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This chapter conducts a systematic comparison of behavioral economics’s challenges to the standard accounts of economic behaviors within three dimensions: under risk, over time, and regarding other people. A new perspective on two underlying methodological issues, i.e., inter-disciplinarity and the positive/normative distinction, is proposed by following the entanglement thesis of Hilary Putnam, Vivian Walsh, and Amartya Sen. This thesis holds that facts, values, and conventions have inter-dependent meanings in science which can be understood by scrutinizing formal and ordinary language uses. The goal is to provide a broad and self-contained picture of how behavioral economics is changing the mainstream of economics.

The Australian unemployment rate has fallen to its lowest level since 1989, and looks likely to fall further, perhaps even reaching the rate of 5 per cent, widely regarded as “full employment”. However, this relatively favourable outcome has been achieved only after a cyclical expansion so long and robust that it has been widely regarded as “miraculous”. It is important, therefore, to consider whether recent reductions in unemployment will be maintained when the current expansion ends, and whether alternative policies could produce stronger and more sustainable growth in employment.

The author presents new estimates of the probability weighting functions found in rank-dependent theories of choice under risk. These estimates are unusual in two senses. First, they are free of functional form assumptions about both utility and weighting functions, and they are entirely based on binary discrete choices and not on matching or valuation tasks, though they depend on assumptions concerning the nature of probabilistic choice under risk. Second, estimated weighting functions contradict widely held priors of an inverse-s shape with fixed point well in the interior of the (0,1) interval: Instead the author usually finds populations dominated by “optimists” who uniformly overweight best outcomes in risky options. The choice pairs used here mostly do not provoke similarity-based simplifications. In a third experiment, the author shows that the presence of choice pairs that provoke similarity-based computational shortcuts does indeed flatten estimated probability weighting functions.

Reviews the discount rate controversy, and examines sustainability theory and optimal growth theory, tracing the rise in prominence of the former and the decline of the latter. Presents the rule‐of‐thumb interpretation of sustainability criteria, and proposes a utilitarian approach, discussing its implications for uncertainty, discounting and social welfare.

A weighting or a rank‐dependent weighting function was used by revamped models of risky choice to explain that Allais Paradox arises because people behave so as to maximize overall value rather than EU. The risky choice behavior was, however, simply seen by the equate‐to‐differentiate model as a choice between the best possible outcomes or a choice between the worst possible outcomes. A “judging” task was designed to examine whether the knowledge of paired outcomes will permit prediction of preference. It was shown that the observed choices could be better accounted for by the equate‐to‐differentiate approach revealed by the judging data.

Paradox has been an instrument to challenge the traditional expected utility theory. Paradox arises from the inconsistency between the empirical or experimental results and the theoretical deductions. In the expected utility theory field, there are many paradoxes or effects showing behaviors that are contradictory to the “theoretical” ones. Many studies questioned the validity of the expected utility theory by means of these paradoxes; while many others disqualified the expected utility theory as a descriptive model for human decision making behaviors. Among these paradoxes or effects, the Allais Paradox raised by Allais in 1953 is the most famous one.

In the wake of public service liberalisation in many OECD countries, economic interventions into the purpose and implementation of social policies have gained a lot of interest in recent years. The prime aim of this paper is to describe the nature of these interventions. The paper examines the reasons for pursuing elusive efficiency objectives in the conduct of public policy, rationales for purchaser‐provider splits, evaluation of cost‐quality relationships, service costing and pricing, and the influence of “external” economic variables.

The paper breaks the analysis of public policy down to three layers of economic interventions: macroeconomics (allocative efficiency, intervention rationales and macroeconomic environment), mesoeconomics (economics of delivery in “social industries”) and microeconomics (agent behaviour, contracting, pricing and evaluation). Each level of economic intervention is illustrated with examples, mainly taken from Australian public policy and mainstream social economic research.

Some of the most critical questions in policy implementation (outsourcing, pricing, contracting and agency problems) can be traced back to economic reforms. Experiments with new modes of service delivery are driven by a changing economic context, yet the efficiency gains from these innovative approaches may come at the expense of service quality.

Changing macro‐, meso‐ and microeconomic variables profoundly alter the parameters of service delivery. Designers and managers of service delivery systems need to be aware of – and skilled in – the practical application of economic principles, concepts and methods.

Except for the health sector, there is a lack of consistent research on the interrelationships between the standard economics toolkit and the delivery of public services. Yet the two are profoundly intertwined. The paper helps distinguish these relationships by putting together elements of conceptual analysis and fieldwork.

The purpose of this paper is to trace the development of economic theory to the point where “economic rationalism” is a commonly used term.

The paper draws on earlier research and published works examining: the history of economics; economic rationalism; and the different influences in comprising basic economic concepts.

The analysis of writing indicates that rationalism has been a focus of discussion in economic writing since Classical times, through to the “rational” influence in economic policy making from neoclassical economic writing. But, the specific term “economic rationalism” gained wider usage after Pusey's book. From that time, the term was used outside academia as a disparaging means to criticise economic theorists and policy makers.

The research is limited by the ability to examine all the literature in the field in greater depth. However, this has been ameliorated by examining a sufficient sample of literature relevant to the concept of rationality in economic theory and policy.

This paper provides a useful critique – from the classics to the modern era – of the contribution made to economic theory and practice. It provides managers with a comprehensive historical overview.

This paper fulfils an identified need and gives support to executives and managers who have doubts about theological justification for some values and accountability procedures being employed in policymaking.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the use of commercial‐in‐confidence arrangements within the public sector allows the deliberate manipulation of accounting figures to generate support for the privatisation agenda.

A case study is presented of an Australian power entity, United Energy, where the privatisation was subject to commercial‐in‐confidence restrictions and differing opinions as to the accuracy of the entity's financial accounts during the privatisation process. It examines many of the key “commercial‐in‐confidence” documents, which are now available through parliamentary and official document sources, together with pre‐ and post‐privatisation financial statements.

The accounting figures were shaped to support a privatisation agenda and this was obscured by the commercial‐in‐confidence provision. Some attempts were made to use accounting arrangements to reduce federal taxes but this failed. A substantial element of the reported sale price represented internal transfers between the state‐owned entity and the government with the actual price paid by the purchaser being substantially lower than the reported price. The price paid was based on the financial statements which were openly challenged by the Auditor‐General. The paper strongly supports the contention that manipulation of accounting figures occurs under commercial‐in‐confidence privatisations.

This was limited to one example at one time. Further work is needed on other settings.

The paper challenges the success claimed for the privatisation process and for the social benefits of privatisation by tender.

There was little evidence of a substantial improvement in financial performance following privatisation or that the pre‐privatisation performance was substantially boosted to support the privatisation agenda. It did show that the accounting served political ends.