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Management history has long acknowledged the existence of unproductive labour. Despite becoming unfashionable in modern times, the growth of unproductive labour within the economic composition of Australia’s labour force, witnessed since the late 1980s, brings to the fore old debates with a modern resonance, debates as to how and when labour contributes to economic growth. Using Australia as a case study, this paper aims to explore the economic cost increasing rates of unproductive labour, typically associated with government-imposed regulation, may have upon an organisation, and more broadly society.

This paper explores the theoretical frameworks developed by classical and neoclassical economists on the subject of productive and unproductive labour and uses key elements to explain the economic consequences of the current labour economy and regulatory environment that exists within modern Australia.

It is the growth of unproductive roles within the Australian economy since the late 1980s that contributes not only to the rising cost of employing domestically and the rising cost of living, but furthermore, to the fragility of Australia’s long-term economic security.

Australia’s economy is bound by chains of regulation. No longer does productivity fuel a growing economy, but rather, economies are powered by the rein of unproductive labour – labour that does not produce value but rather, consumes it. Unproductive labour is not a “dusty museum piece”. Rather, it is a defining characteristic of modern Australia, one that impacts immensely the cost of domestic business, and ultimately, society and the cost of living.

This article aims to uncover the influence employment relations, and more specifically union avoidance has on the decision to outsource road transport. Employment Relations literature often attributes outsourcing decision to decollectivist strategies, minimising the influence unions have in their workplaces or to labour cost reduction objectives. These explanations, however, fail to explain why some firms do not outsource when their sourcing structure incurs greater union involvement or industrial relation.

The author examines two case studies. Company A and Company B, while operating in a similar environment, selling similar products and offering a similar home delivery service have adopted different governance structures for their outbound transport function; Company A has integrated while Company B has outsourced. Was union avoidance or transaction cost reductions central to their respective decisions?

Company A did not integrate in an effort to circumvent union intervention or reduce costs. Company A’s integration, on the contrary, increased the firm’s dealings with unions, as well as regulatory compliance and transaction costs. Company B’s decision to outsource yielded similar results. While not experiencing an increase in union intervention, the firm failed to reduce the density of unionised labour and by maintaining ownership of delivery vehicles, saw a rise in costs.

Union avoidance is not an explanatory factor in the sourcing decision, nor is it possible to explain through transaction cost economics. Explication for outcomes lies in value enhancement. Companies are willing to incur higher employment relations and transport costs if the result is higher value capture.