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This paper aims to present the rules for determining the net asset value according to the AIFM Directive which have fundamentally changed regulation of the European alternative funds industry. The paper discusses how these rules must be applied to ensure a reliable and objective valuation and to protect the interests of investors.

The paper draws upon experience gained in the market following the implementation of rules on fund valuation in the European Union in 2011 and further in Germany in 2013. The valuation rules for relevant asset classes are presented and discussed in the light of the overarching goal of investor protection.

The paper’s findings show that the market participants saw the increased requirements as an opportunity and that they have adapted to the new system. This also applies to fund valuation, even though some people criticise terminology, lack of clarity and the complexity of the new valuation scheme from a practical perspective. Also, due to the increased valuation requirements, a consolidation among market participants can be expected.

The issues addressed in the paper are currently the subject of debate by regulators and market participants. There are direct implications for future prudential regulation in the asset management industry.

This paper analyzes the new EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to determine the level of guidance on instruments to wind-down bad asset portfolios of asset management vehicles. In the absence of such detailed guidance stipulated by the BRRD, the aim is to provide certain practical guidance to future resolution planning and execution.

This paper draws upon experience from portfolio reduction strategies applied at European bad banks in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. For illustration purposes, the paper use case study data from a bad bank located in the eurozone.

For the new European Commission, implementation and enforcement of the Banking Union within the eurozone is currently a key priority. Present efforts are mainly directed towards minimum technical standards. However, the fundamental question of how to orderly unwind a bad assets portfolio without the usage of public funds remains partly addressed only. While a uniform approach to any bad asset does not seem to be applicable, certain lessons learned from previous financial crises may contribute to a selection of reduction strategies.

This paper draws upon experience from portfolio reduction strategies applied at European bad banks in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. It includes case study data from the wind-down of a eurozone bad bank detailing the asset reduction strategies achieved so far. Such per asset class wind-down patterns have not been published and commented on in academia so far.

This paper seeks to provide an overview on potential impacts German primary life insurers are exposed to in relation to upcoming Solvency II regulation and potential strategic choices, especially in the light of halting low‐interest rates. Given a large degree of complexity, the paper aims at giving some guidance to decision makers considering a discontinuation of underwriting.

The paper builds upon current observations made in the German primary life insurance industry, especially, recent strategic decisions of two market participants to discontinue their life insurance carriers. On the background of low‐interest rates but yet guaranteed interest participations and additional capital requirements arising from Solvency II, the paper illustrates the strategic options life insurers have in the German market, given the specific market environment.

Regulatory capital requirements of Solvency II will sanction guarantee products in a way that for some insurers life products will become unattractive. As there is evidence in the market that some participants have started to consider the run‐off option for selected carriers, the paper finds that this option may represent an appropriate consequence not only for foreign insurers ceasing their business in Germany but also for domestic insurance groups. Given the specific rules‐in‐use in the German primary life insurance market, the paper discusses the controlled run‐off approach as a strategic option for selected life insurers, enabling a harvesting strategy through maximizing cash flows from existing liabilities while avoiding further investments.

Discussions in this paper help to bring into focus the strong challenges by both the upcoming regulatory Solvency II and current market conditions. The brief case study included in this paper may illustrate the implications as well as some crucial success factors of discontinued life business.