Under US law, whether the proceeds of electronic crime can be identified and seized where the funds have been commingled with legitimate funds depends on whether the legitimate…
Abstract
Under US law, whether the proceeds of electronic crime can be identified and seized where the funds have been commingled with legitimate funds depends on whether the legitimate funds somehow facilitated the concealment and laundering of criminal proceeds. The US criminal forfeiture statute, 18 US Code, s. 983, and the civil forfeiture statute, 18 US Code, s. 981, provide that all property involved in the offence is subject to forfeiture.
In preparing this report, the compliance sub‐group has set out to (a) summarise the current compliance regime as a matter of law and practice, (b) identify particular problem…
Abstract
In preparing this report, the compliance sub‐group has set out to (a) summarise the current compliance regime as a matter of law and practice, (b) identify particular problem areas within that regime concerning public sector officials (PSOs), and (c) suggest recommendations for change. The result may be seen as providing features of a ‘model’ compliance structure designed to cause difficulties for corrupt PSOs seeking to launder the proceeds of their corruption; UK law and practice has formed the springboard for the model, but it should be stressed that in order to be of any utility any suggested changes would have to be adopted (effectively) universally throughout the financial world. Piecemeal adoption by one or a few states would merely be likely to drive the tainted monies elsewhere, and would not serve the desired purpose of reducing the extent/profitability of corruption.