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This study aims to evaluate changes in the presence of women on Spanish boards after the Unified Good Governance Code of Listed Companies (2006) and the Organic Law 3/2007 on Gender Equality, and this study compares the educational background of women and men directors. Also, this study analyses the influence of gender diversity and educational background of women directors on economic performance, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and, ultimately, firm value. In addition, this study explores the differences in board gender composition and its effect on firm value during the crisis and post-crisis periods. Finally, this study analyses the different influence of women directors depending on their typology.

This study uses a system of structural equations and a sample of 4,101 directors of 30 Spanish companies listed on IBEX-35 over 2008–2017.

The results show that women’s presence on boards has grown since 2008, and they have higher educational background than men. This study finds that women directors improve economic performance and CSR, though results are non-significant for firm value. Women directors with a bachelor’s or master’s degree increase economic and social performance but reduce firm value. Women directors with business or industry-related studies positively influence CSR but business specialisation negatively affects economic performance and firm value.

This study analyses the direct and indirect effect of women directors on firm value, the influence of their educational background and the potential differences arising from the economic situation (crisis) and the type of board position they hold.

The purpose of this paper is to use the dynamic capabilities framework to explain the effect of board networks, as a source of intellectual capital, on firm performance. The authors propose that the influence of board interlocks depends on their ability to contribute to strategic decision making. As a result, their effect is subject to the business context in which they occur and the different role of the interconnected directors involved.

The authors use social network analysis to make board connections and to calculate centrality measures. The authors also identify busy boards to analyze whether their effect differs from centrality. The authors estimate the theoretical model using the Generalized Method of Moments in order to take advantage of the panel database.

For a sample of Spanish firms from 1999 to 2015, the results show there is no direct significant effect of directors’ networks on firm performance. However, the authors find a positive and significant influence of intra-industry board connections, particularly when they are established among outsiders.

The Spanish context of the study can limit the generalization of the papers’ results.

The results can be useful both for practitioners – since they can serve as a guide for companies to reformulate their boards in search of the optimal structure-, and when implementing good governance codes – establishing limits for director interlocking.

This study helps to offer a better understanding of how directors’ networks can add value to the firm depending on the kind of resources they provide (context) and the role of the director who is connected.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the ownership structure and the investment in research and development (R&D) for a sample of listed Spanish companies.

Following the agency theory and the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective, the authors propose that R&D investment is affected by ownership structure, specifically by the identity of the controlling owner (family firms and firms with an institutional investor) and the level of contestability by other shareholders. In order to test these hypotheses, the authors build an original database identifying, at a 10% threshold, the ultimate shareholders of a sample of 96 Spanish firms listed during 2008–2018 (1,002 obs).

The results show that there is no significant relationship between the ownership concentration and the R&D investment. Only when the authors consider the nature of the main shareholder, the authors find that in family firms there is an inverted U relationship between ownership and R&D, so that at low levels of ownership, the R&D increases, while at high levels of ownership (that we compute around 54%) the R&D decreases. Also, when the main shareholder is an institutional investor, the greater its ownership, the higher the R&D investment. Finally, the authors test that, contrary to what mainstream suggests, contestability in family firms is higher when ownership in the hands of other family shareholders increases.

The work uses an original database to test a nonlinear relationship between ownership and R&D investment in family firms. Also, the study addresses a topic hardly ever discussed in the literature about R&D as it is the role of the contestability by other controlling shareholders.

El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar la relación existente entre la estructura de propiedad y la innovación corporativa para una muestra de empresas cotizadas españolas.

Utilizando los planteamientos de la teoría de la agencia y de la perspectiva de la riqueza socioemocional proponemos que la I+D empresarial está relacionada con la estructura de propiedad, específicamente con la naturaleza del accionista de control (empresas familiares y empresas con un inversor institucional como principal accionista) y con el grado de contestabilidad por parte de otros accionistas significativos. A fin de testar nuestras hipótesis, construimos ad hoc una base de datos de propiedad original en la que identificamos, al umbral del 10% de propiedad, a los accionistas últimos de una muestra de 96 empresas cotizadas españolas para el periodo 2008–2018 (1.002 obs).

Nuestros resultados muestran que no existe relación significativa entre la concentración de propiedad y la inversión en I + D. Solo cuando consideramos la naturaleza del principal accionista encontramos que en las empresas familiares la relación entre la propiedad de la familia y la innovación corporativa adopta una forma de U invertida, tal que a bajos niveles de propiedad la I + D crece, mientras que a altos niveles de propiedad (que computamos en torno al 54% de propiedad) la inversión en I + D decrece. Asimismo, en las empresas con un inversor institucional como principal accionista, cuanto mayor es la propiedad de este inversor institucional, mayor es la I + D de la empresa. Finalmente testamos que, en contra de la corriente dominante, en las empresas familiares la propiedad en manos de otras familias incrementa el grado de contestabilidad a la familia controladora respecto a su inversión en I + D.

El trabajo utiliza una base de datos de propiedad original para testar una relación no lineal entre concentración de propiedad e innovación corporativa en las empresas familiares. Asimismo, el estudio aborda un tema apenas analizado en la literatura de I + D como es el papel de la contestabilidad al accionista de control.