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Empirical evidence on the shareholder wealth effects of changes in executive compensation agreements is provided by a body of research which examines common stock returns around the time that pay packages are modified. Most studies report significantly positive excess stock returns contemporaneous with the compensation event. Despite this, numerous methodological issues prevent researchers from ascribing a causal relation between the compensation change and the observed stock price behavior. This paper critically reviews the accumulated evidence from studies in this literature and suggests directions for future research.

Long‐term performance contracts are awarded to top management in order to provide incentives to maximize shareholder value. We test the incentive hypothesis using 350 firms, one half of which has adopted long‐term performance plans over the period 1971–80. The analysis uses performance indicators such as earnings per share (EPS), rate of return on assets (ROA), rate of return on equity (ROE), rate of return on investment (ROI), and stock returns (ASR). In addition to using a control group of firms that did not adopt plans, the test period consists of a control period (six years prior to plan adoption) and a test period (six years following plan adoption). The results support the incentive hypothesis in that all performance indicators for the test firms improved compared to prior performance, but the performance of test firms in the period subsequent to plan adoption when compared to the control firms was not significantly different.

The following classified, annotated list of titles is intended to provide reference librarians with a current checklist of new reference books, and is designed to supplement the RSR review column, “Recent Reference Books,” by Frances Neel Cheney. “Reference Books in Print” includes all additional books received prior to the inclusion deadline established for this issue. Appearance in this column does not preclude a later review in RSR. Publishers are urged to send a copy of all new reference books directly to RSR as soon as published, for immediate listing in “Reference Books in Print.” Reference books with imprints older than two years will not be included (with the exception of current reprints or older books newly acquired for distribution by another publisher). The column shall also occasionally include library science or other library related publications of other than a reference character.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the motivations for and variations in terms of stock option modifications under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123(R). Stock options are used to motivate and retain employees. Unfortunately, when stock prices decline, existing options lose their incentive value. In response, firms look for ways to re-incentivize their employees. Their choices include issuing additional options and/or modifying existing grants.

We investigate the economic determinants of stock option modification post SFAS 123(R), such as financial reporting cost, shareholder/political cost and employee incentive and retention. Our analysis is based on 67 sample firms that modify their stock option plans from 2005 to 2008 and 67 control firms constructed based on size, industry, year and stock price performance for the prior five years.

The results show that loss firms are more likely to modify their options, which supports the argument that financial reporting costs influence the decision to modify. We find support for the shareholder/political costs hypothesis, as the overhang ratio is positively associated with the decision to modify. However, we find no evidence that modifications substitute for additional option grants. We find that politically sensitive larger firms are more likely to incorporate more shareholder friendly measures such as excluding executives from modification or providing shareholders the opportunity to vote on modification.

This is the first paper examining the economic determinants of stock option modification under SFAS 123(R). Our findings provide some insights regarding economic determinants of SFAS 123(R) for accounting policy-makers and investors.

This study investigates the motivations for and compensation structure changes behind $1 CEO salary decisions.

Using a hand-collected sample, we relied on an event study framework and regression analysis to decipher the informational content of $1 CEO salary announcements.

The results show that the market reacts positively to $1 CEO salary announcements that indicate aligning the interests of CEOs and shareholders.

A lot of academic and professional attention has been given to the components of executive compensation packages as tools for incentivizing managers. Our findings will help executive board members tasked with determining CEO compensation packages.

This study adds to the literature on CEO compensation by deciphering the market reaction to $1 salary decision announcements. Our study contributes to the literature on executive compensation by providing evidence consistent with efficient contracting.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether client industry importance affects auditor independence.

This study analyzes audit firm merger data from China Stock Market and Accounting Research and uses a difference-in-difference model to find whether client industry importance is associated with auditor independence. This study uses discretionary accruals and propensity to issue modified audit opinions as proxies for auditor independence.

Results show that the greater the decline in client industry importance, the more significant the increase in auditor independence. In addition, the magnitude of decline in client overall importance is also positively associated with the extent of increase in auditor independence; however, this result disappears after controlling for client industry importance.

The authors acknowledge that this study has limitations. First, audit firm mergers provide a unique research setting. However, the findings of this study in such setting may not be generalizable to other situations. Second, this study has a limited sample size because of data availability, which could impact the robustness of the results.

Results from this study are important because investors and regulators have increasing concerns over auditor independence since the Enron scandal. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of client industry importance on auditor independence and in a unique setting of audit firm merger to separate auditor independence from auditor competence, and hence controlling for self-selection bias. Results of this study provide evidence that client industry importance has significant influence over auditor independence.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between executive perquisite consumption and indicators of corporate governance after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expanded the disclosure requirements related to perquisites.

This study uses ordinary least squares and Tobit regressions to examine the dollar value of perquisites consumed, the number of perquisites consumed and the types of perquisites consumed.

The analysis shows that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to award perquisites to executives. Firms characterized as being more prone to the presence of agency problems are associated with greater levels of perquisite consumption. Finally, there is evidence that not all perquisite consumptions can be attributed to an agency problem. Efficiently operating firms are associated with greater levels of perquisite consumption as are larger firms.

The authors examine firms in the period immediately after the SEC initiated the expanded disclosures. This may limit the generalizability of the results to other exchange-listed firms that changed their perquisite policy as a result of the rule change.

The paper extends the literature on corporate governance and mandatory corporate disclosure by investigating the association between corporate governance characteristics and perquisite consumption. This paper examines this relation immediately after the SEC expanded the disclosures surrounding perquisites to provide the public with more transparent disclosures.

The purpose of this paper is to add an important new dimension to the earnings management literature by establishing a link between idiosyncratic risk and the degree of accrual management.

Based on a comprehensive sample of 44,599 firm-year observations during the period spanning 1987-2009, the study offers robust empirical evidence of the importance of firm-specific idiosyncratic volatility as a determinant of earnings manipulation. The authors use standard measures of earnings management and idiosyncratic volatility. The authors test the hypotheses with robust econometrics techniques.

The authors document a strong positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and accruals management. Further, the authors find a positive association between residual volatility and discretionary accruals whether accruals are income inflationary or income deflationary. The findings are robust to alternate idiosyncratic risk proxies and variables associated with earnings management.

Overall, the knowledge derived from this study provides additional tools to assess the degree of earnings management by firms, and hence the quality of the financial reporting. Thus the findings will enable standard setters, financial market regulators, analysts, and investors to make more informed legislative, regulatory, resource allocation, and investment decisions.

This study aims to examine whether national industry expertise in Italy is more dominant than local expertise. Prior studies from Australia, USA and UK show that audit fees for industry experts are priced at a higher premium at the local level than the national level. These countries have voluntary audit firm rotation, while Italy has mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR). The authors predict that Italy has a stronger national than local level of industry expertise, to better retain and transfer industry expertise.

The authors compare audit fee premiums of national industry experts to local levels, using quantitative (multivariate tests) and qualitative (interviews) methodology.

Using hand-collected audit fees, the authors find that the audit fee premium for industry expertise is greater at the national level than the local level. The authors find corroborating results with audit hours. To provide further support, the authors conduct analysis for a neighboring country that does not have audit firm rotation. Using hand-collected data from Germany, the authors find that audit fee premiums from national industry expertise are no different from local industry expertise.

The present study study has theoretical and practical implications, for European Union countries, which recently adopted MAFR and for countries considering adoption in the future.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a deeper understanding about the reasons behind difference in previous studies’ results in the field of audit quality determinants.

A meta-analysis method is employed in which 52 studies including 40 international studies from authentic scientific articles during the year 2000–2015 and 12 national studies out of authentic national scientific articles from 2001 to 2015 are taken to account as sample studies. Audit firm size, auditor tenure and auditor specialization are set as independent variables and audit quality is the only dependent variable in the current paper.

The results indicate that audit firm size and auditor specialization are positively associated with audit quality. In other words, contracting with larger audit firm and specialized auditor results in delivering higher quality audit services.

The current study is the first study to be conducted in the field of audit quality determinants. The results may be beneficial both for standard setters as well practitioners in a way that it provides evidence that contributes to basis policy and audit-standard makers about domination and determinants of audit quality.