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The complexity of computerized information systems increases the complexity of the external auditor's assessment of the reliability of a client's internal control systems. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of weaknesses in IT related internal controls on the cost of a SOX 404 audit of internal controls over financial reporting.

The paper considers the impact on audit fees through three dimensions: percentage increase in audit fees; amount of change in audit fees per outstanding common share; and actual dollar amount of audit fees. Examination of first year reports by accelerated filers yields 131 companies with material IT‐control weaknesses. These 131 companies are matched with a similar set of companies with no reported material weaknesses, and for a subset of 54 from the 131 companies in which a good match could be identified, a set of companies having only material non‐IT‐based control weaknesses are compared.

As expected, substantial fee differentials were identified for companies reporting material IT‐based control weaknesses as compared to both companies without any material weaknesses and those companies with only non‐IT related material weaknesses.

Preliminary evidence in regard to the costs of SOX 404 compliance for stockholders is provided. The cost of SOX 404 compliance has often been cited in criticisms of SOX, yet the focus of SOX is not on corporate wealth, but rather on enhancing corporate governance to protect the interest of stockholders. The cost of SOX compliance across the number of reported outstanding common shares for the companies studied is factored. It is found that the increased cost of audit fees on a per share basis is higher for companies reporting IT material weaknesses.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a general discussion of how techniques from financial engineering can be used to investigate the economic costs of farm programs and to aid in the design of new financial products to implement margin protection for dairy farmers. Specifically the paper investigates the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) and the Dairy Margin Protection (DMP) program. In addition the paper introduces the concept of the Milk to Corn Price ratio to protect margins.

The paper introduces and reviews the tools of financial engineering. These include the stochastic calculus and Itô's Lemma. The empirical tool is Monte Carlo simulations. The approach is part pedagogy and part practice.

In this paper the authors illustrate how financial engineering can be used to price complex price stabilization formula in the USA and to illustrate its use in the design of new products.

In this paper the authors illustrate how financial engineering can be used to price complex price stabilization formula in the USA and to illustrate its use in the design of new products.

Farm programs designed to protect dairy farmers margins are designed in a seemingly ad hoc fashion. Assessments of programs such as MILC or DMP are conducted on an ex-post basis using historical data. The financial engineering approach presented in this paper provides the means to add significant depth to the assessment of such programs which can be used in conjunction with Monte Carlo simulation to identify alternative model structures before they are written into law.

This paper builds upon an existing literature. Its originality is in the application of financial engineering techniques to farm dairy policy.

We investigate the effect of the PCAOB’s Part II report on annually inspected firms’ audit fees and audit quality. The PCAOB replaced the peer review auditor program with an independent inspection of audit firms. Upon completion of each inspection, the PCAOB issued inspection reports that include a public portion (Part I) of identified audit deficiencies, and (in most cases) a nonpublic portion (Part II) of identified quality control weaknesses. The Part II report is only made public when the PCAOB deems that remediation was insuffcient after at least 12 months have passed. Starting around the time of the 2007 Deloitte censure (Boone et al., 2015), the PCAOB shifted from a soft synergistic approach to an antagonistic approach, such that Part II reports were imminent, despite delays that ultimately led to their release one to four years later than expected. Our study spans the period from 2007 to 2015, and examines the effect on audit fees and audit quality at the earliest date that the Part II report could have been released – 12 months after the Part I report was issued. We find that following the 12 month period, that annually inspected audit firms eventually lost reputation by lower audit fees, while they concurrently made remedial efforts to increase the quality of their client’s financial reporting quality (abnormal accruals magnitude and restatements). However, three years after the Part II report was actually released, audit fees increased.

To analyze the August 2016 court decision in Sivolella v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. and its implications for cases concerning mutual fund advisory fees under Section 36(b) of the of the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Discusses Section 36(b), the plaintiffs’ arguments and the judge’s decision in favor of the mutual fund adviser. Provides insights from the judge’s analysis of the advisory fees at issue, including the independence of the mutual fund board and quality of the annual advisory contract renewal process, whether the language of the advisory and subadvisory agreements fully reflects the nature and extent of services provided, the board’s reliance on outside experts and advisers when considering the advisers’ fees and services, and continuous improvements in the boards’ annual advisory contract renewal process.

AXA was a decisive victory for the adviser, and serves as a reminder to boards and advisers alike that a diligent focus on board process and independence can pay twofold after litigation is filed.

Boards and advisers should consider AXA’s implications, and whether the decision raises issues that should be reviewed by independent counsel with experience advising funds and advisers with respect to the Investment Company Act.

Practical guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

Part I of this series appeared in the Summer 2002 issue of The Journal of Investment Compliance. It addressed the regulation of wrap fee programs under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”) and the requirements of Rule 3a‐4 thereunder, which must be met so that a wrap fee program is not deemed to be an investment company. Part I also discussed certain issues arising under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), including how program sponsors and any third‐party portfolio managers generally are viewed as investment advisers and are subject to the Advisers Act. Part II discusses additional Advisers Act issues such as suitability, fees, and advertising. It also briefly reviews issues arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). The information provided in Part II assumes that readers have some basic familiarity with Part I.

Wrap fee programs are an increasingly popular product offered by broker‐dealers and investment managers to their clients. Wrap fee programs present unique issues under both the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”) and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), the two primary bodies of law that govern the product and those who offer and manage it. The regulations and rules under those Acts applicable to wrap fee programs and related interpretive statements made by the SEC staff, however, are wide ranging and have not been provided in a single format. This article attempts to present a comprehensive discussion on the regulation of wrap fee programs, as well as the many compliance issues associated with these programs. The article is delivered in two parts. Part I, presented in this issue, addresses the regulation of wrap fee programs under the Investment Company Act. Part I also begins a review of unique issues arising under the Advisers Act, including registration requirements for wrap fee sponsors and other persons who manage or offer the product to their clients, as well as required contents for wrap fee brochures and related disclosure issues. Part II, which will be presented in the next issue, will discuss additional Advisers Act issues such as suitability, fees and advertising. It also will briefly review issues arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).

To describe the main provisions of the US Department of Labor’s final “fiduciary” rule and its related prohibited transaction exemptions and the key challenges the rule poses for financial advisers.

This article describes the impact of the new “fiduciary” rule on broker-dealers, banks and other financial organizations who will, for the first time since the passage of ERISA, be subject to ERISA’s fiduciary standards and remedies when providing investment and asset management recommendations to individual retirement accounts and other retail retirement clients.

The most immediate impact of the rule will be on the compensation practices at broker-dealers and other financial institutions and on the fee and revenue sharing arrangements among funds, fund sponsors and the financial institutions that offer investment advice to retail retirement clients. Although the new rule responds to many of the concerns raised by the financial services industry, compliance with the rule will require the restructuring of pay and compliance policies at financial institutions servicing retail clients.

Practical guidance from experienced ERISA lawyers.