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The purpose of this paper is to assist bank regulators in Africa who are currently considering the implementation of Basel III countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) requirement.

Using a panel data set of 129 commercial banks operating in 14 African countries over the period 2004–2014, this paper estimates the system generalized method of moments regression to examine the impact of business cycle on banks’ regulatory capital buffers and attempts to identify the influence of bank revenue diversification, market power and cost of funding (CF) on bank regulatory capital buffers. It further carries out some robustness analyses using a panel data set of 257 commercial banks in 23 African countries over the period 2004–2014.

The results show that higher regulatory capital buffers are associated with higher market power, higher revenue diversification and higher CF. Additionally, the results show significant evidence of procyclical behavior of bank capital buffers (BUFs) in the sampled countries.

The results of this study suggest that African banking systems are not exposed to contagion and systemic risks arising from countercyclical movements of BUFs to the real economy. Therefore, this study does not support the implementation of the Basel III CCB requirement in the sampled African countries.

Considering that the results of existing studies on the cyclical behavior of BUFs are inconclusive, there is value in studying the cyclical movements of bank regulatory capital buffers in a set of countries that has not been analyzed before. Toward this direction, this is the first empirical study focusing on the cyclical behavior of bank regulatory capital buffers in Africa. Besides examining the cyclical behavior of bank regulatory capital buffers, this paper further investigates the effects of bank revenue diversification, market power and CF on bank regulatory capital buffers.

“Corrupt practices” is a recurring feature of media coverage. The paper seeks to encourage debates about the influence of institutional structures on agency to break away from methodological individualism. This paper aims to encourage reflections on the role of both the structures and actors which have shaped the continuous expansion of corrupt practices in Nigeria.

Whilst recognising that deviant behaviour by some individuals is always possible, this paper has rejected methodological individualism and shows the value of locating anti-social practices within the broader socio-political and historical context. Within a socio-political framework, this study adopts the theories of critical realism, developmental state and globalisation to understand the relationship between social agency and society, focusing upon the institutional structures and the role of social actors.

The evidence shows that socio-political and economic development, politics, power, history and globalisation have continued to reproduce and transform the institutional structures and actors which have facilitated anti-social practices in Nigeria. The paper concludes that large sums of government revenue have been undermined by the anti-social practices of the Nigerian political and economic elite (both local and international), which have enriched a few, but impoverished most, Nigerians.

As a consequence of recurring corrupt practices in Nigeria, there is a pressing need for reform to curb these practices which have had, and continue to have, a serious effect on Nigeria and its future development.

It provides a framework for understanding and explaining the inter-relations of actors and institutional structures and the linkages and influences that have shaped the practices in Nigeria.