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The first part of Volume 26 is dedicated to our annual feature from a leading scholar. The 2012 Recipient of the Booz & Co./Strategy + Business Eminent Scholar in International Management Award was Professor Jean-François Hennart of Tilburg University. Professor Hennart was honoured by this Award by the International Management Division of the Academy of Management at its annual conference in Boston, Massachusetts. His acceptance speech discusses the role of his work on transaction cost economics on international business and organizational structure. The speech is followed by the commentaries of Alain Verbeke and Jenny Hillemann of the University of Calgary and Arjen Slangen of Tilburg University.

This chapter discusses the global factory paradigm. We show how mainstream international business (IB) thinking, namely, internalization theory, can guide multinational enterprise (MNE) strategic decision-making in the context of a global factory network.

We identify the key assumptions made in the global factory paradigm about the fine slicing of economic activities and the related implications for the ownership status and location of each activity. In order to overcome the global factory paradigm’s relative lack of predictive capacity, as compared to internalization theory, we propose an asset-bundling approach. This approach uses a clear and unambiguous criterion, namely, the tradability of resources (and resource combinations) to determine which sets of activities can best be left to external market contracting or should on the contrary be internalized on the basis of efficiency considerations.

We describe the enhanced role of developing/transition countries in the functioning of the global economy and show that these countries represent an increasing share of worldwide economic activities. Given this macrolevel development, the global factory, as a complex organizational form governing both internal activities and contracts with external parties, is rapidly gaining in importance. We describe, at the conceptual level, the strengths and weaknesses of the global factory and propose a “decision dynamics” matrix to support global factory, senior managers’ strategies in the realm of ownership status and location.

Future research on the MNE should focus on in-depth analysis of firms that embody “global factory”-type characteristics in order to understand better the evolution of this type of company and to capture the close requisite links among the focal firm, external contracting parties, and the broader environment. Such research should also lead to a better understanding of innovative resource combination processes and the transferability of non-location-bound firm-specific advantages (FSAs) across the global factory network.

In the global factory, the MNE head office assumes the role of resource orchestrator and is responsible for key strategic decisions on ownership status and location. Here, the head office must assess critically the operations that are part of the MNE’s value chain and reflect on the firm’s international dispersion of economic activities on an ongoing basis, given a myriad of broad environmental changes and changes in external competitive pressures. Our “decision dynamics” matrix provides a simple but effective managerial tool supporting MNE ownership status and location decisions, but the head office’s capability to make these decisions should not be overestimated.

We explicitly link internalization theory with the global factory paradigm and explore unresolved issues in the relevant literature. Internalization theory prescribes the optimal ownership status and location for each economic activity considered. The theory focuses on the bundling of firm-level resources and complementary ones held by external parties, for each fine-sliced economic activity. It also considers explicitly the nature of the linkages among these activities.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that sound, mainstream international business (IB) thinking should be applied when assessing the economic opportunities available to multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) markets.

We describe and evaluate critically the key points made in the BOP literature about the alleged attractiveness of BOP markets, and the alleged strengths of MNEs to penetrate these markets successfully. We revisit the managerial implications from the BOP literature using an internalization theory lens.

We demonstrate the weak conceptual grounding of conventional BOP thinking, which suggests that MNEs from developed economies should be very entrepreneurial and should systematically serve BOP markets with new products and business models. We also show the fallacy of the idea that a “success template” in one BOP market would be easily replicable in other BOP markets and would allow the MNE to earn economies of scale and scope.

IB researchers should start conducting serious studies on the attractiveness of BOP markets for MNEs. They should also analyze seriously the micro-foundations of successful knowledge recombination in BOP markets and the limits to the transferability of success templates. Mainstream IB theory, namely internalization theory, is particularly well equipped to analyze the costs and benefits of entering BOP markets, building upon a comparative institutional logic.

Senior MNE managers should not allow themselves to be blinded by BOP gurus, advocating the alleged great benefits of penetrating BOP markets. BOP markets may be especially challenging international expansion targets for MNEs because of large institutional voids, high uncertainty, high “distance” vis-à-vis the home country market and the difficulties of transferring relevant knowledge from one BOP market to another.

This chapter is the first to show that mainstream IB research can be usefully applied to analyze the “real” attractiveness of BOP markets for MNEs. Comparative institutional analysis is proven to provide substantially more insight to make BOP market penetration work than past guru-talk on BOP markets.

This paper aims to apply internalization theory in the context of economic efficiency-driven institutions interacting with societal institutions that pursue broader goals.

The analysis builds upon Buckley and Boddewyn’s (2015, this issue) recent work on the perceived need for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to supply public goods outside of their sphere of technical competences. This paper proposes a more restrictive approach: external markets will only be internalized if, on balance, the efficiency benefits of internalization outweigh its costs at the firm level, in line with orthodox internalization theory.

MNEs replacing the activities of failing (or even absent) public sector institutions is a business phenomenon commonly observed in less developed economies. However, positive distributional effects and societal externalities without the required efficiency benefits at the firm level are insufficient for MNEs’ supply to occur.

Managerial decisions in the internalization sphere will be guided by the transactional characteristics of the MNEs’ firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and the requisite complementary resources held by host country economic actors. Internalization theory thinking suggests applying various, specific principles to assess in a comparative institutional fashion whether “diversification” into supplying public goods will serve the MNEs’ efficiency goals, namely, the “cost of entry” test, the “better-off” test and the “value capture” test.

Internalization theory provides a solid, efficiency-driven rationale to guide MNE choices on which activities the firm will conduct internally. The nature of the MNEs FSAs and the most efficient, feasible option to bundle firm-level resources and locally held resources in host environments are critical to these choices.

We discuss Professor Jean-François Hennart’s key contributions to international strategic management theory, with a special focus on his integrative, 2009 Journal of International Business Studies article, ‘Down with MNE-centric theories! Market entry and expansion as the bundling of MNE and local assets’. In Hennart’s (2009) model, complementary assets co-determine the MNE’s initial entry mode choice and the subsequent evolution of the MNE foreign operations’ governance. Hennart (2009) describes this perspective on MNE governance as one based on asset bundling. We focus on the paper’s conceptual insights and discuss how Hennart’s model of foreign market entry informs managerial practice in the realm of international strategy.

The acronym and neologism “VUCA” is employed by management and some scholars to denote the unpredictability of the modern world and its impact on business. The VUCA approach suggests that a rational firm’s response should be to: protect against volatility by engineering-in redundancy and slack, gather information to reduce uncertainty, develop expertise to make complexity computable, and learn heuristically to reduce ambiguity. We combine a critical perspective on the VUCA approach with the global factory model, popularly used to describe the flexibility sought by advanced economy multinational enterprises (MNEs) within the global value chain. Both VUCA and the global factory would seem to account less well for the expansion of emerging multinational enterprise (EMNEs) abroad, particularly the preference for equity-based control and inflexibility when seeking strategic assets. Also, both approaches fail to incorporate behavioral principles toward risk. Using International Business theory, we propose a research agenda that may help to make VUCA more tractable, the global factory more useful, and the internationalization of EMNEs more comprehensible.

The Booz & Co./strategy+business Eminent Scholar in International Management is an annual award given by the International Management Division of the Academy of Management and Sponsored by Booz & Co./strategy+business.