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In fragile institutional environments, firms often have no choice but bribery as the means to access the services monopolized by the government. Corrupt government officials whose resources are valuable to many different firms can easily find other firms willing to offer bribes. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how this imbalanced interdependence exposes the bribing firm to the hazard of opportunism from the bribed officials.

This study draws on World Business Environment Survey (WBES) data and the instrumental variable (IV) Probit estimator with Heckman correction for the potential selection bias.

The authors find that the more firms depend on bribery to acquire governmental resources, the severer the level of opportunism they encounter from the government officials. In addition, the authors find that although the presence of a legal alternative to bribery reduces the level of a corrupt government official's opportunism that a bribing firm experiences, the more firms depend on bribery despite the presence of a legal alternative, the higher the level of the corrupt official's opportunism that the firm will experience. Finally, the authors find that establishing a relational contract with government officials reduces the hazard of opportunism.

The study contributes to the resource dependence literature by finding that a greater imbalance in the interdependence between two parties in bribery exposes the more dependent party to a larger hazard of opportunism. The finding that an ineffective alternative to a current resource provider would not strengthen but weaken a resource seeker's bargaining power expands the literature. The authors also contribute to the corruption research by showing the significant strategic, not legal, risk to bribing firms of engaging in bribery, which to date has not been sufficiently discussed.

Drawing on the bribery literature, this paper aims to examine the effect of bribes paid in the home country on firms’ decision to internationalize through exports from transition economies. It also investigates whether the effect of home country bribery may vary from new ventures to established firms, and from those firms that operate in an environment with high to low informal competition.

This paper tests several hypotheses using a panel data with fixed effects based on a sample of firms in transition economies from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey.

First, home country bribery in transition economies can make domestic markets more lenient and dampen firms’ motivation to seek opportunities abroad. Second, new ventures have a higher motivation to focus on their domestic markets after paying bribes. Finally, despite the benefits accrued in the home country through bribery, firms that face a higher level of informal competition in the home country are more likely to seek opportunities abroad.

Managers in transition economies should consider their home country bribery activities in their evaluation of foreign market opportunities. Firms that use money to influence home country government officials, especially new ventures, are advised to have a more holistic view in evaluating foreign market opportunities so they will not miss out on new opportunities.

This paper advances literature on home country institutions and the research on firm global strategies. Moreover, it also highlights several contingencies that shape the effect of home country bribery on firms’ foreign market focus.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare the effects of conventional and unconventional FDI on the host country in a more comprehensive and systematic way.

Both the OLI paradigm and the imbalance theory are linked to the diamond model in order to compare the effects of conventional and unconventional FDI on the host country. This methodology is then applied to the real world as a case study, FDI toward the Korean automobile industry.

Conventional FDI is often said to be more beneficial to the host country than the unconventional type. However, the actual effect of unconventional FDI is shown to be more positive with better management and is often larger than perceived. Therefore, unconventional FDI emerges as important as conventional FDI for sustainable economic development.

In general, unconventional FDI has often been criticized severely because of misperceptions derived from the dominance of conventional FDI on theoretical aspects, incomprehensive perspectives toward assessing the effects of FDI, and negative political views. Therefore, rigorous and holistic case study analyses based on solid analytical tools are needed in order to better understand the effects of unconventional FDI and to draw up effective and proper FDI promotion policies.

This paper provides a way to better understand the effect of unconventional FDI on the host country comprehensively and systematically by expanding and deepening existing theories. Based on this, the effects of conventional and unconventional FDI on the host country are compared theoretically and empirically, particularly with the case of the Korean automobile industry.