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Recent research shows that financial institutions in the European Union (EU) close branches, offices and correspondent connections to jurisdictions with less transparency due to possible sanctions related to the increase in EU money laundering regulation. This tendency is called de-risking and the purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the recent regulatory approach towards money laundering in the EU limits the incentive to have operations in tax havens.

This paper follows a functional approach to law and economics.

The paper finds that recent EU money laundering regulation increase an incentive for financial institutions to limit any connection to jurisdictions known as tax havens, where transparency is at minimum. Thereby, it can be discussed whether the spillover effect from money laundering regulation in to the fight of tax avoidance could support further regulatory interference.

The recent trend of de-risking in light of money laundering regulation is scarcely covered by present research. Furthermore, there has been no linking of this de-risking tendency and the effects or relation to the use of tax havens/low tax jurisdictions.

Recent research shows that because of money-laundering risks, there has been an increase in the off-boarding of certain types of corporate clients in the financial sector. This phenomenon known as “de-risking” has been argued to have a negative impact on society, because it increases the possible risk of money laundering. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the de-risking strategy of financial institutions results in an expansion of the regulatory framework concerning anti-money laundering focusing on off-boarding of clients and, if so, is there a way to avoid further regulation by changing present behavior.

This paper applies functional methods to law and economics to achieve higher efficiency in combating money laundering.

In this paper, it is found that the continuing of de-risking by financial institutions because of the avoidance strategy of money-laundering risks will inevitably result in further regulatory demands regarding the off-boarding process of clients. The legal basis for the introduction of further regulatory intervention is that some of the de-risking constitutes a direct contradiction to the aim of the present regulatory framework, making the behavior non-compliant to the regulation.

There has been very little research concerning de-risking related to money laundering. The present research has focused on the effect on society and not the relationship between the financial institutions and the regulator. This paper raises an important and present problem, as the behavior of the financial institutions constitute a response from the regulator that is contradicting the thoughts behind the behavior of the financial institutions. It is found that the paper is highly relevant if an expansion of regulation is to be hindered.

Recent research questions the innocence of companies outside the current EU money laundering regulation in terms of contributing to the externality problem of money laundering. The purpose of this paper is to examine how including anti-money laundering as an element of the EU corporate social responsibilities (CSR) directive can contribute to solving the externality problem of money laundering. Based on the principles of CSR and the economic effects of disclosure duties, this paper analyzes the implications an introduction of anti-money laundering policies and disclosure duties can have on corporate clients and the combatting against money laundering. Furthermore, it is the intention of this paper to argue how such a regulatory change can help the financial companies dividing “good” and “bad” clients to prevent money laundering from happening.

The method of this paper is a functional approach to law and economics. It seeks to enhance the efficiency of the regulatory framework combatting money laundering by including economic incentive theory.

Based on the regulatory framework of the fourth anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing directive and the directive on criminalizing money laundering, this paper argues that inclusion of anti-money laundering in the EU CSR directive will contribute to solving the externality problem of money laundering in the EU. Additionally, the expansion of the regulatory framework can start a culture, where corporate clients to the financial sector will take active steps toward combatting money laundering.

The paper identifies a way to change the corporate perception of anti-money laundering prevention from having an incentive of minimal compliance/“race-to-the-bottom” to be a possible element of competition between companies through their CSR strategy. While most research focuses on the financial sector in terms of money laundering, this paper takes the next step and includes corporate clients in the financial sector.

Recent research and market effects within the European Union (EU) show a rising concern toward the de-risking of certain sectors/actors owing to the increased anti-money laundering regulation. Because of the enhanced due diligence and monitoring costs related to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regulation by the AMLD4 and AMLD5, several financial institutions now turn to de-risking their corporate client base to minimize not only costs from monitoring and onboarding but also the risks of sanctions and reputation. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the incentives behind de-risking and the relevant solution models to the de-risking “crisis.” Overall, to find, to what extend de-risking is efficient and when it is not and how to mitigate the concept.

This paper applies a functional approach to law and economics with the aim of reaching a higher level of efficiency in combatting money laundering through analyzing present regulatory and economic conditions.

It is found that de-risking within the EU opposes the aim of the present regulatory scheme regarding anti-money laundering. The paper finds that it is needed to divide the analysis of de-risking to a national and regional/union level. In addition, this paper establishes that the present strategy of de-risking at national level eventually will result in enhanced regulation to fulfill the aim of the present regulatory framework, which is why a proactive approach by recontracting the client base is recommended. At a regional level, it is found that de-risking is valid, why a solution needs to come from the EU enhancing control, monitoring and sanctions to establish trust and the possibility for financial inclusion.

Most of the recent research within the field highlights the problem of de-risking and therefore presents a range of initiatives to regulators and financial institutions at a global level. This paper solely focuses on the EU and shows that the de-risking dilemma demands financial institutions to take a proactive approach to contracting if unnecessary regulation is to be hindered. Furthermore, this paper shows that the concept of de-risking cannot be analyzed nor mitigated as one singular concept, but it needs to be addressed according to different levels of activity and geography.

Recent research has emphasized the need for engaging non-financial companies in combating money laundering for the efforts to be efficient and effective. To incentivize engagement, several options are available, such as regulation, voluntary disclosure or commitment to international principles such as the United Nations (UN) Global Compact. The purpose of this paper is to analyze how anti-money laundering fits the aim of the UN Global compact and how anti-money laundering can support the other principles of the UN Global Compact. Furthermore, this paper addresses the necessity to include anti-money laundering in the core principles to reach the overall goal of sustainability by the UN Global Compact. Such an inclusion will incentivize the signatories of the UN Global Compact to include anti-money laundering as a part of their social responsibilities, helping the financial sector in combating money laundering.

The methodology of this paper is a functional approach to law and economics. It seeks to enhance the efficiency of the regulatory framework combating money laundering by including economic incentive theory and addressing new areas of law.

The paper finds a strong relationship between the UN Global Compact and anti-money laundering. Furthermore, it is concluded that it is necessary to include anti-money laundering as a core principle in the UN Global Compact if the Global Compact is to be efficient and effective in terms of its sustainability goals. The reason being that money laundering to a great extent supplies operational finances to the illegitimate sector related to core issues of the UN Global Compact such as human trafficking, child labor and corruption.

The paper identifies a significant missing element with regard to the core principles of the UN Global Compact. Although most research within anti-money laundering concerns the financial sector and thereby does not address the UN Global Compact, the focus of this paper is the link between anti-money laundering and the UN Global Compact. Furthermore, most research related to the UN global compact does not connect the core principles to the illegal financing of the businesses contradicting the principles. This paper addresses both of the neglected areas and combines them to improve the overall combating of money laundering while supporting the UN Global Compact sustainability goal.

This paper formulates a microeconomic model to investigate the effects of current anti-money laundering (AML) regulations. The model is motivated by the requirement that banks undertake risk-based transaction monitoring, using “risk signals” to separate benevolent bank clients and money launderers.

This paper uses methodology from the functional school of law and economics, holding that structural forces may hinder the development of efficient legal rules. The goal is to offer economic insights to address inefficiencies at a meta-level. Assuming money launderers have specific preferences and strategies, the paper models how they hide their activities. This allows us to investigate how money launderers respond to external shocks and policy changes.

As money launderers use resources to hide their activities, this paper finds several noteworthy effects. For instance, increasing criminal penalties may decrease the amount of money laundering that is detected. Furthermore, wealthy money launderers may rarely be detected.

This paper only presents theoretical results.

The academic literature on AML is still relatively limited. This paper’s results suggest regulators should be aware of unintended and potentially adverse effects of current regulation.

Current research within law and economics focus on money laundering as an externality problem caused by financial institutions. Thus, when existing research and legislation place the responsibility on financial institutions, it creates a void where it is neglected that clients of financial institutions may, in fact, play a vital role in the problem of externality. However, based on the definition of money laundering, this paper aims to examine and analyze the need to focus on the clients as part of the externality problem with regard to money laundering.

This paper examines how a lack of regulatory focus on the clients of financial institutions lead to inefficient anti-money laundering regulation. Through a functional approach of law and economics, it analyzes the externality problem of money laundering based on both the legal definition and the economic conditions of the problem.

Based on the fourth anti-money laundering directive, the paper argues that present regulation has a tendency to focus on financial institutions, thereby not considering the entire scope of the externality problem in money laundering. For regulation to efficiently combat money laundering, it is necessary to place some responsibility on the clients of financial institutions and not solely on the financial institutions. Nevertheless, the inclusion of client responsibility might lead to some legal or economic complications, which need to be subject to further research.

The paper identifies the need for a fundamental change in the perception of the externality problem of money laundering, and thus, presents the required approach to reach an efficient solution.