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This paper explores the impact of both government subsidies and decision makers' loss-averse behavior on the determination of transportation build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession periods based on cumulative prospect theory (CPT). The prospect value of a transportation project under traffic risk can be formulated according to the value function for gains and losses and the decision weight for gains and losses. As an extra income for investors, government subsidy is designed for highly risky aspects of BOT transportation projects: uncertain initial traffic volumes and fluctuating growth rates.

A decision-making model determining the concession period of a transportation BOT project is proposed by using the Monte-Carlo simulation method based on CPT, and the effects of risky behaviors of private investors on concession period decision making are analyzed. A subsidy method related to the internal rate-of-return (IRR) corresponding to a specific initial traffic volume and growth rate is proposed. The case of an actual BOT highway project is examined to illustrate how the method proposed can be used to determine the concession period of a transportation BOT project considering decision makers' loss-averse behavior and government subsidy. Contingency analysis is discussed to cope with possible misestimating of key factors such as initial traffic volume and cost coefficients. Sensitivity analysis is employed to investigate the impact of CPT parameters on the concession period decisions. An actual BOT case which failed to attract private capital is introduced to show the practical application. The results are then interpreted to conclude this paper.

Based on comparisons drawn between a concession period decision-making model considering the psychological behaviors of decision makers and a model not considering them, the authors conclude that the concession period based on CPT is distinctly different from that of the loss-neutral model. The concession period based on CPT is longer than the loss-neutral concession period. That is, loss-averse private investors tend to ask for long concession periods to make up for losses they will face in the future. Government subsidies serve as extra income for investors, allowing appointed profits to be secured sooner. For the benefit side of contingency variables, the normal state of initial traffic volume, average annual traffic growth rate and bias degree and the government subsidy need to be paid close attention during the project life span. For the cost side of contingency variables, the annual operating cost variable has a significant impact on the length of predicted concession period, while the large-scale cost variable has minor impact.

With an actual BOT highway project, the determination of transportation BOT concession periods based on the psychological behaviors of decision makers is analyzed in this paper. As the psychological behaviors of decision makers heavily impact the decision-making process, the authors analyze their impacts on concession period decision making. Government subsidy is specifically designed for various states of initial traffic volume and fluctuating growth rates to cope with corresponding high risks and mitigate private investors' loss-averse behaviors. Contingency analysis and sensitivity analysis are discussed as the estimated values of parameters may not be authentic in actual situations.

Load balancing is an important issue for a heterogeneous distributed computing system environment that has been proven to be a nondeterministic polynomial time hard problem. This paper aims to propose a resource-aware load balancing (REAL) model for a batch of independent tasks with a centralized load balancer to make the solution appropriate for a practical heterogeneous distributed environment having a migration cost with the objective of maximizing the level of load balancing considering bandwidth requirements for migration of the tasks.

To achieve the effective schedule, load balancing issues should be addressed and tackled through efficient workload distribution. In this approach, the migration has been carried out in two phases, namely, initial migration and best-fit migration. Using the best-fit policy in migrations helps in the possible performance improvement by minimizing the remaining idle slots on underloaded nodes that remain unentertained during the initial migration.

The experimental results reveal that the proposed model exhibits a superior performance among the other strategies on considered parameters such as makespan, average utilization and level of load balancing under study for a heterogeneous distributed environment.

Design of the REAL model and a comparative performance evaluation with LBSM and ITSLB have been conducted by using MATLAB 8.5.0.

This paper aims to provide a method for obtaining physically sound temperature fields to be used in geophysical inversions in the presence of immersed essential conditions.

The method produces a thermal field in agreement with a given location of the interface between the Lithosphere and Asthenosphere. It leverages the known location of the interface to enforce the location of a given isotherm while relaxing other constraints known with less precision. The method splits the domain: in the Lithosphere the solution is immediately obtained by standard procedures, while in the Asthenosphere a minimization problem is solved to fulfill continuity of temperatures (strongly imposed) and fluxes at the interface (weakly imposed).

The numerical methodology, based on the relaxation of the bottom fluxes, correctly recovers the thermal field in the complete domain. To obtain bottom fluxes following geophysical expected values, a constrained minimization strategy is required. The sensitivity of the method could be improved by relaxing other quantities such as lateral fluxes or mantle velocities.

A statement of the energy balance problem in terms of a known immersed condition is presented. A novel numerical procedure based on a domain-splitting strategy allows the solution of the problem. The procedure is tailored to be used within geophysical inversions and provides physically sound solutions.

The Build‐Operate‐Transfer (BOT) model of development of privatized infrastructure projects is implemented through the award of a concession to a private sector consortium which will finance, build and operate the facility. In a competitive BOT tender, the selection of the successful consortium does not depend on the lowest tolls offered by the tenderer. Rather, it is dependent on the ability of the promoter to provide the most competitive package of distinctive winning elements in its proposal during the final negotiations. The promoter must fully understand the government's needs and concerns and be able to address them through the right package of the winning elements. In this paper, these elements are developed from sub‐factors of the critical success factors of technical solution advantage, financial package differentiation and differentiation in guarantees.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and prioritize key performance indicators (KPIs) that can be used for stage-based performance assessment of build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects.

This research was conducted through focus group discussions and face-to-face questionnaires. Firstly, stage-level KPIs for BOT projects were identified by conducting a literature survey. The list of KPIs that can be used for measuring performance at different stages of a BOT project was finalized by conducting focus group discussions with 12 participants. The data related to the importance of identified KPIs were collected via a face-to-face questionnaire in which 30 high-level managers participated. Based on these data, KPIs were prioritized considering eight different stages of a BOT project by using Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS).

The research findings reveal that 63 stage-level KPIs can be used for measuring the performance of BOT projects at eight different stages, which are “feasibility study and preliminary plan,” “announcement and submission of application,” “evaluation and selection,” “negotiation and signing of concession agreement,” “design,” “construction,” “operation” and “transfer.” The most important KPIs were determined as “comprehensiveness of project technical feasibility,” “detailed tendering procedure,” “effectiveness of concessionaires' technical knowledge/capability evaluation,” “good relationships between government and concessionaire,” “technology transfer,” “effectiveness of quality control,” “effectiveness of facility management” and “effectiveness of hand-back management” for each stage. The findings can be used by companies to evaluate performance at each stage of a BOT project and, if necessary, take the necessary actions for performance improvement at the stage level.

The main limitation is the size of the sample, which represents the perspectives of 30 Turkish high-level managers on KPIs in BOT projects. Besides, the selected method, namely, TOPSIS, does not provide quality measures related to the outputs; therefore, it is difficult to see the inconsistencies among the experts.

The study findings will help in devising appropriate performance evaluation practices for BOT projects to overcome the shortfalls of the existing practices and systems proposed in the literature and help in achieving the superior performance while developing infrastructure through the BOT route.

This paper proposes a process-based approach for measuring the performance of a BOT project considering eight different stages. It fills a research gap in the public–private partnership literature by focusing on stages rather than phases. The results can be used by practitioners to establish stage-level performance management systems for BOT projects.

Construction projects are risky. However, the characteristics of the risk highly depend on the type of procurement being adopted for managing the project. A build‐operate‐transfer (BOT) project is recognized as one of the most risky project schemes. There are instances of project failure where a BOT scheme was employed. Ineffective rts are increasingly being managed using various risk management tools and techniques. However, application of those tools depends on the nature of the project, organization's policy, project management strategy, risk attitude of the project team members, and availability of the resources. Understanding of the contents and contexts of BOT projects, together with a thorough understanding of risk management tools and techniques, helps select processes of risk management for effective project implementation in a BOT scheme. This paper studies application of risk management tools and techniques in BOT projects through reviews of relevant literatures and develops a model for selecting risk management process for BOT projects. The application to BOT projects is considered from the viewpoints of the major project participants. Discussion is also made with regard to political risks. This study would contribute to the establishment of a framework for systematic risk management in BOT projects.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the fundamental factors influencing the equity share in build‐operate‐transfer (BOT) investments in relation to the project risk profile.

The relationships between risk factors and equity participation into the capital structure of a BOT contract are examined using regression analysis of a dataset of toll road projects.

Results suggest that the inflation rate, the size of the investment, the construction period, the solidity of the vehicle company, and the organizational structure of the project are significant variables of the equity portion of financing.

The analysis may support project promoters by providing better understanding of the factors that might facilitate high debt leverages and by providing lending institutions with valuable information to integrate the method of determining the appropriate debt resources to be injected into a BOT project.

The paper contributes towards growing the body of knowledge regarding the way public‐private partnership initiatives are carried over and helps refine the capital structures of BOT projects.

Dr. L. Botting, Engineering Controller—Advanced Systems, discusses the historical and technical background to one of NGL's many contributions to the Panavia Tornado, describes its operation and the newly established advanced manufacturing unit at NGL's Ordnance Division in Crewkerne which produces it.

Recent trends in the provision of infrastructure development indicate that the private sector is playing an increasingly important role in the procurement process. This trend has partly arisen out of a necessity for the development of infrastructure to be undertaken at a rate that maintains and allows growth. This has become a major challenge for many countries where it is evident that these provisions cannot be met by government alone. The emergence of Build‐Own‐Operate‐Transfer (BOOT) schemes as a response to this challenge provides a means for developing the infrastructure of a country without directly impacting upon the government's budgetary constraints. The concepts of BOOT are without doubt extremely complex arrangements, which bring to the construction sector risks not experienced previously. This paper examines perceptions of BOOT schemes in order to develop a framework of critical success factors. The developed framework is then tested against a case study of Stadium Australia, and the outcomes of the comparison are discussed.

Governments throughout the world are being forced to review how to fund the increasing demand and rising expectations of their citizens. This is especially relevant for developing countries, which often have limited capital resources to meet the soaring needs for essential infrastructure. This has consequently led to increased involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services, using various forms of Public‐Private Partnerships (PPPs). It is, however, important for both the public and private sectors to understand the various risks associated with PPPs throughout the whole life cycle of the projects in order to guarantee long‐term success. This is especially true in Nigeria and other countries where the use of PPPs are still in the early stages of development. Sixty‐one PPP risk factors were identified from literature and classified into exogenous and endogenous risks. This paper presents the results of the questionnaire survey that investigated the perception of Nigerian construction professionals on the relative importance of the identified risks and their preferences of allocation between the public and private sectors. The results show that the three most important PPP risk factors in Nigeria are “unstable government”, “inadequate experience in PPP” and “availability of finnance”. The respondents’ risk allocation preferences show that while most of the endogenous risk factors could be assigned to the private sector partner, the public sector should retain political and site acquisition risks, while relation‐ship‐based risks should be shared between the private and public sector partners