Jordi Surroca, Miguel A. García‐Cestona and Lluís Santamaria
This paper builds upon recent advances in the corporate governance framework to extend and complement the economic literature on producer cooperatives. We argue that the problem…
Abstract
This paper builds upon recent advances in the corporate governance framework to extend and complement the economic literature on producer cooperatives. We argue that the problem of governance in a cooperative is twofold and consists in designing mechanisms and setting up institutions that (1) encourage workers to define a goal that maximizes workers’ welfare and (2) induce managers to pursue and internalize such a broad goal. When compared to capital‐controlled firms, the agency problems become more complex and harder to solve in the cooperative framework. As empirical evidence of this problem and its corresponding solution, we illustrate the case of the Mondragón cooperatives, explaining in detail the incentive system and the control mechanisms now in place in this successful business group. The study of the governance architecture of Mondragón may help us to propose solutions to traditional problems of the cooperative firm and to reach a better understanding of both the governance of cooperatives and corporate governance in general.
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Charles Carroll and Howard Thomas
Strategic groups research has been hampered by the poor alignment between theory and methods. This has been due in large part to the lack of significance tests for cluster…
Abstract
Purpose
Strategic groups research has been hampered by the poor alignment between theory and methods. This has been due in large part to the lack of significance tests for cluster analysis. Now that significance tests are available, the theoretical and methodological implications are discussed. The paper aims to discuss these issues.
Design/methodology/approach
The theory behind strategic groups is reframed to capitalize on the available significance tests. Subsequently, the significance tests are also modified to fit the proposed theory. Due to this integrative approach, this is both a theoretical and a methodological paper.
Findings
In lieu of significance tests, finding differences in performance emerged as the litmus test for the existence of discrete strategic groups. The concept of strategic groups gradually evolved to fit this requirement. Now that significance tests are available, these legacy effects of the structure-performance link can be removed. This reveals that three conflicting concepts have been sharing the label of strategic groups: strategic categories, interdependent strategic groups and strategic performance groups. The theory also reveals that the significance tests developed in ecological research need modifications for use in strategic groups research.
Research limitations/implications
A theory is proposed for interdependent strategic groups and a significance test of external isolation is proposed as part of this integrative solution.
Originality/value
This integrative solution appears to resolve the historical mismatch between theory and methods that has plagued this field since its inception. This creates a variety of intriguing areas for future research.