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The purpose of the study is to examine how operating efficiencies from incentive alignment compensate for rent extraction in family firms. The author asks whether ownership (1) improves operating efficiencies to increase firm value, (2) positively affects related-party transactions (RPTs), or (3) destroys firm value. Finally, the author assesses whether the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect.

This study employs a panel of 333 listed family firms (and 185 nonfamily firms) and handles endogeneity using a dynamic panel system GMM and panel VAR.

Ownership decreases discretionary expenses and increases asset utilization to add firm value. The efficiency gains generate more value in family firms, especially majority-held ones, than in nonmajority ones. However, ownership is also related to increased RPTs (especially dubious loans/guarantees), reducing firm value. RPTs destroy value more severely in the family (or group) firms than in nonfamily (nongroup) firms. It could be why ownership's positive impact on value is lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms. Overall, the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect and is robust to controlling private benefits of control in the dynamic ownership-value model.

(1) A family firm's ownership may not be optimal. (2) The firm's long-term commitment as a dynasty limits the scale of expropriation yet sustains impetus for long-term value creation. The paradox partly explains why large family holdings and firm-specific investments endure over generations. (3) This way, large ownership substitutes weak investor protection in India despite tunneling as skin in the game provides necessary investor confidence. (4) Future studies can examine whether extraction varies with family generations and how family characteristics affect the incentive effects.

(1) Concentrated ownership may not be a wrong policy choice in emerging markets to draw firm-specific investments. (2) Investors, auditors, or creditors must pay closer attention to loans/guarantees. (3) More vigorous enforcement, auditor scrutiny, and board oversight are needed.

Family firms are not necessarily a bad organization type that destroys investor wealth. They can be valuably efficient due to their ownership and wealth concentration, and frugality. They matter in the economic growth of a developing market like India.

(1) Extends ownership-performance research to family firms and shows that although ownership facilitates tunneling, the incentive effect dominates; (2) family ownership is not impacted by firm value; (3) family ownership levels reduce discretionary expenses and increase asset utilization to create added value, especially in majority-held family firms; (4) RPTs and loans/guarantees increase with ownership; (5) value erosion from RPTs is higher in family (group) firms than in other firms.

The aim of this study is to understand a family firm's choice of related-party transaction (RPT) types and analyze their value impacts to separate the abusive from benign RPTs.

It uses a 10-year panel of BSE-listed 378 family (and 200 non-family) firms. The fixed effects, logit and difference-in-difference (DID) models help examine value effects, propensity and persistence of harmful RPTs.

Loans/guarantees (irrespective of counterparties) destroy firm value. Capital asset RPTs decrease the firm value but enhance value when undertaken with holding parties. Operating RPTs increase firm value and profitability. They improve asset utilization and reduce discretionary expenses (especially when made with controlled entities). Family firms have larger loans/guarantees and capital asset volumes but have smaller operating RPTs than non-family firms. They are less likely to undertake loans/guarantees (and even operating RPTs) and more capital RPTs vis-à-vis non-family firms. Family firms persist with dubious loans/guarantees but hold back beneficial operating RPTs, despite RPTs being in investor cross-hairs amid the Satyam scam.

Rent extractability and counterparty incentives supplement each other. (1) The higher extractability of related-party loans and guarantees (RPLGs) dominates the lower extraction incentives of controlled parties. (2) Holding parties' bringing assets, providing a growth engine and adding value dominate their higher extraction incentives (3) The big gains to the operational efficiency come from operating RPTs with controlled parties, generally operating companies in the family house. (4) Dubious RPTs seem more integral to family firms' choices than non-family firms. (5) Counterparty incentives behind the divergent use of RPTs deserve more research attention. Future studies can give more attention to how family characteristics affect divergent motives behind RPTs.

First, the study does not single out family firms for dubious use of all RPTs. Second, investors, auditors or creditors must pay close attention to RPLGs as a special expropriation mechanism. Third, operating RPTs (and capital RPTs with holding parties) benefit family firms. However, solid procedural safeguards are necessary. Overall, results may help clarify the dilemma Indian regulators face in balancing the abusive and business sides of RPTs.

The study fills the gap by arguing why some RPTs may be dubious or benign and then shows how RPTs' misuse depends on counterparty types. It shows operating RPTs enhance operating efficiencies on several dimensions and that benefits may vary with counterparty types. It also presents the first evidence that family firms favor dubious RPTs more and efficient RPTs less than non-family firms.