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A study of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states’ (AMS) norm entrepreneurial practices regarding the energy transition to reveal insights into its current and future governance.

Understanding why the notion of an energy transition has garnered support, and importantly, knowing what this means for the future requires reviewing the forces of norm entrepreneurship at play. By adopting a constructivist lens, this article undertakes a comparative analysis of the “modes of transmission” of the energy transition amongst AMS.

ASEAN nations have in many respects been at the vanguard of the energy transition. Yet the governments themselves demonstrate both norm entrepreneurial and antipreneurial characteristics. Notwithstanding this mix, there are extant opportunities for “intraconnection” – in the form of cooperation between AMS and “interconnection” – in the form of cooperation between AMS and other state and non-state actors.

This article underscores the importance of partnerships in the energy transition: both in enabling AMS to meet their respective nationally determined contributions (NDCs) but also crucially in catalysing action amongst a broader swathe of countries.

Applying the lens of norm entrepreneurship to the ASEAN context, including introducing novel conceptions of “conductive” practices that drive the energy transition and “resistive” practices that slow it down.

The Group of 20 (G20) is tasked with responding to economic shocks in the global financial system, with COVID-19 having proved to be the most significant shock since the G20's inception. COVID-19 also represents the first economic crisis accompanied by a concerted attempt to “build back better”, principally through a climate-compatible recovery. In 2021, there is little clarity as to the G20's response to this challenge, primarily due to considerable divergence in the green stimulus practices of its member states. The paper aims to investigate whether the G20, climate change and COVID-19 are critical juncture or critical wound.

Historical institutionalism (HI) suggests that one can explain an institution's future response by reference to its developmental pathway to date. This contribution adopts its concept of “critical junctures” to shed light on the G20's possible institutional response to COVID-19. The contribution undertakes a comparative analysis of the global financial crisis (GFC) and COVID-19 as possible critical junctures for the G20.

In doing so, the work demonstrates that the G20 “building back better” from COVID-19 requires a shift away from its institutional orthodoxy to a much larger degree than its response to the GFC. Accordingly, whilst both the GFC and COVID-19 may be considered critical junctures for the G20, only COVID-19 has the potential to be a “critical wound” that leads to institutional redundancy.

Through interrogating this further, this exposition prospectively outlines two possible futures the G20 faces as a consequence of COVID-19: reform or redundancy. In this way, it offers an ex ante perspective on policy-reform options for the G20's ongoing response to COVID-19.

Whichever choice the G20 makes in its response to COVID-19 has profound consequences for global governance in an increasingly unpredictable world.

Herein lies the importance of an exploratory assessment of COVID-19 as a critical juncture or a critical wound for the G20.