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According to official statements, BRI is a Chinese call for global cooperation, based on five priorities: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds. The purpose of this paper is, primarily, to describe and contextualize the official discourse of China's foreign policy toward Latin America, emphasizing on BRI. On that basis, the author aims to contrast official rhetoric with real facts, bringing problematic cases associated with implementing BRI in Asian and African developing countries, so as to discuss possible challenges that Latin America can encounter when implementing the initiative. Finally, the author evaluates potential implications of resembling the Chinese three-level scheme of development in the region and make suggestions on this subject.

In an effort to evaluate possible implications of BRI in Latin America, the paper describes and contextualizes Chinese foreign policy official rhetoric toward the region's countries. Based on that, the author brings to discussion Asian and African experiences in the implementation of the initiative and raise questions on controversial issues that Latin America could meet when enforcing BRI-related projects.

As a part of its new foreign and economic policies, China continues to strengthen its engagement with Latin American countries, enlarging its strategy though the promotion of BRI. If Latin American countries, through BRI, seek to replicate the Chinese three-level of development scheme, including domestic, regional and global scopes, certain controversial issues cannot be ignored in the design and implementation processes. Also, equal participation of Chinese and Latin American governments, societies and enterprises is decisive if the goal is to settle a long-term development scenario for the region.

The central thesis of this paper is that the implementation of BRI in Latin American countries could potentially replicate the Chinese three-level development proposal. To achieve such an ambitious goal, much depends on how Latin American countries define and enforce BRI projects. Full understanding of those challenges requires close attention to what the Chinese official rhetoric claims and what actually puts into practice in other developing countries already involved in BRI, so as to anticipate possible consequences for the region.

The objective of this study is to address the diplomatic and economic implications of the participation of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The study examines official documents related to the BRI and LAC's signing of the Memorandum of Understanding within the framework of the BRI (MoUs) in order to look into what it means to join the BRI. Additionally, it also introduces the findings of articles in Asian Education and Development Studies' current issue published in 2020.

In LAC, the BRI does not represent a new policy, but rather the updating and rebranding of a pre-existing one. The BRI primarily consists of an official discursive framework which aims to build a coherent narrative for a wide range of different projects and policies geared toward the improvement of connectivity with China through the development of trade and investments. However, most of these projects were implemented prior to the BRI. Pragmatism lies at the core of this framework which neither has a regulated accession process nor any binding effects. As a result, the signing the MoU represents, foremost, a diplomatic mise-en-scène. The study operates under the belief that BRI membership is not dichotomous; rather, it must be observed in terms of the countries' level of participation. In line with this, the implementation of a generalized BRI policy in LAC countries would not be advisable. Moreover, it must be noted that the BRI's reach to Latin America can be rather problematic due to the fact that the latter was not initially a participant.

The study aims to explore the significance of the BRI beyond the official discourse and discuss the involvement of LAC countries in it. Scholars studying the BRI in other regions have noted that there is not enough information on this policy in the context of LAC.

Relations between the People's Republic of China and Latin America have gradually expanded from commerce and finance to cover different aspects of security. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview over security cooperation between China and South America. Specifically, it analyses the motivations for security cooperation on both sides and its value added for Sino–South American relations.

The article describes four dimensions of security cooperation between China and South America: functional cooperation, defence diplomacy, long-term cooperation initiatives and arms sales. For each dimension of security cooperation, the main motivations on the two sides are discussed, together with the value added of security cooperation to the “comprehensive and cooperative partnership” China's policy papers on Latin America and the Caribbean have called for.

Security and defence considerations have not caused the development of Sino–South American security cooperation. Instead, it were the rapidly growing economic links from the 2000s on that facilitated China's broader political engagement with South America, including in the field of security. There are a number of important motivations that indicate security cooperation between China and South American states will further expand in the future.

Security cooperation should not only be practiced as an end in itself but also serve tangible outcomes to reduce insecurity.

In the context of Sino–Latin American relations, security cooperation has received relatively little attention beyond a comparatively small group of pundits despite the fact that military diplomacy has become increasingly important in bolstering China's growing international profile. This article makes an original contribution in discussing four dimensions of security cooperation between China and South America.