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This paper aims to determine the level of online fraud offending within an Australian jurisdiction and how to best apply resources to combat it.

Empirical data were provided by an Australian law enforcement agency, and qualitative responses were obtained from the parties involved in the crimes themselves (the victims, the offenders and the nominated law enforcement agency).

Although there was variance between the ages of the online fraud victims, there was a slightly higher chance of an older member of the population falling victim to an offender than that of a younger person. The number of a particular gender reporting an instance of cybercrime in a given area can be higher if the total number of participants in that area was also high. Older victims were more likely to lose larger amounts of money to online fraud. Furthermore, it was found that when the non-gender identifiable data were removed, this increased to over 80 per cent.

Existing literature on online fraud and criminal offending generally focused on the quantitative aspects of measuring offending, which does not give an indication into the “why” component of the study: why are these offences being committed; why do these offenders pick particular victims; and why do the victims fall for such ruses? In this paper, the authors combined the qualitative responses obtained from those parties involved in the crimes themselves (the victims, the offenders and the nominated law enforcement agency) with a quantitative examination of the crime figures provided by an Australian law enforcement agency.

Opportunities for malicious cyber activities have expanded with the globalisation and advancements in information and communication technology. Such activities will increasingly affect the security of businesses with online presence and/or connected to the internet. Although the real estate sector is a potential attack vector for and target of malicious cyber activities, it is an understudied industry. This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the information security threats, awareness, and risk management standards currently employed by the real estate sector in South Australia.

The current study comprises both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, which include 20 survey questionnaires and 20 face-to-face interviews conducted in South Australia.

There is a lack of understanding about the true magnitude of malicious cyber activities and its impact on the real estate sector, as illustrated in the findings of 40 real estate organisations in South Australia. The findings and the escalating complexities of the online environment underscore the need for regular ongoing training programs for basic online security (including new cybercrime trends) and the promotion of a culture of information security (e.g. when using smart mobile devices to store and access sensitive data) among staff. Such initiatives will enable staff employed in the (South Australian) real estate sector to maintain the current knowledge of the latest cybercrime activities and the best cyber security protection measures available.

This is the first academic study focusing on the real estate organisations in South Australia. The findings will contribute to the evidence on the information security threats faced by the sector as well as in develop sector-specific information security risk management guidelines.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the identity and payment method verification procedures implemented by a number of popular massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) and online financial service providers (OFSPs) to determine if the systems they currently have in place are sufficient to uncover the identities of those who may wish to use such environments to conduct money laundering or terrorism financing activity.

The paper investigates whether the payment instruments or methods used by account holders to place funds into their account(s) hinder or assist investigators to expose the real‐world identity of the account holder. The paper then discusses whether it is feasible and/or desirable to introduce know your customer (KYC) and customer due diligence (CDD) legislation into virtual environments and illustrates an effective KYC approach which may assist MMOGs and OFSPs to correctly identify their account holders, should legislation be put in place.

The systems currently in place by all of the MMOGs investigated are wholly inadequate to successfully establish the real‐world identities of account holders. None of the information required at the account setup stage is verified and, therefore, cannot be reliably associated with an account holder in a real‐world context. It appears that all three of the MMOGs investigated are leaving the serious matter of identity and payment method verification to the organisations that assist in the sale and purchase of their in‐world currency such as third party currency exchanges and Internet payment systems (collectively referred to as OFSPs). However, many of these OFSPs do not have adequate systems in place to successfully verify the identities of their account holders or users either. The authors' experiments show that it can be a very simple process to open accounts and perform financial transactions with all of the OFSPs investigated using publicly available or fictitious identity information and a prepaid Visa® gift card. Although all five OFSPs investigated in this research claim to verify the identity of their account holders, and may already be subject to KYC and CDD legislation, their systems may need some work to ensure that an account holder or user is accurately identified before financial transactions can take place.

The authors believe that the electronic KYC approach discussed in this paper deals effectively with the challenges of global reach, anonymity and non‐face‐to‐face business relationships experienced by virtual environment operators, thereby assisting in the effective detection and possible prosecution of individuals who wish to use these platforms for illicit and illegal purposes.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the risks posed by politically exposed persons (PEPs) and explain the money laundering risk when entering into financial transactions and business relationships with PEPs. Risk mitigation by regulated entities and corruption prevention strategies are also outlined. To minimise money‐laundering risks associated with PEPs, legislation will need to adapt to deal with threats that organized criminals and terrorists seek to exploit. Future directions for research in relation to PEPs are also identified.

An analysis of how regulated entities can reduce their risk of money laundering when entering into financial transactions and business relationships with PEPs is presented.

It was found that there is a need to harmonise legally enforceable obligations targeting PEPs. PEP monitoring, arguably, should be extended to individuals holding prominent public functions in their own jurisdictions, individuals exercising functions not normally considered prominent but who have political exposure comparable to that of similar positions at a prominent level, and individuals holding important positions in private sectors such as CEOs of listed companies. Regulated entities in the private sector need to play their part to mitigate their risks such as conducting ongoing environmental scans of risks of money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

This paper improves awareness of the potential money laundering risks when entering into financial transactions and business relationships with PEPs and makes several recommendations to mitigate the risk posed by PEPs.

There is a clear consensus of opinion that virtual environments and virtual currencies pose a money laundering and terrorism financing threat. What is less clear, however, is the level of risk that they pose. This paper aims to clarify the suitability of virtual environments for conducting money laundering and terrorism financing activities.

A number of experiments were conducted to estimate the quantity of funds that could be moved through these environments. These experiments took into account a number of factors such as the number of accounts that would need to be opened to launder/raise a specific amount of funds, the amount of funds that could be placed within a certain timeframe and the transaction limits imposed by each of the massively multiplayer online games and online financial service providers involved in the money laundering and terrorism financing scenarios.

The findings of this research show that money laundering and terrorism financing can take place inside virtual environments. Virtual money laundering and terrorism financing offer high levels of anonymity, potentially low levels of detection, and remove many of the risks associated with real-world money laundering and terrorism financing activity. However, this comes at the cost of ease, time and, in some cases, the amount of funds laundered. Large sums (millions of dollars) can be laundered in virtual environments, but this exponentially increases the level of effort involved in setting up accounts and placing, layering and integrating funds.

A number of authors have described potential virtual money laundering scenarios, but some of these are out-of-date due to closed loopholes, all are rudimentary and make no attempt to discuss the practicality or feasibility of using these scenarios. This research addresses those issues.

The purpose of this paper is to measure the size of the money laundering and terrorism financing problem, identify threats and trends, the techniques employed and the amount of funds involved to determine whether the information obtained about money laundering and terrorism financing in real‐world environments can be transferred to virtual environments such as Second Life and World of Warcraft.

Analysis of 184 Typologies obtained from a number of anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorism financing (AML/CTF) bodies to: determine whether trends and/or patterns can be identified in the different phases of money laundering or terrorism financing, namely, the placement, layering and integration phases; and to establish whether trends and/or behaviours are ubiquitous to a particular money laundering or terrorism financing Type.

Money launderers and terrorism financers appeared to have slightly different preferences for the placement, layering and integration techniques. The more techniques that are used, the more cash can be successfully laundered or concealed. Although terrorism financers use similar channels to money launderers, they do not utilise as many of the placement, layering and integration techniques. Rather, they prefer to use a few techniques which maintain high levels of anonymity and appear innocuous. The sums of monies involved in money laundering and terrorism financing vary significantly. For example, the average maximum sum involved in money laundering cases was AUD 68.5M, as compared to AUD 4.8 for terrorism financing cases.

This paper provides some insight into the relationship between predicate offence, the predominant techniques utilised in carrying out that offence and the sums of money involved.

The purpose of this paper is to show how modelling can be used to provide an easy‐to‐follow, visual representation of the important characteristics and aspects of money laundering behaviours extracted from real‐world money laundering and terrorism financing typologies.

In total, 184 typologies were obtained from a number of anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorism financing (AML/CTF) bodies to determine the common patterns and themes present in the cases involved. Financial flows, transactions and interactions between entities were extracted from each of the typologies and modelled using the Unified Modelling Language (UML) features within Microsoft Visio.

The paper demonstrates how complex transactional flows and interactions between the different entities involved in a money laundering and terrorism financing case can be shown in an easy‐to‐follow graphical representation, allowing practitioners to more easily and quickly extract the relevant information from the typology, as opposed to reading a full text‐based description. In addition, these models make it easier to discover trends and patterns present within and across Types and allow money laundering and terrorism financing typologies to be updated and published to the wider international AML/CTF community, as and when new trends and behaviours become apparent.

A set of models have been produced that can be extended every time a new scenario, typology or Type arises. These models can be held in a central repository that can be added to and updated by AML/CTF practitioners and can be referred to by practitioners to help them identify whether the case that they are dealing with fits already predefined money laundering and terrorism financing behaviours, or whether a new behaviour has been discovered. These models may also be useful for the development of money laundering and terrorism financing detection tools and the training of new analysts or practitioners. The authors believe that their work goes some way to addressing the current lack of formal methods and techniques for identifying and developing uniform procedures for describing, classifying and sharing new money laundering and terrorism financing with the international AML/CTF community, as and when they happen, in a simple but effective manner.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the feasibility and desirability of using the Microsoft Passport service for client authentication and authorization. It aims to present the business benefits of using Microsoft Passport, an overview (logical) description of the work involved in adopting Microsoft Passport into a business site, and a functional description of how Microsoft Passport works in conceptual terms.

An analysis of the level of business adoption of passport is then presented.

The paper concludes that business adoption of Microsoft Passport appears to be losing ground due to lack of trust, control, and privacy; and the proliferation of other identity management paradigms. This issue report is prepared from the perspective of a business analyst and is pitched in terminology suitable for a business audience.

This work provides organisations investigating the feasibility/desirability of using the Microsoft Passport, a fundamental understanding of passport, how passport works in conceptual terms, and the current business adoption status for passport services.

Offers a significant analysis of the feasibility and desirability of using the Microsoft Passport service for client authentication and authorization and its current business adoption.

This study aims to provide a more complete picture of blockchain development by combining numerous methodologies with diverse data sources, such as academic papers and news articles. This study displays the developmental status of each subject based on the interrelationships of each topic cluster by analyzing high-frequency keywords extracted from the collected data. Moreover, applying above methodologies will help understanding top research topics, authors, venues, institutes and countries. The differences of blockchain research and new are identified.

To identify and find blockchain development linkages, researchers have used search terms such as co-occurrence, bibliographic coupling, co-citation and co-authorship to help us understand the top research topics, authors, venues, institutes and countries. This study also used text mining analysis to identify blockchain articles' primary concepts and semantic structures.

The findings show the fundamental topics based on each topic cluster's links. While “technology”, “transaction”, “privacy and security”, “environment” and “consensus” were most strongly associated with blockchain in research, “platform”, “big data and cloud”, “network”, “healthcare and business” and “authentication” were closely tied to blockchain news. This article classifies blockchain principles into five patterns: hardware and infrastructure, data, networking, applications and consensus. These statistics helped the authors comprehend the top research topics, authors, venues, publication institutes and countries.

Since Web of Science (WoS) and LexisNexis Academic data are used, the study has few sources. Others advise merging foreign datasets. WoS is one of the world's largest and most-used databases for assessing scientific papers.

This study has several uses and benefits. First, key concept discoveries can help academics understand blockchain research trends so they can prioritize research initiatives. Second, bibliographic coupling links academic papers on blockchain. It helps information seekers search and classify the material. Co-citation analysis results can help researchers identify potential partners and leaders in their field. The network's key organizations or countries should be proactive in discovering, proposing and creating new relationships with other organizations or countries, especially those from the journal network's border, to make the overall network more integrated and linked. Prominent members help recruit new authors to organizations or countries and link them to the co-authorship network. This study also used concept-linking analysis to identify blockchain articles' primary concepts and semantic structures. This may lead to new authors developing research ideas or subjects in primary disciplines of inquiry.

This paper aims to review the latest management developments across the globe and pinpoint practical implications from cutting-edge research and case studies.

This briefing is prepared by an independent writer who adds his own impartial comments and places the articles in context.

The findings of this research show that money laundering and terrorism financing can take place inside virtual environments. Virtual money laundering and terrorism financing offer high levels of anonymity and potentially low levels of detection, and remove many of the risks associated with real-world money laundering and terrorism financing activity. However, this comes at the cost of ease, time and, in some cases, the amount of funds laundered. Large sums (millions of dollars) can be laundered in virtual environments, but this exponentially increases the level of effort involved in setting up accounts and placing, layering and integrating funds.

The paper provides strategic insights and practical thinking that have influenced some of the world’s leading organizations.

The briefing saves busy executives and researchers’ hours of reading time by selecting only the very best, most pertinent information and presenting it in a condensed and an easy-to digest format.