Search results

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the effect of country and corporate governance mechanisms on zero leverage is heterogeneous across market- and bank-based financial systems.

Using logit regression methods and a sample of listed firms from 14 Western European countries for the 2002–2016 period, this study examines the propensity of firms having zero leverage in different financial systems.

Country governance mechanisms have a heterogeneous effect on zero leverage, with higher quality mechanisms increasing zero-leverage propensity in bank-based countries and decreasing it in market-based countries. Board dimension and independency have no impact on zero leverage. A higher ownership concentration decreases the propensity for zero-leverage policies in bank-based countries.

This study’s findings show the importance of considering both country- and firm-level governance mechanisms when studying the zero-leverage phenomenon and that the effect of those mechanisms vary across financial and legal systems.

For managers, this study suggests that stronger national governance makes difficult (favours) zero-leverage policies in market (bank)-based countries. In bank-based countries, it also suggests that the presence of shareholders that own a large stake makes the adoption of zero-leverage policies difficult. This last implication is also important for small shareholders by suggesting that investing in firms with a concentrated ownership reduces the risk that zero-leverage policies are adopted by entrenched reasons.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to consider simultaneously the effects of both country- and firm-level governance mechanisms on zero leverage and to allow such effects to vary across financial systems.

The present study aims to investigate an unsuccessful implementation of an active learning methodology. Active learning methods have emerged in order to improve learning processes and increase students' roles in the classroom. Most studies on the subject focus on developing learning strategies based on successful implementations of such methods. Nevertheless, critical reflections on unsuccessful cases might also provide material for developing further contributions to this literature.

The authors conducted an intrinsic case study of an unsuccessful application of the flipped classroom method to an undergraduate basic statistics course at a Brazilian business school. The data collected comprised the course's syllabus, evaluation forms and two rounds of interviews with students and the professor.

The findings indicate that, apart from that which had been mapped by past literature, three additional aspects may limit the chances of successfully implementing a flipped classroom methodology: students' educational backgrounds, the course's structural issues and methodological and relational issues.

The present study contributes to the literature on active learning methodologies mainly by mapping additional aspects that should be considered in the implementation of the flipped classroom methodology. Additionally, the authors investigate an unsuccessful case of such an implementation, an investigation that is still scant within this literature.

The role played by corporate governance mechanisms on corporate deleveraging policies has not been clarified. Empirical evidence is confined to developed economies, even with conflicting and inconclusive results. This paper aims to examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure, board composition and CEO dominance, in explaining corporate deleveraging policies.

Using a sample of listed Pakistani firms between 2010 and 2022, this study resorts to binary response models to examine the effects of governance mechanisms on firms’ decision to go debt-free.

A greater ownership concentration, institutional ownership and family ownership increase the propensity for zero leverage. Board gender diversity decreases the propensity for deleveraging policies, which seems to indicate that the presence of females reinforces the monitoring function of the board. Finally, lower managerial ownership or CEO dominance decreases the propensity toward zero leverage (interest convergence hypothesis), but higher managerial ownership or CEO dominance increases the propensity toward zero leverage (managerial entrenchment hypothesis).

Risk-averse managers who prefer to control a firm using little or no debt will find it easier to implement these financing policies in firms with greater ownership concentration and where institutional holders have a substantial stake. For shareholders, this study suggests that investing in firms with females on board reduces the risk of corporate deleveraging policies being adopted for entrenched reasons.

The presence of females on board seems to decrease the propensity of managers to adopt opportunistic actions and may also contribute to enhancing human welfare and society in developing countries.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study considering the effect of board diversity on zero leverage. Another singularity is that this study exhibits a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and corporate deleveraging policy.

This study aims to examine why Ghana has English legal origins (hypothesised as a legal framework that promotes financial development) but has not developed a well-functioning mortgage finance market.

The authors adopt the institutional autopsy approach developed by Milhaupt and Pistor (2008). This study is not a cross-country study but a historical examination of Ghana’s mortgage finance regulatory framework. The institutional autopsy framework considers the iterative process of change in a system and allows for context-specific system analysis.

The authors note that for a long period of about 68 years (1940-2008), some of the legal rules regulating mortgage finance were not typical of the hypothesised characteristics of the English common law tradition. These rules, including, interest rate controls, excessive entry barriers, loan default guarantee discriminations and complex foreclosure procedures, tended to inadequately protect creditors. In the context of the history of military rule and law-making, judicial discretion that could have promoted legal efficiency and strengthened contract enforcement was also limited. During this period, the legal system demonstrated a concentrated and coordinative character. New legislation in the form of the Home Mortgage Finance Act 2008 (Act 770) attempts to resolve some of these bottlenecks and improve creditor rights protection.

The study focuses solely on how the legal institution affects creditor protection and mortgage finance in Ghana.

Policy-wise, the study deepens the understanding of the channels through which the law affects the development of mortgage finance.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the methodology used (institutional autopsy) is novel in the context of analysing mortgage finance.