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The purpose of this paper is to make employers aware of the unique characteristics of the baby boomer generation in the workforce, the causes of boomer behavior and how employers might respond to those unique circumstances. A review of some books and articles is included as documentation of the phenomena.

As this is not a research paper, there is no specific design or methodology. The approach used was to write an assessment based on the authors’ nearly 50+ years’ experience in the recruiting and talent management field and Sparzo’s academic experience teaching in an MBA program.

Employers should be mindful that employees who are members of the baby boomer generation are not generally performing or retiring in ways that are similar to previous generations of workers. Recommendations are made as to how to manage this cohort, how to integrate this generation with the members of an employer’s workforce who belong to other younger generations and how the accommodations suggested may be applicable into the future, even after the last boomer retires.

The authors believe that the emerging trends and patterns of baby boomer behavior offer both challenges and opportunities to employers. The authors’ unique view as to how to understand the source of these trends and manage this workforce’s accumulated knowledge, while using the period of longer work-spans to “catch up” in developing strategies to capture, manage and redeploy their knowledge before they leave the employment scene.

Assumptions regarding long‐term expected returns have significant implications for asset/liability management of financial institutions. This article questions the validity of common assumptions regarding long‐term expected returns that are employed by financial institutions, in particular insurance companies. Although this article directly addresses this issue in the context of the insurance industry, the discussion is relevant for all institutional investors in fixed income markets.

The purpose of this postmortem is to assess whether the design, implementation, and maintenance of financial policies during the period from 1996 through 2006 were primary causes of the financial system's demise.

To draw conclusions about the policy determinants of the crisis, the paper studies five important policies: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) policies toward credit rating agencies, Federal Reserve policies concerning bank capital and credit default swaps, SEC and Federal Reserve policies about over‐the‐counter derivatives, SEC policies toward the consolidated supervision of major investment banks, and government policies toward two housing‐finance entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

The evidence is inconsistent with the view that the collapse of the financial system was caused only by the popping of the housing bubble (“accident”) and the herding behavior of financiers rushing to create and market increasingly complex and questionable financial products (“suicide”). Rather, the evidence indicates that senior policymakers repeatedly designed, implemented, and maintained policies that destabilized the global financial system in the decade before the crisis. Moreover, although the major regulatory agencies were aware of the growing fragility of the financial system due to their policies, they chose not to modify those policies, suggesting that “negligent homicide” contributed to the financial system's collapse.

Although influential policymakers presume that international capital flows, euphoric traders, and insufficient regulatory power caused the crisis, this paper shows that these factors played only a partial role. Thus, current reforms represent only a partial and thus incomplete step in establishing a stable and well‐functioning financial system. Since systemic institutional failures helped cause the crisis, systemic institutional reforms must be a part of a comprehensively effective response.

We address here how the U.S. neoliberal policy regime developed and how its reconstructed vision of modernization, which culminated, under the rubric of globalization, was neutralized by 9/11 and neoconservative geopolitics. We analyze the phases in the rise of neoliberalism, and provide a detailed map of its vision of global modernization at its high tide under Clinton. We also address how the Bush Doctrine's unilateral, preemptive polices and the consequent War on Terror and Iraq War eroded U.S. legitimacy as the globalization system's hegmon and shifted the discourse from globalization to empire. Cold War modernization theorists, neoliberal globalization advocates, and Bush doctrine neoconservatives all drew on an American exceptionalist tradition that portrays the U.S. as modernity's “lead society,” attaches universal significance to its values, policies, and institutions, and urges their worldwide diffusion. All three traditions ignore or diminish the importance of substantive equality and social justice. We suggest that consequent U.S. policy problems might be averted by recovery of a suppressed side of the American tradition that stresses social justice and holds that democracy must start at home and be spread by example rather than by exhortation or force. Overall, we explore the contradictory U.S. role in an emergent post-Cold War world.

Job Corps is the United State’s largest and most comprehensive training program for disadvantaged youth aged 16–24 years old. A randomized social experiment concluded that, on average, individuals benefited from the program in the form of higher weekly earnings and employment prospects. At the same time, “young adults” (ages 20–24) realized much higher impacts relative to “adolescents” (ages 16–19). Employing recent nonparametric bounds for causal mediation, we investigate whether these two groups’ disparate effects correspond to them benefiting differentially from distinct aspects of Job Corps, with a particular focus on the attainment of a degree (GED, high school, or vocational). We find that, for young adults, the part of the total effect of Job Corps on earnings (employment) that is due to attaining a degree within the program is at most 41% (32%) of the total effect, whereas for adolescents that part can account for up to 87% (100%) of the total effect. We also find evidence that the magnitude of the part of the effect of Job Corps on the outcomes that works through components of Job Corps other than degree attainment (e.g., social skills, job placement, residential services) is likely higher for young adults than for adolescents. That those other components likely play a more important role for young adults has policy implications for more effectively servicing participants. More generally, our results illustrate how researchers can learn about particular mechanisms of an intervention.

The purpose of the present studies was to derive an integrative taxonomy of responses to social conflict. In Study 1, we had college‐age participants sort 33 responses to conflict, taken from various research domains, according to their similarities. From this, we generated two different classification systems: a very simple low‐dimensional system, obtained through multi‐dimensional scaling; and a complex high‐dimensional system, obtained through cluster analysis. To aid in the interpretation of the structures, in Study 2 we collected a set of ratings on each of the conflict responses. The results from Study 2 indicated that many of the labels used to describe conflict responses in past research could be used to describe some aspects of these taxonomies. However, no dimension or set of dimensions was sufficient to describe all classes of conflict responses. The results are discussed in terms of their larger theoretical and practical implications.

Investigates urban bias in state policy making in Mexico. Refers to literature claiming that rural poverty in developing nations is a major problem because capitalism reflects an urban bias. Examines social security coverage for the rural poor in Mexico and notes that there are great variations depending on area, suggesting that social security coverage is politically negotiable. Outlines briefly the historical development of Mexico’s welfare state and uses a power resource model to demonstrate how groups with competing interests go about securing benefits from the state. Cites literature on dependency theory, indicating that rural groups have failed to mobilize politically and have therefore not secured the same state resources (such as social security benefits and housing) as urban groups, yet argues that this does not always apply in Mexico, partially due to party politics and bureaucratic paternalism. Explains how data was collected to examine regional variations in social security coverage among the rural poor and how the data was analysed. Reveal that workers in important international export markets (such as cotton and sugar) have greater political leverage in obtaining better social security benefits. Notes also that areas supporting the political party in power obtain better benefits. Concludes, therefore, that rural workers are not powerless in the face of urban capitalism and that urban bias and dependency theories do not reflect the situation in Mexico – rather social security benefits are politically negotiable.