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Roseda is a family-operated business that had its beginnings in a farm that Ed and his wife purchased before his retirement in 1994. The company’s current business strategy emphasizes producing high-quality natural Black Angus beef without using hormones, chemical additives or antibiotics in cattle feeding and by dry aging the carcasses for enhanced flavor. This case focuses on the alternative growth strategies that Ed Burchell confronts for Roseda in early 2015.

The founder of Roseda Beef and the lead author became acquainted many years ago. In 2014, the two owners of Roseda agreed to have a case written about the firm. The case is based on formal interviews, on site observations at Roseda Farms, and an extensive review of the documentation that exists on this privately held company. In addition, the company made some internal documents available including the income statements and balance sheets for this private company.

This course has been taught four times at the MBA level so far: twice in a strategic management course, and twice in a financial strategy course.

Roseda Beef was developed to provide students in a capstone strategy or finance course the opportunity to undertake a situational analysis including the firm’s summary financials and the rudimentary financial analysis of the expansion opportunities that are included in the case. The case is based on capital budgeting principles in finance and fundamentals of strategy development.

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the use of weather derivatives to hedge firm exposure to previously unmanageable risk events caused by natural phenomenon such as excessive rainfall.Design/methodology/approach – The paper adopts a case study approach to meet the objectives above, focusing on golf courses in the Midwest USA, which provide perfect examples of businesses with seasonal cash flows.Findings – It is shown that a firm can reduce its revenue volatility by up to 80 per cent. Weather derivatives are important additions to firm portfolios of risk management tools. Purchasing weather derivatives will improve the owner's ability to forecast revenues and assure expenditure coverage, both important goals for a small business owner.Practical implications – Many firms find the uneven revenue streams associated with their industry to be difficult to manage. One of the primary risks faced by firms is exposure to weather phenomena. With the introduction of weather derivatives, firms can now hedge their exposure to climatologic events. The application for weather derivatives is quite limitless. Weather derivatives are a relatively new product, and most firms are either unaware of their existence or believe them to be complicated. It is an industry that may experience explosive growth in the coming years.Originality/value – This paper demonstrates the use of derivatives to hedge exposure to climatic events.

This case looks at the design and implementation of a risk management strategy. It reviews the early moves by Great Plains Energy (GPE) to establish a corporate-wide Enterprise Risk Management program. The corporate Chief Risk Officer is Andrea Bielsker. Andrea appointed Jana Utter to take charge of coordinating the design and implementation of the ERM program. Utter faces a number of challenges. She has had to first conceptualize the program given the charge by the Board of Directors, then design a process by which she identifies the risks that the corporation faces, assist in designing measures for the risks, and work with the various divisions and functional areas to put processes in place to mitigate the identified risks.

To evaluate various hedge programs designed to minimize the risk of an extreme monthly gas bill subject to a pre‐determined hedge program budget.Design/methodology/approach – Historical data were collected on natural gas spot and futures prices. Also, theoretical options prices were calculated. These data were then applied to derive the risk associated with extreme bills under different hedge strategies.Findings – In every instance, having a price cap hedge program is better for core customers of a utility company than not having a hedge program.Research limitations/implications – The better hedge performance is based on historical data. It may not apply to future scenarios. Also, the theoretical options prices may need refinements.Practical implications – Any utility company should seriously consider a price cap hedge program to protect its core customers. The exact program design will likely change but the basic principles and methods described in this paper are directly applicable.Originality/value – This paper provide/guidelines for a utility company to design its hedge programs for the benefits of core customers. Currently, there is no such guideline available and there is no study evaluating these hedge programs. This paper provides a first attempt.

Many energy firms currently compensate their risk managers with bonuses based on their ability to outperform a budget benchmark. This creates the incentive for a manager to “let it ride” (LIR) when prices move adversely to the benchmark, thus exposing the firm to further adverse movements. The purpose of this paper is to present an alternative compensation model based on the adherence to a risk control system utilizing value at risk (VaR). The model is designed to reward the risk manager for staying within the prescribed risk limits, which effectively rewards the manager for taking actions that decrease the deviation from the budget benchmark.Design/methodology/approach – The days within limits (DWL) compensation model is developed with a demonstration of how it works through an illustrative example.Findings – The DWL method of measuring risk and compensating risk managers effectively reduces the potential conflicts of interest from the LIR mentality by establishing strict rules for the risk manager and providing a compensation structure that rewards the manager's ability to stay within the prescribed risk limits.Practical implications – These results should be of great interest to the managers of energy traders as well as to investors in firms participating in energy risk management. Clearly, it is important for energy firms to structure the compensation incentives of its traders such that they act in the best interests of the firm and its investors.Originality/value – This paper develops a compensation model for energy risk managers based on the number of days their DWL remains below their prescribed VR limit.

The purpose of this study is to present theory and empirical evidence on whether changes in leverage are systematically associated with changes in the CEO's risk incentives over time.Design/methodology/approach – A model is developed to explain the dynamic relationship between leverage and managers’ risk incentives, and empirically tested with data on executive stock option grants. The model relies on the observation that the risk sensitivity of a call option does not monotonically increase or decrease in the value of the underlying stock.Findings – It is found that changes in the CEO's risk incentives are not systematically correlated with changes in the firm's leverage over time.Research limitations/implications – The near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage, and therefore executives’ incentives to take equity risk are not correlated with firm leverage.Practical implications – For reasonable parameter values, this risk incentive‐maximizing stock price lies very close to the option's exercise price. This finding provides evidence that stock options plans granted approximately at‐the‐money encourage maximum risk‐taking by managers in a dynamic setting.Originality/value – This paper develops theory and evidence to explain why executive stock options are usually granted at‐the‐money.

Interviews in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and India indicate net present value (NPV) is not widely employed in making capital investment decisions in these newly industrialized and developing countries. It is not from lack of knowledge about net present value: rather, it is due to (1) widespread violation of the assumptions underlying NPV, (2) the high risk/high return nature of the capital investments, and (3) the decision‐making process employed in making capital investment decisions. These same three conditions exist for many capital investment decisions made by firms in developed countries. Only by abandoning the static NPV approach, building in real options, and understanding and building in the decision‐making process will further advances be made in capital budgeting decision‐making. One of the key paradigms in finance is net present value (NPV). In order to maximize value, managers should accept all positive NPV investment projects, and reject all negative NPV projects. The issue becomes more complex when uncertainty is introduced, or, as in recent years, when real options to defer, abandon, expand, etc. are incorporated into the decision‐making process [e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1995 and 1996)]. However, with these exceptions, the state of the art in capital investment decision‐making revolves around the simple statement—take all positive NPV projects. In practice, evidence from surveys and discussions with corporate executives indicates the message taught for the last 30 years in business schools has been heard and, to a large extent, acted upon by larger U.S., Canadian, and British‐based firms. While larger firms in North America, and to a lesser extent Western Europe, generally employ the static, or traditional, NPV framework for making, or assisting in making, capital investment decisions, less is known about the decision‐making process employed by firms in other parts of the world. The question addressed in this study is: “Do firms in other parts of the world, especially in newly industrialized or developing countries in the Asia Pacific region, employ NPV for making capital investment decisions?” The purposes of this study are threefold: (1) to report the results of a series of open‐ended interviews conducted in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and India about the capital investment decision‐making process employed; (2) to understand why NPV is not widely employed in making capital investment decisions in these newly industrialized and developing countries; and, most important, (3) to indicate that NPV and the capital budgeting decision‐making process need rethinking and refocusing to make them more effective—in all countries, whether developed, newly industrialized, or developing. The paper proceeds in the following manner. Section I provides an introduction to the study. In Section II the results of the interviews are presented. In Section III patterns that emerged during the interview process are presented, along with a number of specific examples of the types of capital investment decisions being considered. In Section IV the assumptions underlying NPV are examined, and then risk/return and the decision‐making process are considered. Section V contains the discussion and conclusions.