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James Benson and Daniel O. O'Connor
Many librarians have hypothesized that psychological and sociological variables can be used to explain library use. This article examines the possibility of utilizing biological…
Abstract
Many librarians have hypothesized that psychological and sociological variables can be used to explain library use. This article examines the possibility of utilizing biological variables to explain library use.
Gaelynn P. Wolf Bordonaro, Laura Cherry and Jessica Stallings
The relationship between learning and mental health, as well as a growing body of literature, underscores the need for art therapy in educational settings. This is particularly…
Abstract
The relationship between learning and mental health, as well as a growing body of literature, underscores the need for art therapy in educational settings. This is particularly true for learners with special needs. Shostak et al. (1985) affirmed that “for children with special needs, art therapy in a school setting can offer opportunities to work through obstacles that impede educational success” (p. 19). School art therapy facilitates improved social interaction, increased learning behaviors, appropriate affective development, and increased empathy and personal well-being. It can be adapted to meet the specific developmental needs of individual students and to parallel students’ developmental, learning, and behavioral objectives. This chapter introduces the reader to the history and basic constructs of art therapy as a psychoeducational therapeutic intervention in schools. Model programs are identified, as well as the role of the art therapist within the context of K-12 education settings. Additionally, examples of special populations who benefit from art therapy intervention within school systems are provided, along with considerations for school-wide art therapy.
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Robert J. Antonio and Alessandro Bonanno
We address here how the U.S. neoliberal policy regime developed and how its reconstructed vision of modernization, which culminated, under the rubric of globalization, was…
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We address here how the U.S. neoliberal policy regime developed and how its reconstructed vision of modernization, which culminated, under the rubric of globalization, was neutralized by 9/11 and neoconservative geopolitics. We analyze the phases in the rise of neoliberalism, and provide a detailed map of its vision of global modernization at its high tide under Clinton. We also address how the Bush Doctrine's unilateral, preemptive polices and the consequent War on Terror and Iraq War eroded U.S. legitimacy as the globalization system's hegmon and shifted the discourse from globalization to empire. Cold War modernization theorists, neoliberal globalization advocates, and Bush doctrine neoconservatives all drew on an American exceptionalist tradition that portrays the U.S. as modernity's “lead society,” attaches universal significance to its values, policies, and institutions, and urges their worldwide diffusion. All three traditions ignore or diminish the importance of substantive equality and social justice. We suggest that consequent U.S. policy problems might be averted by recovery of a suppressed side of the American tradition that stresses social justice and holds that democracy must start at home and be spread by example rather than by exhortation or force. Overall, we explore the contradictory U.S. role in an emergent post-Cold War world.
Thomas M. Keck and Kevin J. McMahon
From one angle, abortion law appears to confirm the regime politics account of the Supreme Court; after all, the Reagan/Bush coalition succeeded in significantly curtailing the…
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From one angle, abortion law appears to confirm the regime politics account of the Supreme Court; after all, the Reagan/Bush coalition succeeded in significantly curtailing the constitutional protection of abortion rights. From another angle, however, it is puzzling that the Reagan/Bush Court repeatedly refused to overturn Roe v. Wade. We argue that time and again electoral considerations led Republican elites to back away from a forceful assertion of their agenda for constitutional change. As a result, the justices generally acted within the range of possibilities acceptable to the governing regime but still typically had multiple doctrinal options from which to choose.
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Despite its stated intention to be independent, impartial and thorough, the 9-11 Commission was none of the three. The Commission was structurally compromised by bias-inducing…
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Despite its stated intention to be independent, impartial and thorough, the 9-11 Commission was none of the three. The Commission was structurally compromised by bias-inducing connections to subjects of the investigation, and procedurally compromised, among other reasons, by (1) its failure to take up promising lines of inquiry and its failure to try to force the release of key documents that were closely guarded by the Bush administration, the FBI and various intelligence agencies; (2) its distortion of information about pre-9-11 military preparedness, foreknowledge of the attacks or attacks of like-kind; and (3) omissions of information related to the funding of the plot and the specific whereabouts of key officials on the morning of September 11, 2001.
These structural compromises and procedural failings converged to assure that the Commission would not challenge core elements of the “official story” of the 9-11 attacks. This failure was compounded by the Commission's desire to produce a final report that would read as a “historical narrative” rather than as an exhaustive set of findings on the critical unanswered questions that arose after the attacks. The Commission's unquestioning acceptance of the official narrative also meant that it missed a perhaps larger opportunity to challenge key myths associated with American exceptionalism. Thus, the 9-11 Commission ultimately functioned as an instrument of cultural hegemony, extending and deepening the official version of events under the guise of independence and impartiality.
Yellen is widely regarded as a ‘safe pair of hands’; Biden’s other choices for financial regulatory roles are unlikely to infringe the priorities of Democratic donors, including…
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DOI: 10.1108/OXAN-DB258930
ISSN: 2633-304X
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Vance Lesseig and Janet D. Payne
The capital asset pricing model has fundamentally changed the way finance is taught and practiced since its development in 1964. However, one problem with the use of the model is…
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Purpose
The capital asset pricing model has fundamentally changed the way finance is taught and practiced since its development in 1964. However, one problem with the use of the model is estimating the systematic risk of untraded assets. Academics and practitioners have dealt with the problem by using traded assets as “proxies” for the untraded asset. Some academic research has attempted to measure the validity of this technique using the average difference in the true beta of a traded firm and the “proxy” beta using a sample of similar firms. The paper aims to discuss these issues.
Design/methodology/approach
However, the use of the average difference across a number of comparisons is not necessarily useful to a practitioner. This paper examines the absolute difference between a firm’s unlevered beta and a proxy beta calculated using the formula given in Hamada, 1972, and the pure play method.
Findings
The authors find that the estimates are not reliably close to the true value. Using both deciles of relevant variables and a matching method similar to that used by practitioners, the authors examine a variety of different characteristics to identify similar firms.
Originality/value
However, the authors do not find any matching criteria that improves the absolute error of the estimate to a level, the authors believe would be acceptable to practitioners attempting to measure cost of equity capital for their untraded firm or asset. The authors conclude that managers should use pure play estimates of asset beta with caution. More research should be done in order to identify a better way for managers of untraded firms or assets to proxy their systematic risk.
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The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and…
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The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.