The first part of this feature examined the story behind the revival in the fortunes of the Co‐operative movement during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Part 2 goes on to look at…
Abstract
The first part of this feature examined the story behind the revival in the fortunes of the Co‐operative movement during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Part 2 goes on to look at the future prospects for the movement, and to make some observations concerning the autonomous tendency of individual societies when matched against the benefits offered by planning on a national scale.
The imminent demise of the Co‐operative movement has been frequently predicted. Critics point to its failure to hold its market share; Co‐ops took 20% of the food trade in the…
Abstract
The imminent demise of the Co‐operative movement has been frequently predicted. Critics point to its failure to hold its market share; Co‐ops took 20% of the food trade in the 1950s, but this had fallen to 11% by the early 1970s. But in recent years the Co‐op has reformed itself. This article considers how and why the Co‐operative movement managed to reverse its fortunes in the late 1960s and early 1970s; this helps to throw light on the process of change within retailing and the problems that occur when a retailer like the Co‐op stands aloof from the rest of the retail market. Part 2 of this feature, on future prospects for the movement, will be published in a forthcoming issue.
Keri Davies, Colin Gilligan and Clive Sutton
The structure of the UK food manufacturing industry is highly fragmented and consists of some 5,000 firms. Of these, however, the ten largest companies are estimated to account…
Abstract
The structure of the UK food manufacturing industry is highly fragmented and consists of some 5,000 firms. Of these, however, the ten largest companies are estimated to account for one‐third of all sales. The importance of the 100 largest private sector firms has traditionally been relatively high within the industry and in 1975, for example, they produced 55 per cent of the food sector's net output, compared with the 40 per cent provided by a similar sample in the total manufacturing sector. Similarly, evidence from both Ashby and Mordue demonstrates that during the 1970s the average size of food manufacturers/processors overtook that of manufacturers as a whole in terms of numbers employed. By the same measure, businesses with more than one hundred employees continued to expand at a faster rate in food than the average for all manufacturers, so that the mean employment size of these larger food enterprises in the late 1970s was more than one‐third greater than in all manufacturing. Smaller establishments, by contrast, are relatively under‐represented in the UK food, drink and tobacco sector, both in comparison with the average for all manufacturers and internationally.
Shows that electronic data interchange (EDI) is often difficult tocost‐justify. Co‐operation between retailers and suppliers is oftendifficult to achieve. The variety of…
Abstract
Shows that electronic data interchange (EDI) is often difficult to cost‐justify. Co‐operation between retailers and suppliers is often difficult to achieve. The variety of communication channels available forces manufacturers to maintain a mix of systems, so increasing costs and making the co‐ordination of EDI data time consuming. Anticipated savings in administration costs are rarely achieved. EDI may not provide competitive advantage but it may prevent competitive disadvantage.
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The retail trades are an important employer of labour in Britain. The Retail Inquiry of 1982 found that there were 2.202 million people engaged in the retail trades (British…
Abstract
The retail trades are an important employer of labour in Britain. The Retail Inquiry of 1982 found that there were 2.202 million people engaged in the retail trades (British Business, 1983). This figure includes self‐employed and casual workers. The 1981 Census of Employment recorded that retailing (1968 S.I.C.) had 1.863 million employees in employment, i.e. 8.8 per cent of the British employees in employment total. On revision to the 1980 S.I.C., the figures became 2.049 million and 9.7 per cent of the total in employment. The Census of Employment excludes the self‐employed. The present economic recession has severely contracted employment, and especially manufacturing employment (see, for example, Townsend, 1983). Little is known, however, about the impact of the recession on the retail trades, despite their importance as a source of employment.
Investigates employment in the distributive trades — considering it is the second largest order in the UK Standard Industrial Classification of 1968. Says that June 1980…
Abstract
Investigates employment in the distributive trades — considering it is the second largest order in the UK Standard Industrial Classification of 1968. Says that June 1980 employment totalled 2.7 million workers, but that the retail trades — largest sub‐division of the distributive trades ‐ employed 1.87 million people in the UK. Recognizes that since the mid‐1950s there has been a rapid increase in the female labour force and also in part‐time working. Analyses both trends, focusing on impact and importance in UK retailing, examining the importance of female part‐time labour in the spread of superstore retailing. Discusses recent trends in the UK labour force using much information from results over time, and the role of part‐time labour in retailing — looking also at UK superstore development. Finally, looks at survey results presenting these in tabular format. Examines the impact of ‘new technology’ in the UK and how it will affect workers. Concludes by stating this aspect of retail development is long overdue a reasoned appraisal.
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Balkrushna Potdar, John Guthrie, Juergen Gnoth and Tony Garry
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly considered a central tenant of marketing strategy and a source of competitive advantage within the retail sector. As such, it…
Abstract
Purpose
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly considered a central tenant of marketing strategy and a source of competitive advantage within the retail sector. As such, it may affect a supermarket’s customer, employee, and other stakeholder attitudes and behaviours. This research explores how a supermarket’s involvement in CSR activities may influence employee engagement and how this may manifest itself in positive employee behaviours. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the role of CSR and its impact on employee engagement and consequently, employee propensity to exhibit intervention behaviours to prevent in-store retail crime.
Design/methodology/approach
This research uses a phenomenological approach through semi-structured in-depth interviews with shop-floor employees of a national supermarket chain.
Findings
Findings suggest that external and internal CSR practices of supermarkets are important in shaping organisational engagement behaviours among employees. Additionally, heightened employee engagement may have a significant impact on employee propensity to engage in shoplifting prevention behaviours. A conceptual model is developed based on these findings.
Practical implications
Retail managers should fully communicate CSR practices to employees to increase employee engagement and consequential shoplifting intervention prevention behaviours.
Originality/value
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First and from a theoretical perspective, it offers both a conceptual foundation and empirical-based evaluation of CSR and its impact on employee engagement and specifically, shoplifting prevention behaviours. Second and from a pragmatic perspective, the conceptual model derived from this research may aid retailers in developing and communicating CSR strategies that engage employees and consequently lead to shoplifting prevention behaviours.
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A self‐report questionnaire was used to discover key shrinkage, theft and loss prevention data from 476 major European retailers (23 per cent of West Europe's retail turnover) in…
Abstract
A self‐report questionnaire was used to discover key shrinkage, theft and loss prevention data from 476 major European retailers (23 per cent of West Europe's retail turnover) in 16 countries for the financial year 2001‐2002. The response rate was 33 per cent. Shrinkage rates were found to vary considerably between countries with a weighted average of 1.45 per cent (1.42 per cent in 2000/2001), equivalent to €30,310 million (or $27,582 million). A total of 18.3 per cent of shrinkage was perceived to be caused by “internal error” rather than crime and this estimate is deducted from shrinkage to derive the crime figure. Retail crime cost retailers €30,407 million ($27,670 million). In contrast to US data, customer theft was seen as the most important crime cost, followed by employee theft, security costs and supplier theft. Stores apprehended more than 1.2 million thieves in 2001/2002, but passed only 25.7 per cent to the police.
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Considers EDI for retailers in the context of innovation theory. A casestudy of nine retailers who adopted EDI during 1987‐92 is used todiscuss the reasons why EDI was delayed…
Abstract
Considers EDI for retailers in the context of innovation theory. A case study of nine retailers who adopted EDI during 1987‐92 is used to discuss the reasons why EDI was delayed until 1986‐93 even though it was technically possible in the early 1980s. Argues that an innovation will not join the portfolio of “possibles” until three issues are resolved. These are: innovation “poles” to disseminate EDI knowhow; cost and performance improvements to the technology; and management learning, based (in this case) on learning developed from handling EPoS. Also considers the decision‐making process underlying EDI.
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Considers EDI for retailers in the context of innovation theory. A casestudy of nine retailers who adopted EDI during 1987‐92 is used todiscuss the reasons why EDI was delayed…
Abstract
Considers EDI for retailers in the context of innovation theory. A case study of nine retailers who adopted EDI during 1987‐92 is used to discuss the reasons why EDI was delayed until 1986‐93 even though it was technically possible in the early 1980s. Argues that an innovation will not join the portfolio of “possibles” until three issues are resolved. These are (1) innovation “poles” to disseminate EDI know‐how, (2) cost and performance improvements to the technology, and (3) management learning, based (in this case) on learning developed from handling EPoS. Also considers the decision‐making process underlying EDI.