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This study examines the impact of firm-bank relationships on bank loan spreads and the mitigating role of firm credit ratings on that impact.

The study sample consists of Indonesian publicly listed companies for the period 2006 to 2016; bank-loan data was extracted from the Loan Pricing Corporation Dealscan database. For the degree of firm-bank relationships, the data on each loan is manually computed, using five different methods taken from Bharath et al. (2011) and Fields et al. (2012). All of the regression analyses are controlled for the year fixed effects, heteroscedasticity, and firm-level clustering. To address the endogeneity issues, this study uses several methods, including partitioning the sample, running nearest-neighbour and propensity score matching tests, and using instrumental variables in two-staged least-squares regression models.

In line with relationship theory and in opposition to the hold-up argument, this study finds that lending relationships reduce bank loan spreads and that the impact is more noticeable among non-rated Indonesian firms. Specifically, each additional unit in the total number of years of a firm-bank relationship and the number of previous loan contracts with the same bank are associated with 7.34 and 9.15 basis-point decreases, respectively, in these loan spreads.

Corporations and banks should maintain close, long-term relationships to reduce the screening and monitoring costs of borrowing. Regulators should create public policies that encourage banks to put more emphasis on relationships in their lending practices, especially in relation to crisis-prone companies.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of lending relationships on bank loan spreads in Indonesia. The study offers insights on banking relationships in emerging markets with concentrated banking industries, underdeveloped capital markets and prominent business-group affiliations.

This paper's aim is to examine whether board independence influences debt and dividend policies of family controlled firms.

The paper examines panel data on a sample of Australian publicly‐listed firms over the period 2000‐2005 using panel (random effects) regression.

Empirical test demonstrates that family controlled firms appear to have higher levels of leverage and dividend payout ratios than their non‐family counterparts. More importantly, the result indicates that the positive impact of family control on dividend policy is due to the higher proportion of independent directors on family boards. This underlines the significant role that independent directors play in influencing firm's dividend policies, especially for family controlled firms. The result also supports the notion that independent directors and dividends are complementary government mechanisms. This paper, however, finds little evidence that board independence moderates the relationship between family control and debt.

While not all family firms are the same, this research treats them as a homogeneous grouping (i.e. firms are delineated into family versus non‐family). The fact that family firms are difficult to identify and define (reflected in the diversity of definitions in the literature) may also affect the validity of studies of family business. For policy makers, the finding could serve to justify initiatives to encourage more independent directors on boards, especially in family controlled firms.

This paper provides evidence about the relationship between board independence, dividends and debt from a country with higher levels of private benefits of control, strong legal shareholder protection but less significant role of external governance mechanisms compared to the USA.