Search results

The practice of organized corporate planning in major Japanese enterprises is more sophisticated, further developed, and better accepted than most Westerners recognize. Just as we can learn from Japanese management, we can also learn from Japanese corporate planning. Our research reveals that formal planning was started in Japan before most American or European managers embraced the concept, that the best Japanese practices represent the forefront of the state of the art, and that the current emphasis in Japanese planning is highly entrepreneurial and strategic. As of the mid‐1970s, corporate planning in Japan is very popular, well integrated into the Japanese managerial system, and highly geared to diversification strategies at home and resource‐ and market‐based strategies internationally (see Appendix A). The so‐called Japanese challenge may have abated in traditional form. A study of current corporate planning practices, however, suggests that Western managers would make a mistake in discounting the challenge altogether.

In Chapter One it was argued that multinational companies should give adequate emphasis to procurement factors in their corporate planning. While this argument is difficult to refute, many multinational companies do not pay sufficient attention to this aspect of their planning. This article presents some of the conclusions from a study which investigated the extent to which procurement factors were considered in the planning of these firms.

The purpose of this study is to revisit the conventional wisdom about a key contribution [i.e. strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) analysis] in the field of strategic management. The societal context and the role of academics, consultants and executives is taken into account in the emergence of SWOT analysis during the 1960–1980 period as a pivotal development within the broader context of the satisfactory, opportunities, faults, threats (SOFT) approach. The authors report on both the content and the approach, so that other scholars seeking to invigorate indigenous theories and/or underreported strategy practices will thrive.

Applying a historiographic approach, the authors introduce an evidence-based methodology for interpreting historical sources. This methodology incorporates source criticism, triangulation and hermeneutical interpretation, drawing upon insights from robust evidence through three iterative stages.

The underreporting of the SOFT approach/SWOT analysis can be attributed to several factors, including strategy tools being integrated into planning frameworks rather than being published as standalone materials; restricted circulation of crucial long-range planning service/theory and practice of planning reports due to copyright limitations; restricted access to the Stanford Research Institute Planning Library in California; and the enduring popularity of SOFT and SWOT variations, driven in part by their memorable acronyms.

In the spirit of a renaissance in strategic planning research, the authors unveil novel theoretical and social connections in the emergence of SWOT analysis by combining evidence from both theory and practice and delving into previously unexplored areas.

Caution is advised for scholars who examine the discrete time frame of 1960–1980 through mere bibliometric techniques. This study underscores the risks associated with gathering incomplete and/or inaccurate data, emphasizing the importance of triangulating evidence beyond scholarly databases. The paradigm shift of strategic management research due to the advent of large language models poses new challenges and the risk of conserving and perpetuating academic urban legends, myths and lies if training data is not adequately curated.

It is very easy to obtain agreement that corporate planning is a “good thing”, for the idea of planning has a powerful appeal to logic and reason which few would dare to refute. The need for planning is not, unfortunately, the same as the ability to plan well and it is in the performance that corporate planning can so easily come to grief Because it is never possible to turn the clock back, the success or failure of corporate planning is often hidden from view, and planners share the distinction with economists of always being able to “prove” they were right— simply because no one can prove they were wrong!

Ever since the days of Sir Thomas More and Robert Owen, people have been engaged in studying and predicting the future. Today's futurist has refined the art to such a high degree that futures studies have important implications for business strategic planning.

The application of the strategic management concept to research organisations operating in the public sector is reviewed. The unique characteristics of such organisations are discussed in terms of strategic management and the need to tailor this process to suit the organisations′ particular requirements.

Our planning systems are predicated upon a variety of myths. One of the most cherished is the myth of stability: “Business as usual” is a very comforting notion. Organizations everywhere enjoy the feeling of safety that develops when change is slow. Planners are usually directed to the task of preserving the existing “stable system” and maintaining the status quo. The alternatives — deliberately modifying the system or allowing it to evolve — are not often contemplated.

Global strategic marketing planning has become increasingly important with the advent of worldwide competition and the growing rapidity of change in the international marketplace. In this article, research and commentaries from the strategic management and international marketing planning literatures are brought together in a model examining what factors influence global strategic marketing planning formality, and whether competitive and organizational benefits accrue from the process. Responses from 90 multinational corporations were subjected to a LISREL analysis. Corporate culture, supply chain elements, foreign regulations and competition were identified as key determinants of planning formality. Considerable non‐financial benefits also accrue as planning formality increases.