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Article
Publication date: 21 August 2019

K-Rine Chong, Yusniyati Yusri, Aslam Izah Selamat and Tze San Ong

The purpose of this paper is to extend the slippery slope framework by exploring different dimensions of compliance quality and tax minimisation under different tax climate…

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Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to extend the slippery slope framework by exploring different dimensions of compliance quality and tax minimisation under different tax climate manipulation by groups.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors run a random assignment of tax climate manipulations through questionnaire with 301 usable data collected from the full-time postgraduate students, employed individuals and self-employed individuals. Manipulation check and results are generated via multivariate analysis of variance.

Findings

The results confirm the biggest impact of synergistic climate on voluntary compliance, and small to medium impact of antagonistic climate on tax evasion across three groups.

Research limitations/implications

The manipulation of this research is constrained with two treatments in addition to the common pitfall of social desired responses of self-report.

Practical implications

Theoretically, this study empirically explores tax minimisation dimensions and provides new insights that only illegal tax minimisation is at maximum under the prevailing negative antagonistic climate, but not for legal tax minimisation. Second, the effect of tax climate represented by trust and power on enforced compliance is minimal, as compared to the strong effect of positive synergistic climate on voluntary compliance. As for policy implications, possible guidelines and interventions are outlined to policy makers which would lead to a better quality of compliance behaviour.

Originality/value

This study operationalises and manipulates tax climate from perceptions of trust, legitimate power and coercive power. It also further affirms the prior inconsistent findings in respect of tax behavioural intentions due to sampling group and cultural differences.

Details

Journal of Applied Accounting Research, vol. 20 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0967-5426

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Book part
Publication date: 15 November 2018

K-Rine Chong and Murugesh Arunachalam

This study examines the determinants of enforced tax compliance behavior of Malaysian citizens where trust in tax authorities is assumed to be a mediator. Quota sampling method…

Abstract

This study examines the determinants of enforced tax compliance behavior of Malaysian citizens where trust in tax authorities is assumed to be a mediator. Quota sampling method was used to select a sample of 340 participants to participate in a survey. A two-step structural equation modeling (SEM) process was adopted to test a framework comprising 13 hypotheses. Model fit was initially measured using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) while model specification was applied in the second stage to test the structural relationship. The mediating effects of trust in tax authorities were tested via Baron and Kenny (1986) approach, bootstrapping, and AMOS AxB estimand. The findings confirmed that trust in government, trust in tax administrator, power of Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, and awareness influence enforced compliance. However, tax morale and tax amoral behaviors do not influence enforced compliance. The findings suggest that citizens would fulfill their tax responsibilities if they believe that tax authorities are effective in tax administration. Trust in government fosters trust in the tax authorities. This study contributes to existing literature by confirming the factors that affect enforced tax compliance.

Details

Advances in Taxation
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78756-416-9

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Book part
Publication date: 15 November 2018

Abstract

Details

Advances in Taxation
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78756-416-9

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