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Although green logistics has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises under environmental constraints, how local governments formulate subsidy policies to effectively guide the green transformation of regional logistics and how to facilitate the reasonable cost-sharing are rather critical. This paper will deeply explore the dynamic process of the tripartite participation (government, platform, and logistics enterprises) in the selection of regional green logistics strategy, and reveal the evolutionary game relationship of the three parties.

To explore the dynamics involving the government, platform and logistics enterprises for the green logistic transformation, and reveal the evolutionary gaming among the three parties, based on the bounded rationality premise, this study constructs the tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game models, uses the stability theorem of differential equation to explore the evolution and stability strategy of the system in different cases and explicates the paths of influence on the tripartite behaviors via simulations.

Results of this study indicate that there exist stable equilibrium strategies among the three parties regarding the regional green logistics, and they are affected by different factors. The government's subsidy, subsidy intensity and the platform's cost-sharing proportion can generate positive effects, but the latter two can also impact negatively beyond the effective ranges. The findings provide a theoretical basis for local governments, platforms and logistics enterprises to formulate justifiable subsidy intensity and determine reasonable sharing proportion.

Firstly, considering the significant relevance of local government, it is included in the evolution model, and the tripartite game (among government, platform and enterprises) is explored; Secondly, by comparing the equilibrium results under different game conditions, this paper analyzes the evolution of each party's game strategy to achieve the optimal return under bounded rationality and the important factors determining the strategic selection; Finally, the key factor of platform cost sharing is involved, and to what extent the change of platform cost sharing ratio will influence the systematic stability is explored.

China’s education has rapidly developed since 1949. Although much has been written about reforms in China’s preschool and primary education policies, less attention has been given to the transition-to-primary school policies.

This study examines the evolution of these policies from 1949 onward, analysing 61 policy documents from the PKULaw.

Four phases are identified: minimal political attention (1949–1982), steady policy releases (1983–2004), stagnation (2005–2010) and frequent updates (since 2011). Policy changes align with educational development, reflecting a shift from academic readiness to overall development. Increased government involvement has led to more diverse themes and more cooperation among stakeholders. The role of the preschool class has evolved from basic support for children without kindergarten access to an institution for early academic learning, prompting policies to restrict it.

These findings provide valuable insights for optimizing China’s educational policies and offer lessons for other nations facing similar challenges in transitioning children from preschool to primary school.