additional relevant data.
Findings – The interpretation of results makes use of institutional theory, more specifically the work of Oliver (1991). Our study shows that active institutional investors may opt for different responses when confronted with new institutional pressures, and that these responses would seem to depend on antecedents underlined by Ryan and Schneider (2002), which in turn depend on the nature of their business relationships with the firm in which they invest. Whereas pressure-sensitive investors (such as banks and insurance companies) generally adopt acquiescence responses, pressure-resistant investors (such as pension funds and investment funds) pursue joint strategies of co-optation, influence or control with key actors such as local and international proxy advisors and French investor associations. Acting conjointly, certain pressure-resistant investors are often considered as institutional entrepreneurs in that they initiate changes and actively participate in the implementation of new norms in the field of shareholder activism in the French context. In parallel to this ongoing professionalization, other pressure-resistant investors such as activist hedge funds seem to lack sufficient legitimate power to be effective.
Originality/value – This chapter illustrates that the level of institutional investor activism depends largely on the relevant national legal framework. It also shows how institutional investor coalitions take advantage of new institutional pressures to enhance their legitimacy or increase the effectiveness of their action.
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The subject on which I have been asked to speak is ‘The training of translators”. This is not an easy matter, particularly as there can, in the nature of things, be no golden rule…
Abstract
The subject on which I have been asked to speak is ‘The training of translators”. This is not an easy matter, particularly as there can, in the nature of things, be no golden rule for training for a task so complex and varied as that of the translator, especially in technical or scientific matters. I shall make no apology for approaching this subject from a very practical point of view.
Richard Whitley and Jochen Gläser
Recent reforms to higher education systems in many OECD countries have focused on making universities more effective organisations in competing for resources and reputations. This…
Abstract
Recent reforms to higher education systems in many OECD countries have focused on making universities more effective organisations in competing for resources and reputations. This has often involved increasing their internal cohesion and external autonomy from the state to make them more similar to private companies. However, pre-reform universities differed so greatly in their governance and capabilities that the impact of institutional changes has varied considerably between three ideal types: Hollow, State-chartered, and Autarkic. Furthermore, the combination of: (a) the inherent uncertainty of scientific research undertaken for publication, (b) limited managerial control over work processes and reputations, and (c) the contradictory effects of some funding and governance changes has greatly restricted the ability of universities to function as authoritatively integrated organisations capable of developing distinctive competitive competences.
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The rules on takeover bids are generally considered to be an important factor within the debate on corporate governance. The risk of a takeover bid – and of a consequent change in…
Abstract
The rules on takeover bids are generally considered to be an important factor within the debate on corporate governance. The risk of a takeover bid – and of a consequent change in company control – should motivate a company’s board to act in the best interests of the shareholders (the so-called disciplinary mechanism). The European rules on takeover bids are enshrined in Directive 2004/25/EC (which is also known as the Thirteenth Directive on Company Law), which applies to bids for securities of companies (issuers) governed by the laws of Member States. In this chapter the author analysed the European rules on takeover bids and highlighted certain national options for implementing the Directive, although a revision of the European Directive, which will be based, among other things, on an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of its application, has been under way since 2004. The chapter also considered the revisions currently being proposed by the European Commission and the European Parliament.
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Much has been said, and written, on systems of journal circulation. Mr. Hanson's contribution to this subject is valuable in that, as distinct from its predecessors, it describes…
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Much has been said, and written, on systems of journal circulation. Mr. Hanson's contribution to this subject is valuable in that, as distinct from its predecessors, it describes no one system in particular but attempts to analyse the cost, in time, of circulation. It incidentally provides some figures by which the efficiency of this operation can be measured in so far as it involves the useful dissemination of information.