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This study aims to analyze corporate mail and wire fraud penalties, using bounded rationality in decision-making and assessing internal and external influences on prosecutorial choices.

The study analyzed 467 cases from 1992 to 2019, using data from the Corporate Prosecution Registry of the University of Virginia School of Law and Duke University School of Law. It examined corporations facing mail and wire fraud charges and other fraud crimes. Multiple regression linked predictor variables to the dependent variable, total payment.

The study found that corporate penalties tend to be lower for financial institutions or corporations in countries with US free trade agreements. Conversely, penalties are higher when the company is a U.S. public company or filed in districts with more pending criminal cases.

This study’s originality lies in applying the bounded rationality model to assess corporate prosecutorial decisions, unveiling external factors’ influence on corporate penalties.

This paper analyzes trading and tipping activities in insider trading litigation decided by federal courts from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014.

Legal documents from the US Securities and Exchange Commission, LexisNexis and Westlaw databases were coded to determine profile, patterns of trading and settlement outcomes.

Results of statistical analysis indicate that a defendant in both civil and criminal cases is more likely to trade on the information when he/she receives a direct, financial benefit from breaching his/her duty of confidentiality. The defendant tipper is also more likely to pass on the information to a close personal friend, business associate or family member. The average amount of profit of defendants in both civil and criminal proceedings substantially exceeds the average amount of their settlements.

This paper offers support for the rational choice model – insider trading is often based on rational calculations of benefits not only to the defendant but also to his/her family and associates. Although the threat of civil enforcement and criminal proceedings may possibly deter him/her from committing the crime, results indicate that the amounts of settlement in both proceedings are considerably lower than the amount of profits obtained from the offense.